THE MORAL ASPECT OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR: FOUNDATION AND CURRICULUM

A PsyD Clinical Dissertation

Presented to the Faculty of the

California School of Professional Psychology

Alliant International University

Irvine

In Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirement for the Degree

Doctor of Psychology

by

Donald B. Ford

2008

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

Darryl Freeland, PhD

Abstract of Dissertation

THE MORAL ASPECT OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR:

FOUNDATION AND CURRICULUM

by

Donald B. Ford, PsyD

Alliant International University

Committee Chairperson: Darryl Freeland, PhD

A quest for balance between scientific and moral concerns has characterized the history of psychology in America. Such a balance is unlikely, absent a clear identification of those concerns. Scientific concerns have been carefully addressed, but moral concerns have been underrepresented. Moreover, the field of moral psychology is unhelpfully fragmented. A comprehensive account of the moral aspect of behavior is needed to identify the form, application, and curriculum of a *morally balanced psychology*. The current body of psychological knowledge contains the necessary data. Prior organizational efforts may have been constrained by a developmental perspective. An evolving tradition within American psychology points to a more powerful solution.

An integrative, pragmatic approach and multimodal epistemology were applied to an extensive literature review. Basic categories and concepts were identified for navigating and making sense of what can be a bewildering landscape. Input was gathered from neuroscience, genetics, endocrinology, ethology, evolutionary biology, social sciences, and the humanities. A scheme for organizing the moral aspect of behavior was presented in five dimensions: *animal nature*, *human nature*, *personal nature*, *social nature*, and *conduct*. *Animal nature* was

elaborated to illustrate the scheme's explanatory potential. Three conclusions are supported: (a) There is a moral reality, (b) there is a natural orderliness to the moral aspect of behavior, and (c) there is an evolving moral tradition in American psychology from which a morally balanced psychology may be emerging. A morally balanced psychology recognizes the centrality of moral concerns independent of any religious connection; it engages the person as a moral agent and acknowledges its own moral agency; it is interested in all the properties and problems of morality; and it views *moral care* as the third pillar of mental health treatment, along with psychotherapy and psychopharmacology.

A century of "value neutrality" has rendered psychology morally inarticulate and the clinician unprepared for the moral reality in the therapy session. An articulate knowledge of the moral aspect is both a practical advantage and an ethical obligation for mental health professionals, researchers and practitioners alike. A comprehensive moral component belongs in the core curriculum of a psychology education program.

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Director, Clinical PsyD Program

DEDICATION

In grateful memory of

Ida Mazer Ford

for her gift of moral care

and

George Robert Ford

who loved to build and explore

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I came to this project somewhat late in life, with little more than a nagging suspicion, an intuition, a fact, and a desire. The suspicion was that something fundamental was missing from much of the psychological knowledge that I encountered. The intuition was that some of what passed for "I can't" in the therapy session really meant "I won't." The fact was that, in all my psychology training, no course addressed the moral aspect of behavior. The desire was to know what, if anything, psychology had to say about morality and to satisfy an old curiosity about human good and evil. So, I wrote to learn. I set out on an unmapped path, with no idea where it might lead. Some of what turned up was wholly unexpected; none of it was boring. In all, I gained a new appreciation for those who have struggled to know the moral reality, and I have tried faithfully to identify the names of those living and dead whose ideas and words appear in this work.

I am deeply grateful to Dr. Darryl Freeland, dissertation chair, for his careful and critical re-readings of this work as it slowly came into focus and for reminding me to let the authors speak for themselves. I also thank committee members Dr. Casey Dorman and Dr. Matt McCann for their efforts, insights, and suggestions.

This work could not have proceeded without the loving support of my wife, Myra, who not only unselfishly and cheerfully endured a long and unexpected intrusion on our lives, but whose gift of moral clarity and care are very much a part of this work.

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Chapter I
INTRODUCTION

Louisa lived with her husband and three children in a small town on the outskirts of Amsterdam. In 1940 the couple began covertly to shelter fugitives—adults and children—in their Christian home. They continued this uncommon activity until the war ended, knowing that discovery would mean the immediate execution of their entire family. In her written account of the experience, Louisa found it difficult to articulate the reasons for her decision, although her actions had been plain enough:

> We saw a big car in front and knew it was the Germans. It was a big official Ford. Everyone ran out the back door and into the tunnel and disappeared with my husband. But our children and the Jewish children were taking a nap upstairs. I knew we could not all run. I stayed because I was the last one anyway. I picked up the papers [files on people in hiding] and put them in the sweater that my nine-year-old son was wearing. I said to him—a terrible thing to say—"Try to get out of here quietly and disappear with the papers." He said yes. (Oliner & Oliner, 1988, pp. 217-218)

Several moral understandings are embedded in this Dutch rescuer's story. The reader can keep one in mind, the better to appreciate the significance of this or any study that speaks to the human inclinations for good and for evil: Depravity is never far off, and goodness is not inevitable.

Background of the Problem

The overall development of psychology in America can be viewed as an ongoing, if uneven quest for balance between scientific and moral concerns. In this

study, a *morally balanced psychology* is conceived as one that preserves the wholeness and humanity of the person, the confirmatory processes of science, and the gravity of the moral. This work anticipates that such a psychology is now possible, given the substantial, if fragmented, body of psychological knowledge pertaining to the moral aspect of behavior. It further anticipates that a comprehensive, psychological account of the moral aspect based on the now sufficient body of knowledge will define a morally balanced psychology and reveal its rationale and curriculum. Finally, this work anticipates that a comprehensive look at the moral aspect will find the following propositions well supported: (a) A psychology that addresses human realities cannot possibly be value free and the psychologist is, in fact, a moral agent; (b) *moral care* is one of the three pillars of mental health treatment, along with psychotherapy and psychopharmacology; (c) psychology is the discipline best suited for a comprehensive account of the moral aspect; and (d) a well-rounded moral component belongs in the core curriculum of a psychology education program.

The notion that an otherwise impersonal, scientific psychology might develop strategies to address personal, moral concerns is neither radical nor new. It seems to be a curiously unremembered fact that most of psychology's founders in Europe and America were motivated by moral concerns and immersed in moral tradition (Evans, 1984; Fay, 1939; Leahey, 2004; Leary, 1980). Even as he fitted psychology to the framework of positivism, William James (1902/1994) speculated on the future evolution of scientific understanding based on a deep perception of "how events happen, and how work is actually done" (p. 545):

> The divorce between scientist facts and religious facts may not necessarily be as eternal as it at first sight seems, nor the personalism and romanticism of the world, as they appeared to primitive thinking, be matters so

> irrevocably outgrown. The final human opinion may, in short, in some manner now impossible to foresee, revert to the more personal style, just as any path of progress may follow a spiral rather than a straight line. If this were so, the rigorously impersonal view of science might one day appear as having been a temporarily useful eccentricity rather than the definitively triumphant position which the sectarian scientist at present so confidently announces it to be. (p. 545n)

But any reversion to moral concerns has come slowly to modern psychology, where the formal scientific good has long taken precedence over the personal, human good. Bevan (1991/1995) lamented a myopic preoccupation with data-level knowledge and a parallel disinterest in general ideas that continued to dominate the field 100 years after William James. More recently, R. B. Miller (2004) remarked on what the rigid methodological, theoretical, and educational posture systematically taken by psychology has meant for the student and new practitioner:

> The instruction from scientific psychology to the novitiate to discard all of one's commonsense prescientific understanding of psychological problems . . . is offered with the implicit promise that doing so will produce better answers to the original problems that brought the student to psychology. (p. 8)

Miller argued that, due to a disconnect between psychology department curricula and clinical realities, the "better answers" have not been forthcoming. As a remedy, he advocated a revision of the curriculum for training psychologists and a re-envisioning of the moral purpose that informed the thought of an earlier age.

The attitude of mainstream psychology has remained cool to such critiques and suggestions. Mowrer (1967), editor of *Morality and Mental Health,* recalled,

> When I wrote a world-famous clinical psychologist for permission to include one of his recent papers in this collection . . . his response was: "No, I would not permit any work of mine to appear in a book with *morality* in the title." (pp. vii-viii)

Perhaps *cool* is too cool a term to describe the mood in some circles:

> I am presenting a psychoanalytic theory of moral experience which sees morality as a force antagonistic to life and to love, a force causing illness and death—neurosis and psychosis, homicide and suicide. I see morality as a necessary but immature stage of affective and cognitive development, so that fixation at the moral stage represents developmental retardation, or immaturity, and regression to it represents psychopathology, or neurosis. (Gilligan, 1976, p. 145)

This work recognizes that such hostile (and unwittingly moralistic) attitudes—and they persist to this day—can be grounded in genuinely felt and valid concerns about human well-being. But, as D. T. Campbell (1975) pointed out, such attitudes can also reflect other, less flattering human motives at work in professional, as well as public, spheres:

> From my theory, individuals should be overeager for liberation from the oppressive yoke of moral culture, more eager than is good for society as a whole . . . , [and psychology] may recruit scholars overeager to adopt a demeaning, mechanistic, reductionistic view of human nature. (p. 1121)

D. T. Campbell (1975) found in psychology an unjustified antagonism, an "epistemic arrogance" with regard to moral traditions. Disclosing his own physicalistic, neo-Darwinian world view, he wrote:

> I would recommend that as an initial approach we assume an underlying wisdom in the recipes for living which tradition has supplied us with. I also recommend that we use this perspective to edit our teaching materials in those areas where they conflict with traditional dogmas, removing any arrogant scientistic certainty that psychology's current beliefs are the final truth on these matters, emphasizing our need for modesty on topics on which we can do no experiments . . . and expressing a scientifically grounded respect for the wisdom that well-winnowed traditions may contain about how life should be lived. (pp. 1120-1121)

The reluctant attitude among psychologists with regard to moral matters might also be understood in terms of historical and professional trends. Leary (1980) hypothesized a pervasive pessimism at the turn of the century that may have contributed to psychologists' retreat from a "socially relevant psychology" (p. 294) to a "safer" science narrowly focused on the collection of value-free, empirical facts. Leary added,

> This new businesslike matter-of-factness, and all the talk about "value-free science" and "operational methodology" which came to typify the late 1920s and 1930s . . . and which has filled the methodological chapters of our textbooks ever since, was a direct expression of an upsurge of concern about the scientific status of the human sciences. (p. 295)

The outcome was an explosion within psychology of technical data and institutional organization—and a corresponding dramatic decline in the expression of moral concerns per se.

Despite the confluence of unfavorable attitudes and trends, moral concerns were not extinguished. Leary (1980) suggested that a professional "norm of silence about personal values and concerns" (p. 302) may simply have muted the moral *expression* of many American psychologists. But even in the face of conforming pressures within the psychological community, there were always those who openly declared an interest in moral purpose. For example, beginning with his dissertation in 1958, a developmental psychologist opened a channel for the hitherto marginalized study of morality in the name of *justice* and "the rational good" (Kohlberg, 1981, p. 29). A methodologist advised epistemic modesty and respect for moral traditions in the name of what is "good for society as a whole" (Campbell, D. T., 1975, p. 1121). A behaviorist critiqued the amoral conceptual foundations of economics, evolutionary biology, and behavior theory, aiming to facilitate a return to moral freedom or "the freedom to do what is good" (Schwartz, B., 1986, p. 22). Richardson, Fowers, and Guignon (1999) brought their shared backgrounds in philosophy to bear in a review of assumptions underlying recent psychological theory and practice, asking, "To what degree does twentieth-century psychotherapy represent a significant contribution to human welfare and the struggle for a good society?" (p. 4). A social and cultural psychologist has advocated the strengthening of positive moral emotions for "the common good"

(Haidt, 2003, p. 286). A clinical psychologist has made the case for a morally engaged psychology based on common sense, everyday experience, and the uncomplicated perception that *doing good* is somehow central to clinical work (Miller, 2004). The private holdings and public expressions of moral purpose and involvement have informed a warm undercurrent of mainstream psychology.

The open return to moral concerns effectively began with the acceptance of Kohlberg's work in moral development as a legitimate field of study (Rest, 1974). Lines of research grew and diversified within that field and overviews began to appear (Kurtines & Gewirtz, 1984, 1991; Lapsley, 1996; Lickona, 1976). Kurtines and Gewirtz (1995) announced that the field of moral development had "come of age . . . enough to require its own introductory textbook" (p. v). Their textbook brought together a number of contributors and provided a systematic account of developmental themes, perspectives, and theories. But (perhaps with the exception of Lickona's collection) these overviews paid little or no attention to relevant contributions from fields outside the cognitive-developmental sphere, such as existential, biological, neurological, evolutionary, and clinical psychologies, or to personal, morally relevant topics such as religion, values, human nature, and the problem of good and evil. *It now appears that, insofar as research on morality is viewed through the lens of developmental psychology, only a partial account of the moral aspect is possible.*

This study will show that, for well over half a century, observations indispensable to a full account of the moral aspect have been quietly—not always intentionally—supplied by psychologists working in virtually all fields of the discipline, viewing moral matters through many different lenses. Moreover, relevant data have flowed from neighboring disciplines such as neuroscience,

genetics, endocrinology, and evolutionary biology; from refinements in methodological and epistemological thought; from the social sciences and humanities; and from the instrumentation and media of an increasingly technologically organized social environment. By all accounts, the flow has been accelerating and the data base has been growing. It appears that a critical mass has been reached. It is time for an integrative, interpretive assembly of this fragmented field and a rebalancing of moral and scientific concerns.

To be sure, an *exhaustive* account of the moral aspect of behavior is impractical and theoretically implausible, nor is one necessary for the formulation of a morally balanced psychology. But a *comprehensive* account of the moral aspect seems both plausible and necessary: plausible insofar as the lion's share of details and content areas of the moral aspect are now there to be unpacked in the body of psychological literature; necessary because, in order to balance a scientific psychology with moral concerns, one must first identify what those concerns are. A comprehensive, psychological account of the moral aspect of behavior would reasonably be expected to describe in some systematic way the full range of moral concerns and their related fields and subdisciplines and to identify the salient properties and problems of the moral aspect. Such an account would require an interpretive categorical scheme for the organization of components. At present, no such scheme or account of the moral aspect of behavior appears to exist.

Statement of the Problem

A quest for balance between scientific and moral concerns has characterized the history of psychology in America. Such a balance is unlikely to be found absent a hearty airing of those concerns. Scientific concerns have been addressed for many

decades but moral concerns have been underrepresented. Moreover, the field of moral psychology is unhelpfully (not hopelessly) fragmented. A comprehensive psychological account of the moral aspect of behavior is needed in order to identify the form, content, and curriculum of a morally balanced psychology.

Purpose of the Study

The threefold purpose of this work is (a) to delineate, in accessible language, the nature and problems of the moral aspect of human behavior; (b) to present a handy interpretive scheme for the organization of the components of the moral aspect; and (c) to advance a morally balanced psychology and its curriculum with a rationale and a comprehensive look at the moral aspect of behavior.

Method and Overview

It is proposed in this chapter that the current body of psychological knowledge contains the data for a comprehensive account of the moral aspect of behavior and that the data currently await an interpretive assembly. Locating, organizing, and interpreting the data will require a critical review of the relevant literature, the purpose of chapters II through IV.

Chapter II introduces the historical background as it unfolds against the backdrop of an ongoing search for balance between scientific and moral concerns. Implicit in this backdrop is the research question, *How have psychologists generally viewed and handled moral matters?* Chapter II addresses this question through the first two of four key observations made in the course of the review: the first regarding the current extent and organizational state of the literature in the field of moral psychology and the second regarding the approaches and theoretical

positions taken by authors. The chapter highlights *basic categories* of the moral aspect of behavior and is designed for several tasks: (a) to orient the reader generally to the range of topics, properties, and problems in the field of moral psychology; (b) to introduce some basic categories for navigating and making sense of what can be a bewildering landscape; (c) to provide the criteria by which the reader may identify an author's often-unstated assumptions about morality; and (d) to illuminate the historical problem of the psychology-morality relationship. Section and chapter summaries are provided.

Chapter III continues and completes the historical background, with emphasis on the *basic nature* of morality, its challenges for psychologists, and its effects on the person. The chapter addresses the third and fourth of the four key observations regarding two qualities that warrant the distinct moral category conduct in a science of human behavior: the *enduring moral presence* and the *intrusive moral demand.* The chapter (a) introduces the moral presence and the problem of the moral ground; (b) sketches the development of the moral forms and traditions, including an American moral tradition; (c) examines how psychologists' solutions to the problem of the moral ground have revealed and concealed the moral presence; and (d) introduces *moral intrusion* and its nature, agents, and effects. The chapter ends with a summary and a restatement of the problem and purpose of the study.

Drawing on the literature review, chapter IV presents a scheme for the organization of the moral aspect of behavior in five dimensions. Rationales for the five category dimensions are followed by the presentation of dimensions: (a) *animal nature*, containing the biological and behavioral features that humans share with animals and that are associated with the moral aspect; (b) *human nature*,

containing factors related to the human condition and the unique attribute of moral agency; (c) *personal nature*, containing factors related to the person's unique psychological processes and experiential history; (d) *social nature*, containing factors related to interpersonal relationships, group behavior, and the processes and products of socialization; and (e) *conduct*, containing factors associated with the nature and forms of moral action. In a special section, the dimension *animal nature* is presented in some full detail to illustrate the explanatory potential of the scheme and to show how a comprehensive account can be achieved.

Chapter V briefly discusses three major findings of the study: (a) the moral reality, (b) the natural orderliness of the moral aspect of behavior, and (c) the evolving moral tradition in American psychology. A morally balanced psychology and moral care are briefly discussed as emergent themes of the present moral tradition. The limits and innovations of the present work are noted, followed by some suggestions for future study and application of a morally balanced psychology. A few short remarks conclude the work.

Definitions of Terms and Concepts

As a self-styled "epistemopathectomist," Sigmund Koch (1981/1992b) found flaws in certain widespread psychological practices intended to remedy the problem of ambiguous, untestable "nonsense." For one, Koch showed that, in general, the use of increasingly technical terms for dealing with human subjects yields increasingly meaningless language and that critical features of the human condition can "be degraded, distorted, or obliterated in their technical conceptualizations" (p. 95). Elsewhere, Koch (1959/1999f) took to task the

"sacrosanct" doctrine and practice of *operationism* for "arbitrarily limiting the subject matter of our discipline" (p. 153).

> To insist on fixing the definition of a term by reduction, via a standard linkage relation to some tightly restricted observation base . . . would be to sacrifice the possibility of precise or subtle communication. Far worse, it would eliminate much meaning and knowledge from the universe. (p. 158)

Koch insisted that there can be no guarantee against nonsense and that "to promulgate the myth that nonsense can be averted *in principle* is only to augment its supply" (p. 159). Koch offered that "any definition is at bottom an attempt to guide the addressee toward making a relevant perceptual discrimination" (p. 162), the success of which always entails "an element of luck" (p. 164). Definitions of six concepts central to this study are here offered for the purpose of perceptual guidance: *agency, conduct, evil, good, moral aspect of behavior,* and *moralization.*

Agency

Psychologists have addressed the concept of agency by a variety of names, highlighting various salient features. James (1890/1950) emphasized the *mental effort* of *selective attention.* Murray (1938) counted *autonomy* among the "psychogenic needs" and defined it as a sort of *free won't* attitude that wants to "resist influence or coercion . . . defy an authority . . . seek freedom . . . strive for independence" (p. 82). Writing on *self-determination* and based on his personal experience in four Nazi death camps, Frankl (1959/1992) saw something in man's agentic capacity that is irrevocable, not determined by environmental conditions, nor is it predictable (pp. 132-134).

> There is nothing conceivable which would so condition a man as to leave him without the slightest freedom. Therefore, a residue of freedom, however limited it may be, is left to man in neurotic and even psychotic cases.

> Indeed, the innermost core of the patient's personality is not even touched by a psychosis. (pp. 134-135)

May (1969) evoked the dimension of intent, defining *will* as "the capacity to organize one's self so that movement in a certain direction or toward a certain goal may take place" (p. 218). Rychlak's (1979) definition of *free will* seems to embrace its own intended limitations: "We are free organisms to the extent that we can rearrange the grounds for the sake of which we are determined" (p. 278). Harré, Clarke, and DeCarlo (1985) referred to *decisions* and *plans* that are the special property of "a real actor [who] could have done otherwise" (p. 10). J. M. Schwartz (1999) successfully utilized his patients' *volition* in the treatment of obsessive-compulsive disorder. Bandura (2001) concluded, "The capacity to exercise some measure of control over the nature and quality of one's life is the essence of humanness" (p. 12). Dictionary definitions support a significant overlap among these perceptual guides, as illustrated in this distillation of their salient features gathered from R. J. Campbell (1989) and Corsini (1999): (a) having a capacity to make choices and decisions regarding a course of action, (b) having the quality of and tendency toward the internal control of personal behavior, (c) not ruled or compelled by outside influences or cause-effect processes, and (d) strongly associated with responsibility.

In this study, *agency* refers specifically to the *moral* agency of the person. It shares the above four features and is related in meaning to the *mental effort, selective attention, autonomy, defiance, striving, self-determination, freedom, will, free will, intentionality, decisionality, choice, volition, self-control,* and *responsibility*, as described by the above authors. More easily experienced than defined, agency is that uniquely human power, the awareness of which arouses delight and terror and the examination of which yields mystery and ambiguity—

inexplicable but familiar, independent but embodied, irreducible but complex, sovereign but influenced, uncaused but determined, unpredictable but consistent.

Conduct

Conduct is defined as a type of behavior that involves the total individual, usually implies forethought or self-awareness, is generally expressed both in psychological and physical activity, and relates to a set of behavioral standards or social norms (Campbell, R. J., 1989; Corsini, 1999; VandenBos, 2007). Blasi (1980) emphasized the actional nature of conduct: "Few would disagree that morality ultimately lies in action and that the study of moral development should use action as the final criterion" (p. 1). Similarly, following the 20th-century philosopher Emmanuel Levinas, Vandenberg (1999) distinguished conduct as specifically moral action:

> The use of the term "behavior" . . . is an effort to explain human action in factual terms, free from contaminating "oughts." But ethics as first philosophy suggests that human action is ethically weighted, more appropriately considered as "conduct" than "behavior." Shifting from behavior to conduct not only acknowledges the ethics of human action, but also exposes the ethical implications of investigators' categories, attributions and distinctions. (p. 42)

This study builds on the above views of *conduct* conceived as a subset of moral behavior. But, whereas moral behavior includes the mental and emotional *processes* of a moral agent with respect to a moral situation (construal, deliberation, reasoning, guilt, etc.), *conduct* refers to *agentic action that affects one or more others and entails some standard of good and bad.* In this regard, conduct will include acts of omission. In Sherrington's words, "To refrain from an act is no less an act than to commit one" (as cited in Schwartz, J. M., 2002, p. 307).

Evil

The usage of this term has been problematic for psychologists. VandenBos (2007) and R. J. Campbell (1989) offered no definition. Corsini (1999) defined *evil* as morally reprehensible, adding that the term belongs to philosophy or theology. Hadfield (1923/1964) contrasted the religious personification of evil as external *object* with a psychological view of evil as internal process, simply the perversion of otherwise good primary instincts: "a positive force . . . the misdirection of forces in themselves valuable" (p. 177). But the 20th-century mass exterminations of humans by humans appear to have helped to shift the focus from metaphysics and processes to moral agents: "Evil . . . must be traced to its origins in individuals, and so the search for understanding turns ultimately from the situation to the person" (Lickona, 1976, p. 23). More precisely, the focus has turned to the *effects* of evil*doing*. Hallie (1997) grasped psychology's problem in its inadvertent and tragic impoverishment of evil, eased by a subtle ignoring of its victims:

> What they do not see is the intimate linkage between the moral agents of evil and the sufferings and deaths those moral agents willingly perpetrate. They do not see that these sufferings and deaths have everything to do with evil. (p. 99)

Staub (1989) named the effects that make an evil action "morally reprehensible":

> The essence of evil is the destruction of human beings . . . not only killing but the creation of conditions that materially or psychologically destroy or diminish people's dignity, happiness, and capacity to fulfill basic material needs. (p. 25)

Baumeister (1996) focused on *deliberate* evildoing, "actions that intentionally harm other people" (p. 8). To this, Goldberg (1996) added a *justice* component and noted the generalized social effects of evildoing, preferring the term *malevolence*, which he defined as

> acts that produce undeserved suffering . . . deliberate infliction of cruel, painful suffering on another living being . . . unique among human

> experiences in the power of their impact upon people who are not directly involved or even present when they occur . . . [and which elicit] both captivating excitement and enormous fear. (pp. 3- 5)

In this study, *evil* is a term of value for a subcategory of conduct and is reserved for those deliberate *acts* that entail direct or indirect, significant, unjustified injury to another. Acts of evil may be done with various degrees of intent and care; they may be passively committed, as by the person who facilitates evildoing through others or by the bystander who can but does not intervene in the victimization of another; they may be proscribed within a social group or may reflect a *policy* of evildoing, such as slavery, racist or anti-Semitic acts, ethnic cleansing, terrorism, the

tactical use of children or other innocents in war, and so forth. Evil acts are distinguished from what might be called "lesser evils," such as *antisocial* behavior (e.g., vandalism), *vice* (e.g., intemperance), some *sins* (e.g., adultery, petty theft), *corruption* (e.g., bribes, embezzlement), or *bad* behavior (e.g., rudeness), all of which may lack the significant-injury criterion. Evil acts are distinguished from terms such as *killing*, which suggests significant direct injury but without reference to justice. Acts of evil may vary in degree of harm, in the sense that a murder is a greater evil than a rape. While generalizations about evil may be usefully made, each specific act or judgment of evil is situation dependent, which is to say, *no definition of evil can cover all instances in abstraction*; however, an act of evil by one person in a given situation is evil for *any* person in the same situation. Moreover, real-world situations often entail unexpected conflict scenarios, such as choosing the lesser of two evils: rule-following alone is insufficient, deliberation is required.

Good

It has been observed that a positive articulation of goodness is both difficult and controversial (e. g., Kendler, 1999) and that some definitional inarticulacy may be desirable (Taylor, 1989). In fact, the term *good* is commonly encountered in the psychological literature often unexplained, as if its meaning were intuitively understood. Or, *good* is implied in a variety of common, often morally neutral terms, such as *effective, healthy, correct, appropriate*, and sometimes *the good life;* or in more technical, presumably more meaningful behavioral terms, such as *prosocial*, simply defined as "socially valuable," or *adaptation*, defined as "better adjustment," "better fit," or "optimal functioning" (Corsini, 1999). In all cases, *good* is a term of value, entails a hierarchy, and suggests a highest or ultimate good.

The *good* of interest in this study is, of course, the *moral* good, held to be universally if not uniformly understood at a preverbal level. The moral good is conceived functionally as a subset of conduct and relationally "in terms of what a person does with and to others rather than what he is inside of and by himself" (Lamm, 1974, p. 5). In speaking of a good person or a good society, then, the reference is to moral *action.* With a constant eye on the darker side of human behavior, the present view of moral good retains a gravity and an attitude of obligation often lost in more sophisticated philosophies of "the good life" focused as they are (perhaps dangerously) on the self and its aspirations. *Good* refers to caring about and striving for right action with respect to *all* persons in each moral situation but with an emphasis on obligation to the *other*. Some philosophers will find this emphasis overly narrow; the victim of evildoing will not.

Following Fowers (2005), "It is not necessary to have . . . a final statement of what is good to be able to differentiate between what is better and worse" (p. 33). Indeed, *ultimate* moral good can only be approximated in the real world; because the human condition entails *degrees of goodness*, an achievable *more* good is preferred to an unattainable *absolute* good. Furthermore, the judgment and application of good is situation dependent: *no definition of good can cover all situations in abstraction*; but an act of goodness by one person in a given situation is a good act for any person in the same situation. Real-world situations involve unexpected conflicts, such as competing values or goods: rule following alone is insufficient, deliberation is required.

Moral Aspect of Behavior

This term is used interchangeably with *morality, the moral, moral presence, moral domain,* and sometimes *ethics*. Corsini (1999) defined *morality* as "a system of social beliefs, and set of values relating to right conduct usually codified in various religions—for example, the Ten Commandments—against which certain behaviors can be judged acceptable or unacceptable." In Friedman (1967), morality is "the tension between 'is' and 'ought'—between the given of a situation and the direction of movement which we choose in response to a moral demand" (p. 360). Whether narrowly or broadly defined, morality is continuous with a whole range of human concerns. For Blasi (1980), "morality is ultimately a characteristic of action" (p. 2). Other authors emphasize affections such as seriousness (Midgley, 1981/1983) and conscientious care (Wren, 1991) or virtue as "the source of feelings that prompt us to behave well" (Woodruff, 2001, p. 6). Fisher (1999) applied those affections to discourse: "Ethics . . . represents an important

dimension of what is shared in a human community precisely in terms of what is taken seriously, what matters" (p. 213). Greifinger (1995) considered a sense of moral authenticity to be an aim of psychoanalytic discourse. Levinas (as cited in Vandenberg, 1999) held morality to be "immanent in human conduct" (p. 31). Taylor (1989) highlighted the importance of articulating moral sources as the basis for how one's life is lived. R. B. Miller (2001) wrote, "The moral sphere concerns ultimately defining what is 'good' for human beings, differentiating right from wrong, our rights, responsibilities, duties, and obligations" (p. 346). Each of these concerns entails some behavior—belief holding, perceiving, responding, deliberating, weighing, ordering, judging, selecting, acting, feeling, speaking, articulating, sharing, caring, knowing, questioning, obeying—and each adds a dimension to the present conceptualization of morality. Together, these constitute the personal experience of a call to action and the answer to that call.

In this study, the *moral aspect of behavior* is used two ways. First, it is an umbrella concept under which are collected the plurality of variables associated with the moral situation, such as its dimensions, components, and features, and all of the variables related to the human agent, such as character, values, and behavior, including both observable conduct and the private cognitions and affections, such as deliberation, judgment, and conflicts of conscience. Second, the moral aspect constitutes a unitary *moral presence*, emergent from that plurality in situ, which claims the following three criterial features: (a) agency—the moral presence arises with the conscious capacity by which humans select, plan, and execute actions; (b) objectiveness—the moral is independent of personal preference; and (c) gravity—"*moral* is simply the superlative of serious" (Midgley, 1981/1983, p. 126). The moral presence emerges in the care, deliberation, judgment, and action of the

person engaged in a situation involving good and bad. But morality entails something more than components, variables, cognitive development, rational judgments, or rules and rule following. Simpson (1976) made this point as she touched on the three elemental properties of the moral presence:

> When Odysseus refused Calypso's offer of immortality on the condition that he remain with her, his action flowed from a much more powerful fount than socialization to conventional standards. He was responding as a whole human being to the lucid horror of moral seduction, to the loss of his autonomy. (p. 168)

That each person desires and fears his own freedom, that good and evil are potential in human action, that what matters most calls forth and directs, compels and constrains his private and public *effort*—these point toward the live event-condition summed up in *moral presence*. To live in the presence of the moral is perhaps the distinguishing feature of being human.

Moralization

To moralize, according to *The American Heritage Dictionary* (Pickett, 2000) is simply to think about or express moral judgments or reflections. *Random House Dictionary* (Flexner, 1987) agreed but added "esp. in a self-righteous or tiresome way" (p. 1249). Years ago, this term was used to mean the improvement of character—usually the child's—by means of education geared to conform behavior to social norms (Wendorf, 2001). For instance, in the first American social psychology textbook, published in 1908, McDougall declared, "The fundamental problem of social psychology is the moralization of the individual into the society into which he is born as an amoral and egoistic infant" (as cited in Kohlberg, 1984, p. 90). Today, of course, science speaks in the "value-neutral" terms of *socialization.*

Rozin (1997) introduced a definition for a process of *moralization* that more directly applies to the purposes of the present study and to a morally balanced psychology:

> Within any culture, at a particular time, there is some consensus about the activities that fall into the moral domain, and those that fall outside it. This rough dichotomy is far from stable: moral status for an activity may ebb and flow over time. This paper deals with the changes in which an activity that was previously outside the moral domain enters into it. The process . . . is quite common in both cultural evolution and individual development. It affects both the course of history and individual lives. . . . Because moralization has not been previously framed as a specific phenomenon, it has not been a focus of scholarly investigation and analysis. (p. 379)

Rozin defined *moralization* as the cultural "acquisition of moral qualities by objects and activities that were previously morally neutral" (p. 380).

In this study, Rozin's (1997) concept of moralization is applied not to the individual, who is by definition a moral agent, but to the activities of a psychology that seek to balance scientific and moral concerns, as opposed to a psychology exclusively interested in morally neutral knowledge. A morally balanced psychology presupposes a moralized psychology, versus one that is morally sterile. The terms *remoralization* and *demoralization* are used in this work to mean the re-acquisition and removal, respectively, of an activity from the moral domain. *Demoralization* can also refer to the effect, on a person or group, of the loss or corruption of moral values or purpose, and *amoral* applies to that which, in and of itself, never falls within the moral domain—plants, animals, machines, chemical activity, weather, and so forth.

Theoretical Framework

This dissertation draws theoretical support from William James's (1907/1981) conception of pragmatism, which accommodates an epistemological

and methodological pluralism and which mediates scientific and personal concerns. As much a methodological platform as a theoretical framework, James's pragmatism "lies in the midst of our theories, like a corridor in a hotel" (p. 29); it permits free and earnest exchange between epistemic, methodological, and theoretical chambers.

> She has in fact no prejudice whatever, no obstructive dogmas, no rigid canons of what shall count as proof. She is completely genial. She will entertain any hypothesis, she will consider any evidence. It follows that . . . she is at a great advantage both over positivistic empiricism, with its anti-theological bias, and over religious rationalism, with its exclusive interest in the remote . . . and the abstract. . . . Rationalism sticks to logic and the empyrean. Empiricism sticks to the external senses. Pragmatism is willing to take anything, to follow either logic or the senses and to count the humblest and most personal experiences. She will count mystical experiences if they have practical consequences. (p. 38)

The present work rests on three key assumptions: one regarding human nature, one related to the sort of knowledge to which the study appeals, and one respecting a psychology-morality nexus.

Assumption of Human Agency

This study assumes that *the intact adult individual has the distinctly human and moral attribute of agency,* as defined earlier in this chapter. This is the pivotal assumption of morality in general and of a morally balanced psychology in particular. Notions of an objective right and wrong; of conduct, goodness, justice, and responsibility; of moral conflict, values, deliberation, judgment, and the like—all these are premised on agency and would be quite pointless without it.

The concept of human agency has been problematic for psychologists. Early on, James (1892) declared that, if "psychology is ever to conform to the type of the other natural sciences, it must also renounce certain ultimate solutions" (p. 147). A

century later, Pinker (1997) echoed that "the scientific mode of explanation cannot accommodate the mysterious notion of uncaused causation that underlies the will" (p. 54). More recently, Wegner (2002) ruled that the experience of conscious free will is an illusion altogether. Meanwhile, Nobel-laureate biologist Gerald Edelman (1992) announced that empirical data increasingly *support* the notion of free will; physiologist Benjamin Libet (1999) characterized volition as a "phenomenal fact" (p. 56); and Koch (1980/1999d) reclaimed the status of the person "conceived as agent, not object . . . [who] can never finally adjudicate the question of self-sincerity, or attain final and cozy confidence in his appraisals of others" (p. 301).

Note the threefold nature of the problem as it addresses: (a) how agency is understood by the person; (b) how it is to be scientifically explained; and (c) whether agency warrants membership in what science philosopher Lawrence Sklar (2006) has called the "family of explanatory schemes" (p. 19)—that is, whether it can be used to explain the voluntary actions of a person. Historically, psychologists have "resolved" the problem by excluding or ignoring the concept and experience of human agency in their models. Such "solutions" were not unanimously approved. May (1958) objected simply: "Something occurs which is not just the product of . . . conditioning forces" (p. 187). Polanyi (1958) concurred: "I accept these accidents of personal existence as the concrete opportunities for exercising our personal responsibility" (p. 322). Tolman (1959), too, was unwilling to ignore evidence of purposeful behavior and apparently found the logic of agentless models a little hard to swallow:

> I . . . felt that a response could not be defined as a specific muscle contraction but must in some way be defined as a directed, goal-oriented manipulation or "performance." I still feel that "response" is one of the most slippery and unanalyzed of our current concepts. We all gaily use the term to mean anything from a secretion of 10 drops of saliva to entering a given

> alley, to running an entire maze, to the slope of a Skinner box curve, to achieving a Ph.D., or to a symbolic act of hostility against one's father by attacking some authority figure. Now, I ask you! (p. 95)

Greenwood (1988), for one, presented a nuanced, pragmatic solution that accommodates actions that are "sui generis self-determined by agents, and not determined by any conditions" (p. 95), but whose "products are simply not independent of all empirical conditions" (p. 99). It will be shown in chapter IV that advances in technology, evolutionary biology, and neuroscience have indeed sharpened the empirical boundary conditions that appear to affirm agency.

To stipulate that agency is inaccessible to direct observation and unexplainable by sufficient causal conditions is not to concede its nonexistence or implausibility, or that there is nothing meaningful to say about it, or that it is disorderly and unlawful, or that it has no real-world application, or that it is without substantial effects. Rather, it is to admit what is true in all fields of scientific inquiry: Something always remains unexplained and incompletely described; in this case, it is "the mystery of the origin of motion of the soul" (Jaffa, 1984/2002, p. 66). Thus, in the spirit of pragmatism, this study provides that an agentic function has its physical address in the vicinity of the carbon-based organism *Homo sapiens*; and that the *hypothesis of agency accounts for phenomena not otherwise accounted for by strict causation, most conspicuously the virtually universal human experience of free will and its self-evident, real-world consequences.*

Epistemic Assumptions

The key epistemic assumption of this study is as follows: *The recognition of a knowing embodied agent, versatility and modesty with respect to a range of ways*

of knowing, and a pragmatic conception of what constitutes acceptable data are all necessary in order that psychologists may adequately apprehend, meaningfully interpret, and effectively address the moral aspect of behavior. The works reviewed for this study reflect an ongoing dialogue about how people grasp and understand things. Taken together, the literature points to what is here conceived as a *bio-epistemic field* having four domains—*knowledge, knower, known, and knowing*—that are by nature related and that comprise a whole, naturally evolved system. The bioepistemic field and its domains go to the heart of this project; therefore, it is necessary to consider the field and its contents as a rationale for the key epistemic assumption.

Knowledge

Knowledge is here understood jointly as *exosomatic artifacts* (Popper, 1994), the product of meaningful thought (Koch, 1981/1992b), and an *intellectual commitment* (Polanyi, 1958):

> I think we may distinguish between the personal in us, which actively enters into our commitments, and our subjective states, in which we merely endure our feelings. This distinction establishes the conception of the personal, which is neither subjective nor objective. In so far as the personal submits to requirements acknowledged by itself as independent of itself, it is not subjective; but in so far as it is an action guided by individual passions, it is not objective either. (p. 300)

Knowledge is viewed as composed of experience and data; it is constitutive of understanding and wisdom. Agreeing with most of the psychological works reviewed, this study adopts the following propositions with respect to knowledge: There is the idea of the knowable and the unknowable. Of the unknowable, one correctly speaks in terms of faith or belief. Of the knowable, there is the known and the unknown. Of the unknown, one advances hypotheses or states assumptions. Of

the known, one speaks of two broad classes: formal, objective knowledge and personal, subjective knowledge. Within these classes are levels or categories of knowledge, notably the *descriptive* (names, classifications, scales, features, narratives), the *practical* (predictions, controls, techniques), the *explanatory* (causes, relations, reasons, interpretations), and the *normative* (values, standards). For survival and other practical reasons, knowledge that is dependable and generalizable is highly valued, as are its public confirmatory criteria, such as critical review and testing. For reasons of mental, emotional, and spiritual well-being, knowledge that is meaningful and personally relevant is likewise highly valued, as is its confirmatory measure *understanding*, which, Kendler (1999) pointed out, "refers to . . . personal criteria" (p. 4).

Knowing Organism

It is the agentic human organism that seeks, collects, evaluates, develops, is moved by, and uses knowledge. This ghostly machine has evolved biopsychological capacities, "mental modules with differing agendas and goals" (Pinker, 2002, p. 40) for grasping and understanding at least some of its environment. The individual is prodded by both environment and intrinsic urges to apprehend reality, to increase knowledge, to reduce error and doubt, to facilitate decision making. Knowing may arouse one's emotions (surprise, anxiety, pleasure) or impact cognitions (clarify, confuse, organize) or stimulate bodily responses (weeping, gasping, change in vital signs); one tends readily to accept as true one's own understandings, whereas those of another often require a getting effort. All told, even the most sincere knower is biologically limited, prone to bias, vulnerable

to error and laziness, plagued with doubt, ultimately confined to approximations of truth—and driven to know more.

Central to this work is the knower's agentic role. Knowing has an automatic sensory, receptive function—the knower is constantly *informed*; but it also has a motoric, active function—the knower can set out to know something, to get information. Herein lies perhaps the single most significant and sobering fact of the knowing organism: the remarkable, sometimes disturbing human capacity to regard, disregard, select, reject, collect, block, and manipulate in a myriad of ways virtually any experience or information about any aspect of reality, which humans routinely do, to their profit and their peril. That scientists select and define their subject matter is one instance of the knower's agentic role.

Knowable World

One cannot speak intelligibly about knowing without reference to some aspect of the apprehensible world, thereby selecting and defining a subject matter, the *known*. A dispute of ancient origin regarding the knowable world has turned on a perceived dichotomy, which in psychology is expressed as between body and mind, objective and subjective realities, discovered and constructed worlds, precision and meaning, physics and metaphysics, or some similar split. In one camp a reductionist, physicalist, procedure-oriented empiricism avoids, de-emphasizes, or rejects outright the subjective and claims to mirror the objective reality of a *publicly observable world* (Toulmin & Leary, 1985/1992). In another camp a constructionist, semantic, narrative-oriented humanism avoids, de-emphasizes, or rejects outright the objective and is premised on the invented, personal "reality" of a *socially constructed world* (Feyerabend, 1975/ 2002;

Gergen, 1985/1992). In perhaps more accommodative camps Kerlinger (1992) referred to the "natural and human phenomena" (p. 4) of a *generally sensible world*, Popper (1972/1979, 1994) to the objective knowledge of a *rational metaphysical world*, Polanyi (1958) to the personal contact with a hidden *rational reality* evidenced in nature, Pinker (1997) to an evolved personal mind that meshes with a *bioevolutionary world*, and Gendlin (1997) to the orderly, multifaceted, responsive, and "stubbornly empirical" *objective natural world* as it interacts with the subject's prelogical *experiential world.*

This work does not assume that the apparent binary nature of nature is in need of repair or transcendence. Rather, the tension between objective and subjective aspects, much like that between the traditional and innovative commitments in science discussed by Kuhn (1959/1977), is seen as *essential* and calls for *convergent thinking* (Kuhn's terms). Thus, there is no presumption here to exclude fully one half of "nature's binary" as an illegitimate subject for scientific inquiry; rather, nonphysical human phenomena are taken to be fair game in a natural science. This is not a radical choice.

Biologist Ernst Mayr's (1982, 1988) account of the legitimization of biology as an autonomous scientific field of study provides an analogue, a precedent, and a rationale for the scientific study of human phenomena, such as the mental and the moral aspects of behavior. Mayr noted that, in the late 20th century, biology jettisoned both the strictly physicalist and vitalist explanatory schemes. Instead, the distinction between living and non-living matter is to be explained in terms of *levels of*

organization of matter and *emergent* capacities and properties, roughly as follows: *Biology* entails the emergent properties of a specific organization of nonliving

matter. The relevant basic structure is the *genotype*, the new capacity is *life*. Attempts to reduce biology to physics or to explain it in terms of carbon compounds appear to have failed (the life is lost). Adequate explanations of biological phenomena require a convergence of physics with the thought and terms of *genetic programs* and *variable populations*.

Applying the above rationale to this study, human *psychology* entails emergent properties of the human organism. The relevant structure is the *cortical brain*; the new capacity is *consciousness* or *mind*. Attempts to reduce psychology to biology or to explain it in terms of neural physiology appear to have failed (the mind is lost). Adequate explanations of psychological phenomena require a convergence of biology with the thought and terms of *psychodynamics*. Applied yet again, morality entails the emergent properties of the human being. The relevant special structural organization is (like psychology's) the *expanded cortex*; the new capacity is the *awareness of good and bad*. Attempts to reduce morality to biology or psychology or to explain it in terms of cognitive processes appear to have failed (the good and bad are lost). Adequate explanations of moral phenomena (goodness, evildoing, responsibility, etc.) require a convergence of psychology with the thought and terms of the *conduct of moral agents*.

In each of the above applications, an evolved level of structural organization, having new properties, has given rise to new, observable capacities. Three levels of a knowable human reality are hereby distinguished: the biophysical, the psychological, and the moral. Each level is rooted in the natural world; each leaves its own sort of footprint—bones, an amphitheater, a bronze plaque beneath a statue: "Give me your tired, your poor, your huddled masses yearning to be free." As such, each level of human reality is here considered a legitimate subject matter

for scientific investigation. Each level presents its own methodological challenges to scientific inquiry. In the end, the knowing organism may select and define the level of subject matter, but the subject matter determines the mode of its knowing.

Modes of Knowing

Knowing refers to the act, processes, and methods by which an object is cognitively grasped and knowledge demonstrably confirmed by a *subject* (knower) and which always occurs in a context of some prior (remembered or received) *fundamental* knowledge. These three natural conditions—object, subject, prior fundamental knowledge—are ever present in the knowing domain and establish a corresponding basic modal range of knowing. Each mode has its own properties and premises on which observations are made and explanatory models are built.

1. *Objective mode*. The two chief interests of this mode are (a) the *empirical*—sensible, measurable reality, its components, aggregates, chronologies, and causal relations; and (b) the *rational*—conceptual, reasonable reality, its ideas, constructs, models, and logical relations. The objective mode entails the application of symbols, words, names, or categories to an object in order to locate and define it; its renditions of reality are in terms of the object. Speaking as a physicist, Schrödinger (1958/1992) explained how *objectivation* is achieved:

> Without being aware of it and without being rigorously systematic about it, we exclude the Subject of Cognizance from the domain of nature that we endeavor to understand. We step with our own person back into the part of an onlooker who does not belong to the world, which by this very procedure becomes an objective world. (p. 118)

The objective mode seeks to understand the *why*, *how*, and *when* of things by means of inductive reasoning, measurement, structural or statistical analysis, experiment, and critical review in order to confirm factual precision. Bateson

(1972/1987) noted that the objective mode emphasizes reasoning from facts or data, conceived as constructed records or memories of actual observed objects or events. The objective mode lends orderly precision, rationality, demonstrability, and critical review to the inquiry. But knowledge is more than the systematic collection of precise, testable facts, and logical claims. For one thing, facts must be checked against the fundamentals.

2. *Fundamental mode.* The primary interest of this mode is prior knowledge or wisdom, remembered or received from an authoritative other (such as an ancestor), the traditions of a native community, or some other precedent in which a preserved fund of knowledge is accessed. As it applies to a science of human behavior, this mode entails deductive reasoning from the hard-won heritage of experience and serious thought about human beings; it is the established or received view, formalized over thousands of years. This mode *support*s the increase and application of confirmed knowledge. Koch (1959/1999f) spoke of "vast resources of psychological knowledge coded in the natural language" (p. 186); he envisioned a discipline that admits input from science and the humanities and indicated how that input is to be utilized.

> The partnership that I propose would see the best efforts towards specifying man's inner universe (and his condition) of the most sensitive and prehensile minds in history as already part of the tissue of psychology. It would see those efforts as criterial in respect to the assessment of "new" psychological knowledge. (p. 307)

D. T. Campbell (1975) also suggested the application of fundamental knowledge as a yardstick and recommended a respectful rethinking of the traditional, inhibitory systems found in all complex societies.

> [These] recipes for living . . . have been evolved, tested, and winnowed through hundreds of generations of human social history. On purely scientific grounds . . . [they] might be regarded as better tested than the best

> of psychology's and psychiatry's speculations on how lives should be lived. (p. 1103)

The time-tested criterial knowledge of the fundamental mode lends the perspectives of reverence, wisdom, moderation, and norms to the inquiry. But the fundamentals must account for new facts. Thus, Bateson (1972/1987) described his idea of good epistemic technique:

> In scientific research you start from two beginnings, each of which has its own kind of authority: the observations cannot be denied, and the fundamentals must be fitted. You must achieve a sort of pincers maneuver . . . [and] if these two cannot be made to fit together, then either the data are wrong or you have argued wrongly from them or you have made a major discovery. (p. xxii)

3. *Personal mode.* In order to correct for errors arising from the depersonalization that sometimes haunts psychological studies confined to objective and/or fundamental modes of knowledge, this study employs a third mode, the *personal* mode, implicit in Bateson's formulation, perhaps the fulcrum of his "pincers." This mode is primarily interested in the person's private, qualitative, purposive, mental and felt experience; it seeks to understand the *what* of things—the unique wholeness, substance, or condition of reality, the part of reality that is immune to objective measures and fundamentals. It seeks this understanding not by primarily rational means but by a variously conceived *being-with.* Bergson (1912) wrote of an intuitive "effort of imagination" (p. 2), "the kind of *intellectual sympathy* by which one places oneself within an object in order to coincide with what is unique in it and consequently inexpressible" (p. 7). Woodworth, in 1958, saw it as "the obvious role of the living and active organism" (as cited in Hothersall, 1995, p. 385). Bateson (1972/1987) expressed it as the "raw event which intervenes between the scientist and his object" (p. xix-xx). Koch (1981/1992b) described a primitive, ontologistic "merging of person and object or

problem" (p. 79). Packer (1985) emphasized the scientist's *engagement* and gave "an account of the origin of [objectivist] epistemology and the distortions inherent in it" (p. 1087). Gendlin (e.g., 1978, 1991, 1996) developed a conception of bodily knowing that involves *a felt sense at the edge of what is clear*. Others have revived Aristotelian phronesis, or practical knowledge, emphasizing an action-oriented know-how that flows from direct experience (Baltes & Freund, 2002; Fowers, 2003; Miller, R. B., 2004). In each case, the emphasis is on what happens *in the person*—in the private world of the living body who attends and behaves in relation to actual, specific conditions, to observable events, and to other living bodies. The personal mode brings warmth, care, immediacy, and visceral meaning to the inquiry. But the subjective is often ambiguous, disorganized, desire filled, and fluid, and good science demands objective evidence and the justification of time-tested fundamentals.

Natural Knowing

In the knowing domain there is always the object, always the prior knowledge, always the person. Correspondingly, each of the three base modes of knowing logically presupposes the other two. In this model, the conditions of knowing (subject, object, fundamental) are not *transcended*, they are *organized.* The knowing organism turns—in the sense that attention is said to turn—from its own intimate experience of an object to its own objectivation of that intimate experience; it turns again from these to its own prior experience; and, having engaged and considered its object, it turns yet again to another knowing organism, to tell and to hear the news. In this view of knowing, the special qualities of each mode alternate, converge, diverge, and recollect; the three modes cooperate

variably in a range of permutations of knowing that extends from experience to report.

This work proposes that, for a human psychology to bypass, neglect, or overemphasize any one or two of the three base modes of knowing is to risk errors in judgment and to invite problems such as triviality, arrogance, naïveté, dogmatism, superstition, scientism, parochialism, conformism, dehumanization, narcissism, extremism, or relativism. On the other hand, the three modes in concert provide checks and balances that reduce the likelihood of such distortions and distractions. *Used together, the three base modes of knowing (object, prior knowledge, person) are better fitted for the study of psychological phenomena than any mode alone; they are assumed to be necessary and sufficient for understanding the moral aspect of behavior*. Finally, because the three base modes correspond to the three natural conditions of knowing (object, prior knowledge, person), as well as to three natural levels of a knowable human reality (biophysical, psychological, moral), they are regarded as constitutive of a genuinely natural way of knowing.

Assumption of a Moralized Psychology

A moral involvement in psychology appears to be intuitive for a growing number of American psychologists who sense that the domain of human behavior is also a moral domain and who are increasingly prepared openly to address moral concerns. But intuition is not a rationale, and the assumption that psychology is to be moralized deserves scrutiny. Four essentially pragmatic bases for the premise are presented here for scrutiny: (a) morality as the motherground of science, (b) the logical necessity of moralization, (c) the primacy of the moral good, and (d) psychology's heritage of moral purpose.

Motherground of Science

Authors have commented on the relationship between morality and various aspects of social organization. Yalom (1980) noted that moral values "make it possible for individuals to exist in groups" (p. 464). Vandenberg (1999) added that "the

codification of rules . . . presume[s] a prior relational context of responsibility and regard" (p. 34). D. T. Campbell (1976) noted that "inhibition systems are requisite for complex social coordination and are present in all of the available examples" (p. 382). Professors Bellah, Madsen, Sullivan, Swidler, and Tipton (1996) showed how, without moral values and rules, social organization is fundamentally precarious:

> It is the moral content of relationships that allows marriages, families, and communities to persist with some certainty that there are agreed-upon standards of right and wrong that one can count on and that are not subject to incessant renegotiation. (pp. 139-140)

It is not surprising that science—a rule-bound, socially organized activity—would entail a similar relationship, as American philosopher John Dewey observed in 1903:

> The system of science . . . is absolutely dependent for logical worth upon a moral interest: the sincere aim to judge truly. Remove such an interest, and the scientific system becomes a purely aesthetic object, which may awaken emotional response in virtue of its internal harmony and symmetry, but which has no logical import. (as cited in Kessen, 1983, p. 36)

Today, it is the consensus among historians that one specific, morally based social organization—Christian monotheism—was preconditional for the rise of Western science altogether (Stark, 2003). Simply put, morality is the motherground of science.

Logical Necessity of Moralization

Ironically, perhaps, the human activity of science seems most in its element when personal, moral values do not directly apply, such as when dealing with chemicals, with the microscopic or telescopic, or with machines or laboratory rats. But when science turns its methods upon the moral agent, as it does in psychology, things tend to get muddled. This points up the tension between the objective and experiential epistemic modes, between knowledge and action, between doing science and being human. Still, it seems reasonable to expect that a science that deals with the human realities of mind, body, and behavior would have *something* useful to say about the most serious of human concerns. It also follows that psychology must either attune its criteria for what constitutes meaningful data and adapt its methods to fit its human topic, or else it must (as has so often been the case) reduce the person to something less than human (i.e., mechanical, chemical, numerical, or animal). The called-for attunement—the *moralization* of psychology—is a logical necessity for a realistic and useful human psychology.

Primacy of the Moral Good

In his *Nichomean Ethics* (McKeon, 1947/1992) Aristotle wrote, "All human activities aim at some good: some goods subordinate to others" (Contents, i. 1); and "we are inquiring . . . in order to become good" (Bk. II: Ch 2). By contrast, objectivity and the possibility of scientific *certainty* were chief goods of the "enlightenment project" of the 18th century. Fowers (2005) tagged that effort "the project to eliminate human interpretation" (p. 18). Koch (1981/1992b) questioned the prudence of "preemptive truths" and "preclusive organizations" in a psychology that relies too heavily on objective precision and certainty.

> It raises a grave moral issue reflective of a widespread moral bankruptcy within psychology. In the psychological studies, the attribution to any paradigm of a preemptive finality has the force of telling human beings precisely what they are, of fixing their essence, defining their ultimate worth, potential, meaning; of cauterizing away that quality of ambiguity, mystery, search, that makes progress through a biography an adventure. (p. 93)

The primacy of the objective, scientific good, applied to human beings, is also demoralizing for the scientist, who shares the human vulnerability to the seduction of certainty. Recall that some 20th-century doctors and psychiatrists tortured and murdered helpless innocents, including children, in the name of objective science subordinated to certain ideological dogmas (Blumenthal, 1999; Dudley & Gale, 2002; Lifton, 1986).

Science works as well for an evil master as it does for a benevolent one. This is particularly true when science claims exclusive interest in precise facts regarding *what is*. The objective scientific good has no inherent interest in the deliberation of moral values and *what ought to be*. When both the scientist and his human "object" are free to choose or not choose one action over another, then *what is* becomes useful but insufficient data and the consideration of *what ought to be* emerges as crucial. In a realistic and effective human psychology the primacy of the moral good is recommended because it presupposes and accommodates a moral agent; because it subordinates all activities to the goodness and decency interests of both investigator and human "object," both science and society; and because the moral good *does* have an inherent interest in the objective and the true.

Heritage of Moral Purpose

The philosopher-empiricist John Locke (1690/2006) wrote, "I think I may conclude that morality is the proper science and business of mankind in general"

(IV: xii, 11). Leary (1980) described the moral heritage of scientific psychology as it extends to the 17th century: "The commonly felt need to understand in order to improve human behavior was the fundamental motivation which underlay the development of the new sciences of man" (p. 292). Leary suggested that the same moral purpose that *openly* characterized 17th-, 18th-, and 19th-century psychological thought continued *privately* to be held after the advent of naturalism, positivism, and behaviorism in the 20th century, when the public expression of morality came to be frowned upon. To this day, statements of purpose in mainstream psychology tend carefully to bury moral language, such as in the American Psychological Association (APA) mission statement, "to advance psychology as a science and profession and as a means of promoting health, education, and human welfare" (APA, 2007, Charter Bylaws, I.1). But surely such commitments encompass moral concerns.

In this work the moral purpose of psychology is openly advanced as contributing simultaneously to increased mental health and a more good society, which is to say a society wherein more people do good, a decency-oriented society. Morality and the vision of a decent society are bound up in a particular sort of view of human beings, a view elaborated in this study. It is the recommended view; it is not an extravagant view, but a prudent one; it is not a radical view, but a traditional one. As Leary (1980) wrote, "Those who have raised their voices in recent decades to express moral concerns have been—contrary to common opinion—directly in tune with the historical, traditional rationale for engaging in the sciences of man" (p. 305).

Scope and Limitations of the Study

This study covers the history of American psychology with emphasis on the latter half of the 20th century to the present. The primary population of concern is the healthy adult, alone and in groups, as observed by others and self-experienced; it includes the psychologist as a moral agent. The central topic of investigation is the moral aspect of behavior—as a phenomenon of human life, in its relationship to the field of psychology, and as it has been treated in the psychological literature. Studies are reviewed for authors' categorical schemes and metatheoretical positions and the implications of those positions for research, for applications, for the individual beneficiary, and for society at large. Preference goes to authors who represent influential theories or trends in this area, who have been frequently published, who have

published literature reviews, or whose work otherwise holds some special significance for this study. The majority of publications reviewed are English-language journal articles and books, primary and secondary sources representing various divisions and subdisciplines within psychology. Secondary sources are utilized for their authors' historical interpretations and insights. Traditional disciplinary boundaries are, of necessity, crossed; supportive philosophical, theological, historical, biological, sociological, and literary materials are utilized. Most of the definitions, terms, and concepts in this study are based on psychological sources; highly technical terms are avoided in favor of more accessible language wherever possible.

Importance of the Study

This study asserts two sorts of importance. First, a professional importance is evidenced in the testimonies of psychologists themselves. Second, a moral importance is supported by any sober account of human actions, current or historical, and by the plain fact that good and evil are a human concern. The significance of this work, then, is best understood as both pragmatic and grave.

Future of an Independent Psychology

To the extent that it fails to address the moral agent in a meaningful way, psychology looks less like an independent discipline; its research seems better suited to neuroscience or medicine; its applications readily devolve to guidance counseling, pharmacology, and mass-marketable techniques, such as those offered in motivational, self-help, and coaching programs; and its human remainder—those moral matters abdicated by a scientistic orthodoxy—may then be expected to revert to the domains of philosophy, religion, and the arts. Robinson (1985/1992) remarked on the consequences for such a psychology:

> Because of this slavish devotion to scientism, modern psychology must be regularly embarrassed by its inability to explain all sorts of occurrences which the lay community has no difficulty explaining at all. Moreover, the counterclaim—that laypeople only think they have an explanation but are really deceiving themselves—can only be made by a discipline that has accepted the task of explaining the same phenomenon. In evading the very phenomena that so engage the attention of real people, modern psychology renders itself irrelevant in the most damaging sense of the term and fails in the historic mission facing all serious scholarship—the correction of common errors and the elimination of common prejudice. (p. 74)

Doherty (1995) argued that nearly 100 years of psychotherapy has emphasized a rather narrow, amoral self-interest and de-emphasized moral responsibility and obligations, which has contributed to an erosion of confidence in psychotherapy. Consequently,

> therapists' failure to attend to the broader moral and community dimension has left psychotherapy vulnerable to being managed as just one more commodity in the health care marketplace. Morally sterilized psychotherapy has lost whatever moral leverage it could have used against the hegemony of the bottom-line economic decision making practiced by many public officials and managers of health care. (p. 8)

As a remedy, Doherty proposed the frank promotion of moral responsibility in psychotherapy. R. B. Miller (2001) outlined four "steps toward a psychology of moral engagement" claiming, "We are a morally divided profession that denies its moral functions and the implicit moral content in its theories, research methods, and practices" (p. 353). He concluded, "We must embrace rather than continue to deny this reality, and work vigorously to elevate the quality of the moral discourse in our clinical and academic dialogues" (p. 355). In more generalized appeals, Koch (1981/1992b) called for a psychology that "might show the imprint of a capacity to accept the inevitable ambiguity and mystery of our situation" (p. 96), and Bevan (1995) suggested that, "by scrutinizing values as well as facts, we should be better able to confront the
difficult questions that have too often been avoided in the scientific and scientistic past" (p. 295).

It is equally true, as Kimble (1985/1992) warned, that "if psychology is to have a future as a science, it must obey the scientific rules" (p. 34). The professional importance of this dissertation goes to whether and how scientific rules might best accommodate the moral aspect of human behavior and thereby preserve the status of psychology as an independent discipline.

The Meaningful Variable

> If only there were evil people somewhere insidiously committing evil deeds, and it were necessary only to separate them from the rest of us and destroy them. But the line dividing good and evil cuts through the heart of every

> human being. . . . One and the same human being is, at various ages, under various circumstances, a totally different human being. At times he is close to being a devil, at times to sainthood. But his name doesn't change, and to that name we ascribe the whole lot, good and evil. (Solzhenitsyn, 1973, p. 168)

Selected acts of human goodness are memorialized in stories and works of art and records of deadly struggles against murderous tyrants, of heroic rescues of victims, of painful sacrifices for liberty and justice, and the like. Most good deeds, of course, go unrecorded. They occur daily in modest acts of human kindness, in the near-private world of personal interaction, or in complete anonymity. Like good health, good conduct often goes unremarked, perhaps because it is taken to be normal, experienced as timeless, whereas one tends to mark each moment of pain as "out-of-order." Goodness is the fundamental solution to the problem of conduct.

The fundamental problem of conduct in its extreme is the *doing of evil*: acts of murder, torture, mutilation, cannibalism, infanticide, genocide, racism, enslavement, rape, the repression of women, child abuse, and the like. One wishes such things were matters for ancient history, remnants of a subhuman race, rarities in a remote corner of the world, or, at least, confined to human anomalies, psychopaths. But it is not so. The ubiquity of grim violations of innocent life strongly suggests a natural human potential. The less extreme, more commonplace moral *wrongdoings*—broken commitments, social irresponsibility, deceits, selfishness—are regular features of daily life and color the narratives of the psychotherapy session.

Assumptions, such as that mental health produces goodness or that mental illness causes bad behavior, may prove facile and deadly. The observation at the start of this chapter—that *depravity is never far off, and goodness is not inevitable*—recommends another conclusion: Any solution to the problems of

human conduct must entail the effective human *response* to evil and wrongdoing. In this sense, the larger problem of evil and wrongdoing includes the *response of good people*. In both problem and solution the meaningful variable is the moral agent, whose actions are uncaused but responsive, unpredictable but consistent.

Lickona (1976) wrote, "It seems clear that the best way to prevent evil in the world is to promote the development of goodness" (p. 24). Is it the business of psychology to encourage a response to wrongdoing and to promote goodness? The American psychologist is in a unique position to influence not only the mental health and self-improvement but the moral goodness of Americans as well. It will become evident in the chapters that follow that he or she does so, whether mindfully or not, for better or worse. Therefore, this work asks, *Will the psychologist, who is a moral agent, address the person-as-moral-agent; and will the discipline of psychology attend to the fundamental human problem of conduct?*

An affirmative response to the above question would surely recommend a well-grounded, clear, and comprehensive understanding of what the moral entails, something sorely lacking in today's psychology. This work will show that, given more than a century of refinements in scientific knowledge and historical perspective, and despite a longstanding, widespread academic bias against Judeo-Christian, traditional moral values, such an understanding is attainable. The mental health field today enjoys close cooperation between psychopharmacology and psychotherapy, properly reflecting the basic body-mind distinctions and interactions. Morality represents a third distinct interactive component. It seems fitting to recognize the moral aspect of behavior as the third pillar of mental health, establishing the person as the "meaningful variable." No other discipline—not philosophy, religion, history, sociology, or biology—is better suited than

psychology to render a comprehensive account of the moral aspect of human behavior.

Now, in order to make some sense of this all-too-confused area of human life and in order that a scientific *and* wise course of action be selected, it will help carefully to consider just how the American psychologist has looked at and handled the moral aspect of behavior.

Chapter II
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND, BASIC CATEGORIES

The problem of moral conduct, for millennia a central focus of Western religion, was also a basic concern in American psychological thought from the early colonial period through most of the 19th century. In a remarkable set of developments, the problem was pocketed by a "new psychology," just as the latter was swept up in the relentless rise of 20th-century scientism.

The transformation from the old, moralized psychology to the new, scientific psychology represented a historic shift in balance favoring scientific concerns: laboratory instruments, experimentation, methodologies, and the like. Even so, the status of psychology as a natural science was hardly secure and remained in doubt. Serious concerns had been raised from the beginning: that the new psychology was "only the hope of a science" (James, 1892/1948, p. 468), that psychology might not *want* to "renounce its happy intimacy with metaphysics" (Adams, 1931, p. 282), that it was an immature science (Watson, R. I., 1967), and that its very representation as a science may be altogether unwarranted (Koch, 1981/1992b). But the spectacular products of mathematics, physics, and the life sciences at the turn of the century were generating enormous enthusiasm and confidence; why should equally marvelous results not flow from a science of man? Soon, societal demands for guidance and the psychologist's appetite for explanations regarding all aspects of human functioning drew psychologists out of

the laboratory and classroom to the ground of application—to the workplace, the military, the family, and the intimacy of the consultation room, hitherto reserved for the medical professional. Koch (1959-1963) summarized the early predicament of America's new psychology:

> Psychology was unique in the extent to which its institutionalization preceded its content and its methods preceded its problems. If there are keys to history, this statement is surely a key to the brief history of our science. Never had a group of thinkers been given so sharply specified an invitation to create. Never had inquiring men been so harried by social need, cultural optimism, extrinsic prescription, the advance scheduling of ways and means. (Vol. 3, p. 783)

Psychologists worked vigorously to match their methods and instruments to the accelerating call for knowledge and services. At the same time, they sought to deepen respect for their empirical science, in part to win private and government funding. However well or ill prepared it was for the task, by the end of World War II, psychology had come to be seen as holding the keys to the problems of modern man. Its collective attention reconvened in the once-familiar neighborhood of conduct, around matters of social control (Leahey, 2004, chap. 13). Amid these rapid changes, the moral category *conduct* was quietly absorbed into the broader, morally sanitized category *behavior.* Thus, largely unremarked went the demoralization of psychology and—by way of its growing influence—of its beneficiaries, the American public.

In chapter I it was claimed that the overall development of American psychology can be viewed as an ongoing quest for balance between scientific and moral concerns. Implicit in the claim is the research question, *How have psychologists generally viewed and handled moral matters?* In order to tackle this straightforward question, this chapter introduces the historical background through the first two of four key observations, presented here in the order in which they

were made during the review: one regarding the size, growth rate, and organizational state of the literature related to morality, and the other regarding the approaches and theoretical positions of psychologist authors. This chapter highlights the basic categories of morality defined as an *umbrella concept*. The chapter is designed to perform several tasks: (a) to orient the reader generally to the range of topics, properties, and problems in moral psychology; (b) to introduce a few basic categories for navigating and making sense of what can be a bewildering landscape; (c) to offer some criteria by which the reader may identify any author's often-unstated assumptions about morality; and (d) to illuminate the historical problem of the psychology-morality relationship. Section summaries and a chapter summary are provided.

First Observation: Rapid, Mass Production in Disarray

The psychological community has come to constitute "one of the largest groupings within contemporary scholarship" (Koch, 1981/1992b, p. 75); the pattern of its growth of population and products is partly reflected in the development of its largest professional organization. The APA, founded by a handful of members in 1892 (annual dues: $3), had grown to 9,500 members by 1950. Today it claims nearly 150,000 members and 53 divisions (APA, 2007; Hothersall, 1995).

Over 30 years ago Bateson (1972/1987) scolded, "The present state of the behavioral sciences [is] a mass of quasitheoretical speculation unconnected with any core of fundamental knowledge" (p. xxi). Today, psychology's largest database lists over 2,400,000 records and grows annually by well over 100,000 (APA, 2008). A relatively tiny portion of the database—some 25,000 records—at least

mention the terms *moral* or *morality*. As of this writing, an English language search in the PsycINFO database for works in which morality is a focus yielded about 8,000 "hits." This subset of the research literature seems to share the general unconnected condition described by Bateson. A contemporary philosopher familiar with moral problems in modern psychology has explained, "The research on morality is in considerable disarray, largely because so many of these authors fail to appreciate the philosophical dimensions of the psychological positions they have argued for (and from)" (Wren, 1991, p. 3).

Rapid expansion and disarray have not been limited to the literature of psychology. The clinical field, too—where moral struggles are routinely encountered, and which field is far from settled as to whether and how moral questions should or could be addressed—has undergone a corresponding proliferation. Corsini and Wedding (1995) identified over 400 distinct therapeutic systems (p. 10); Corsini (1999) listed over 270 distinct system *types*; VandenBos (2007) cited over 280 therapies and approaches. Eidelberg (1992) insightfully characterized the proliferation of these often contradictory therapies as reflecting a "widespread confusion among psychologists and other social scientists regarding the nature of man . . . and what constitutes a healthy form of political society" (p. 114).

The state of disarray has not deterred a growing interest in morality. Lickona (1976) referred to a "surge of interest in moral development [that] has been everywhere evident" (p. x), and Kurtines and Gewirtz (1991) identified a need in the moral development field:

> The field has thus emerged as a continuing, separate, substantive area of scholarly and research interest. Yet, despite this substantial interest in the

> area and the emergence of a substantial body of data, there exists currently no single source of information on developments in the field. (p. xi)

Others have addressed integrative and interpretive approaches to a morally balanced psychology (Fowers, 2005; Miller, R. B., 2004; Richards & Bergin, 1997/2005; Richardson et al., 1999) or have identified the foundational elements for a more human psychology (Bevan, 1991/1995; Finkleman & Kessel, 1999; Wartofsky, 1983). But the plan for a comprehensive organization and interpretation of the moral aspect of human behavior based on the present body of knowledge has yet to be drawn. (Nor is there a division within the APA dedicated to moral concerns.)

To summarize this first key observation, the proliferation of the product of the psychological enterprise in the latter half of the 20th century seems to have outstripped its own integration, both in general and specifically where the moral aspect of behavior is concerned. It appears that a substantial body of knowledge pertaining to morality remains unfulfilled in terms of its organization and comprehensive interpretation, and the discipline of psychology remains unfulfilled in terms of achieving a balanced accommodation with respect to that body.

Second Observation: Convergent Approaches, Divergent Positions

An appreciation of the state of the literature gives rise to the second key observation: Psychologists have studied and discussed a wide range of moral topics in all sorts of ways. The topics and methods are all amenable to effective organization. In this study an author's approach refers to the properties, dimensions, and problems of the moral aspect of behavior as they are defined and examined; the levels of organization and level of analysis at which they are

examined; and the terms, categories, concepts, methods, and theories used. The author's metatheoretical position refers to his assumptions about reality, human nature, and ways of knowing, which together account for both his special approach to the moral aspect and his psychological view of morality in general.

Approaches

Approaches may be grouped according to one of three loosely defined types: content, process, or theoretical explanation. The literature contains thousands of studies representing each approach type; a high degree of variation occurs within each type. Three samplings illustrate the approach types and give an initial sense of the scope of the moral landscape.

Content-Specific Approach

In this approach, often narrow in focus, the author has emphasized the dimensions or features of some conceptual or physical element in the moral landscape. For example, the author may focus on the will, either as a factor and central problem of psychology (Rank, 1936/1968) or as an illusory product of mental causation (Wegner, 2002); on the role of values as they apply in psychological science (Howard, 1985) or in psychotherapy (Buhler, 1962); on trends in moral judgments (McKinney, Connolly, & Clark, 1973); on the nature of empathy (Hoffman, 1991b); on the measurement of shame and guilt (Tangney, 1996); on the therapeutic ethos and victim culture (Nolan & Westervelt, 2000); on the centrality of practical wisdom to virtue ethics (Fowers, 2003); on evil as understood in therapy (Spinelli, 2000); on the naturally selected building blocks of

morality in animals (Flack & de Waal, 2000); or on the neuronal basis for intention-recognition (Ferrari, P. F., Gallese, Rizzolatti, & Fogassi, 2003).

Process-Specific Approach

In this approach, also narrow in focus, authors have emphasized the temporal or actional dimension of processes, activities, or mechanisms of the moral aspect, such as the development of moral reasoning (Kohlberg, 1984); empathic arousal and moral action (Hoffman, 1991a); the development of prosocial behavior (Eisenberg, 1995); the primacy of intuitive process over moral reasoning (Haidt, 2001); the relation between moral reasoning and action (Blasi, 1980); rule-based moral processing (Darley & Shultz, 1990); the effects of immoral behavior on the transgressor (Klass, 1978); the mechanisms of moral control (Bandura, 1990); the socialization and internalization of conduct control (Aronfreed, 1968); the evolution of psychodynamic mechanisms, such as deception and conscience (Ness & Lloyd, 1992); the four processes that produce moral action (Narvaez & Rest, 1995); and the volitional process of self-directed neuroplasticity (Schwartz, J. M., 2002).

Theory-Specific Approach

In this broader approach, authors have presented causal explanations or examinations of one or more general features or problems of moral behavior. For example, moral immaturity as the cause of delinquency (Jurkovic, 1980); the pursuit of pleasure, material gain, idealism, and respect as the four causes of evildoing (Baumeister, 1996); natural selection as the source of homicidal motivation (Daly & Wilson, 1988); exclusionary group behaviors as the origin of

genocide (Staub, 1990); shame as the source of malevolence (Goldberg, 1996); teasing and social rejection as the root cause of school shootings (Aronson, 2000); dysfunctional thinking as a cause of aggression and hatred (Beck, 1999); child abuse as an explanation for the behavior of war criminals (Miller, A., 1983, 1987); and neurobiological influences on moral behavior (Schore, 1994). Also included are theoretical works addressing themes such as the relationship between science, psychology, and ethics (Kendler, 2000); between psychology and the soul (Rank, 1930/1998); between moral psychology and moral philosophy (Wren, 1991); between psychology and the humanities (Finkelman & Kessel, 1999); and historical works addressing themes such as the origins of academic psychology in America (Evans, 1984) and premodern American psychology (Fay, 1939).

Positions

William James (1902/1994) wrote, "The most interesting and valuable things about a man are usually his over-beliefs" (p. 559). The metatheoretical position of an author accounts for his overall view of the moral aspect, which bears directly on how scientific and moral concerns are balanced. The author's position, commonly unstated, involves his assumptions about human nature and the world, about science and ways of knowing, about the right and the good, and about how all these assumptions are understood and prioritized. The author's position is the basis of his explanatory scheme; it determines the criteria by which he selects phenomena for study, the line and direction of inquiry he follows, and the terms and categories in which he reasons and communicates. The author's metatheoretical position is the context for his theoretical, factual, and methodological decisions; it is what makes scientific discourse possible (Kurtines

& Gewirtz, 1995, chap. 1). On a personal level, one's metatheoretical position profoundly influences his lifestyle, behavior, health, and relationships (Richards & Bergin, 1997/2005, chap. 4).

A cursory survey of the literature reveals that authors' assumptions with regard to morality tend to cluster around one of three divergent positions (agreeing with Bergin, 1985): the *naturalistic,* the *humanistic,* and the *theistic*. The reader can identify an author's position by his stated claim or, in the absence of a claim, based on key assumptions of the work. A descriptive survey of the three positions and their origins will complete this second observation.[1]

Naturalistic Position

Authors holding this position have openly or tacitly rejected, denied, avoided, segregated, altered, or otherwise precluded the moral aspect of behavior from consideration in psychology, beyond an allowance for basic professional ethics.

The chief concern of the *naturalistic position* is the physical world. According to Leahey (2004), the roots of naturalism can be traced some 2,500 years to the philosophy of the Greek *physicists*, who sought explanations of reality that did not rely on the supernatural. The naturalistic idea was formulated by Thales and advanced by Leucippus and Democritus, of whom Leahey wrote,

> The atomists pushed their hypothesis to its limit, supporting two ideas that have seemed dangerous to some philosophers and ordinary people:

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[1]The narrow intent of this section is to describe the three metatheoretical positions and to show how they relate psychological matters to moral matters. The significance of other aspects of these authors' contributions—of theory, research, psychotherapy, case histories, and so on—are necessarily disregarded.

> *materialism* and *determinism*. A recurring motto of Democritus was that only "atoms and [the] Void exist in reality." There is no God and no soul, only material atoms in empty space. If only atoms exist, then free will must be an illusion. Leucippus said, "Nothing happens at random; everything happens out of reason and by necessity," providing a naturalistic explanation of [fate]. The soul and free will are illusions that can be reduced to the mechanical functioning of our physical bodies. Democritus became known as the "Laughing Philosopher" because he laughed at the follies of human beings who believed in freedom and struggled against . . . Fate. (pp. 44-45)

The natural philosophy of the Greeks favored materialistic and deterministic explanations of reality. This was morally troubling for some because of an implicit *hedonism,* which Leahey concluded "is the logical outcome of naturalism, for it reduces values to our natural bodily experiences of pleasure and pain" (p. 45). Nevertheless, the naturalistic idea proved resilient; in time, it would become the primary commitment of *science*—but not in Greece.

Sherrington (1940/1963) pointed out that the modern natural science explanatory scheme is based on facts and that the fanciful speculations of Democritus and others "cannot be put beside this scheme" (p. 235). Historian Rodney Stark (2003) further explained that science involves predictions based on *fact gathering with respect to some theory*—"a method utilized in organized efforts to formulate explanations of nature, always subject to modifications and corrections through systematic observations" [italics removed] (p. 124). By this definition, Stark argued, neither the ancient speculators (such as Democritus) nor empiricists (such as Aristotle) actually practiced what is today called *science*; it was not until the naturalistic idea was taken up by Christianity that science was born. Stark underscored what is now the consensus among scholars of science history, although it remains virtually unknown outside their circles: Far from being an obstacle to scientific progress, *"Christian theology was essential for the rise of science"* (p. 123).

> The rise of science was not an extension of classical learning. It was the natural outgrowth of Christian doctrine: Nature exists because it was created by God. To love and honor God, one must fully appreciate the wonders of his handiwork. Moreover, because God is perfect, his handiwork functions in accord with *immutable principles.* By the full use of our God-given powers of reason and observation, we ought to be able to discover these principles. (p. 157)

In fact, nearly all leading scientists of the 16th and 17th centuries—Boyle, Brahe, Copernicus, Descartes, Fermat, Galileo, Harvey, Kepler, Newton, Pascal, Vesalius, and others—were devout or conventional Catholics or Protestants—some of them clergymen—who worked "for the glory of God" and who assumed an obligation to comprehend and to proclaim "God's handiwork."

> China, Islam, India, and ancient Greece and Rome had a highly developed alchemy. But only in Europe did alchemy develop into chemistry. By the same token, many societies developed elaborate systems of astrology, but only in Europe did astrology lead to astronomy. (Stark, p. 127)

Stark concluded that today's science "arose only once in history—in medieval Europe . . . [and] could only arise in a culture dominated by the belief in a conscious, rational, all-powerful Creator" (p. 197). The naturalistic idea was thus effectively enshrined in science, in the formal, empirical method and objective, mechanistic view of nature that took shape in Europe's so-called Dark Ages. That science, from its beginnings, was embedded in Christian theism.

In the 17th century, colonists carried the naturalistic idea to America, embedded in their theology, reinforced by the conviction of an orderly and understandable universe, fueled by a moral desire to understand and proclaim God's works, admired and valued for its utility (Evans, 1984; Leahey, 2004; Stark, 2003). According to Evans, an American "Enlightenment" began with the arrival in 1714 of several crates of new books at the newly established College of Connecticut (now Yale), where the "New Learning" was enthusiastically received.

> These nine hundred volumes represented the whole spectrum of science and philosophy. Newton personally contributed his *Principia* and his *Optics*. Francis Bacon's *Advancement of Learning* was included and, most significant of all for the history of psychology, there was a copy of John Locke's *Essay Concerning Human Understanding.* (p. 22)

For the next 175 years, the New Learning guided refinements in the collection and use of empirical data and in experimental method; science became increasingly the favored mode of inquiry. Princeton's president (1795-1812) S. Stanhope Smith summarized the new rule for psychological inquiry:

> No law should be admitted on hypothesis but should rest solely on an induction of facts. . . . The testimony of our senses, and of all our simple perceptions, ought to be admitted as true, and no ulterior evidence required of the reality, or of the nature of the facts which they confirm. (as cited in Fay, 1939, pp. 62-63)

In this lively, formative era of American psychology, virtually all contributors appealed to the morally engaged Christian world view as metatheory. There was as yet no naturalistic *position.*

William James changed all that. James's publication of *The Principles of Psychology* won instant international credibility for American psychology as a wholly naturalistic science (Kuklick, 1907/1981). For his grand survey of experimental findings, James (1890/1950) formally endorsed naturalism as a stand-alone explanatory scheme: "This book consequently rejects both the associationist and the spiritualist theories; and in this strictly positivistic point of view consists the only feature . . . for which I feel tempted to claim originality" (Vol. 1, p. vi). For James, this was a pragmatic—*not a metatheoretical*—endorsement. But it effectively paved the way for the elevation of the naturalistic idea to metatheoretical status. A new, generalized, strictly empirical criterion was rapidly established for determining and defining the subject matter of psychology. Skeptics would come to refer to the powerful new explanatory scheme as "the conspiracy of

naturalism" (Fite, 1913, p. 370), the "cult of empiricism" (Toulmin & Leary, 1985/1992), or simply *scientism*.

The disengagement of psychology from the theistic position marked a sea change in the way moral and scientific concerns would be balanced. Now, because the moral aspect of behavior entailed such "unnatural" matters as free will, purpose, and moral values, the new psychologists (exercising their own will, purpose, and values) rejected it as a topic and basis for scientific inquiry; nor was it alone in its quarantine. In the positivist polemic that launched American behaviorism, J. B. Watson (1913/ 1961) visualized the field thus:

> [The blanket exclusion of mental events] as proper objects of investigation in themselves will remove the barrier from psychology which exists between it and the other [natural] sciences. The findings of psychology become the functional correlates of structure and lend themselves to explanation in physico-chemical terms. (p. 820)

Moral philosopher Warner Fite (1913) commented on this "new psychology":

> True "psychological analysis" ignores all personal experience of mentality. The science of psychology is, then, the finished result of what we may call the conspiracy of naturalism, in which each investigator has bound himself by a strange oath to obtain all his knowledge from observation of the actions of his fellows . . . and never under any circumstances to conceive them in the light of his own experience of his living. (p. 370)

But the non-physical continued to pester psychology. Stevens (1935) introduced a method whereby the science might finally be "rid of the hazy ambiguities which result in ceaseless argument and dissention" (p. 517). The method required that psychological concepts be carefully defined with respect to "concrete operations which can be performed" (p. 518). Perhaps ironically, it proved to be a means by which mentalistic concepts might receive scientific consideration. Although it widened the field of psychological investigation, *operationism* was challenged as being arbitrary. Allport (1937), for instance, outlined an entire area

of study (personality) for which "the account in these operational terms is incomplete" (p. 282). Still, Kimble (1985/ 1992) called it "the most important methodological development of the twentieth century" (p. 318) because it fostered a badly needed objectivism *and* because it permitted the study of some cognitive functions. The doctrine of operationism successfully (if dogmatically) governed the activities of psychologists from the 1930s to the 1960s, when it was liberalized, "so that such topics as consciousness, imagery, and even volition had become acceptable subjects for study" (p. 318). A half-century after the introduction of operationism, Robinson (1985/1992) marveled at its continued "uncritical acceptance" and questioned its underlying assumptions:

> Long after physics itself learned to live without operationism—because it could not live with it—psychologists are still wed to it in perilous numbers; still convinced that the act of measurement will export meaning to a concept, as if the numbers themselves were meaningful; still wary of "primitive terms" which, as it happens, no science, no system of thought can do without. (p. 62)

All the while, one area of ordinary human functioning remained off limits to the psychologist as a topic for consideration. The rules that eventually permitted certain qualifying mental events onto the field of psychology were neatly crafted to disqualify certain "primitive" others. The most prominent rule has been the *naturalistic fallacy* or *fact-value dichotomy*, which presupposes an unbridgeable division between natural *is* and moral *ought* statements and which has served to ensure that no *moral* hocus-pocus make its way onto the scientific field.

It is worth noting that not everyone subscribed to this rule. Köhler (1938/1966) found that value attaches in the human knowledge of facts. Becker (1968) argued that "the separation of fact and value is a historical anomaly that has no place in contemporary science" (p. xiii); he called it a "facile linguistic

separation" (p. 384). Kohlberg (1981) found a common basis and cooperative role for *is* and *ought*. Koch (1969/1999a) held that the naturalistic dogma produced *ameaningful* results, whereas the meaningful study of human motivation "demands recognition of an utter interpenetration between what philosophers have been wont to call the 'realms' of 'fact' and of 'value'" (p. 197). Koch argued that the presumed fact-value dichotomy is itself fallacious: "That 'is' often signalizes empirically 'verifiable' attribution . . . and 'ought' obligation is a useful feature of language, but not a regulative principle of the universe" (p. 226).

Nevertheless, like the doctrine of operationism, the dogma of the fact-value dichotomy prevailed and persisted in psychology; whatever mental operations did win their way onto the field tended to be of a subpersonal, value-neutral, formal variety—or, if they were not, they were quickly "corrected." An architect of the "cognitive revolution" described how that emerging movement early in the 1950s rapidly succumbed to a combination of political pressures and the human fascination with quantifiable data and mechanisms:

> Very early on . . . emphasis began shifting from "meaning" to "information," from the *construction* of meaning to the *processing* of information. These are profoundly different matters. The key factor in the shift was the introduction of computation as the ruling metaphor and of computability as a necessary criterion of a good theoretical model. (Bruner, 1990, p. 4)

The shift in balance toward methodological concerns and away from human ones was partly facilitated by the wartime development of "thinking machine" technologies—number-crunching computers, servomechanisms for guiding aircraft and missiles, and the like—and the shared observation by their inventors that these systems were in some way analogous to the human nervous system (Gardner, 1985; Wiener, 1948/1957). The same fascination with mechanism, empirical techniques,

and the orderliness of "God's handiwork" that had matured into science during the "Dark Ages" was now wedded to a 20th-century physicalistic science that promised to address the problems of human behavior. But the cognitivists of the 1950s, for the most part, preserved the behavioristic practice of rejecting appeals to human purpose for explaining human behavior, such that the enthusiastic newcomer to "information-processing" could set about developing, as Koch (1999c) quipped, "the latest version of humans qua subtle floppy disc programs" (p. 5).

The admission of some mental events onto the field of psychological study stimulated the expansion of an already remarkably creative *amoral* language industry. New "operations" sprung up under a multitude of identities: "Psychologists could now talk about 'coding,' 'search sets,' 'retrieval,' 'pattern recognition,' and other information structures and operations with every expectation that they were constructing scientific theories" (Leahey, 2004, p. 425).

Meanwhile, psychiatrists (and, to some extent, psychoanalysts) had already been dressing their behavioral constructs in naturalistic *medical* language. Seligman (2003) observed that the passage of the Veterans Administration Act in 1946 and the establishment of the National Institute of Mental Health in 1947 rewarded the trend. Psychologists "discovered that they could obtain grants if they described their research in terms of curing mental illness" (pp. xiv-xv), a practice that led to the discovery of treatments or cures for some 14 major mental disorders. On the other hand, the medicalization of psychology inclined mental health professionals, as Spinelli (2000) noted, to "avoid the moral and existential dimensions of evil via the transformative language of psychopathology . . . to rely upon metaphors of disease or immaturity" (p. 561) and to view moral wrongdoings

as intrapsychic disturbances "arising from disturbances of brain and mind" (p. 563). Thus, stealing and arson could be explained as *manias,* reckless gambling or drunkenness as *maladaptive behavioral patterns,* and exposing one's genitalia at a bus stop as a *mental disorder* (American Psychiatric Association, 2000).

Other psychologists, attentive to the neglected *relational* context of human behavior, added a language of *social influence* to the medical diagnostic language of psychiatry. Thus, a social psychologist would characterize the 1999 mass murder at Columbine High School as a "pathological" response to "a general atmosphere of exclusion" (Aronson, 2000, p. 13). In yet another approach, family systems theorists rejected altogether the practice of personal diagnostic labeling; rather, they defined what ordinary folk might call ordinary misconduct in terms of a pathogenic *system.* Don Jackson explained,

> From this threshold the view is not of the individual *in vitro* but of the small or larger group within which any particular individual's behavior is adaptive. We will move from individual assessment to analysis of contexts, or more precisely, the *system* from which individual conduct is inseparable. (as cited in Framo, 1982, p. 12)

Finally, representing a revitalized evolutionary theory as a "new science of the mind," Buss (1999) utilized the language of *biological mechanism* to argue that much of the current psychiatric definitional criteria (*maladjusted, maladapted, abnormal*, etc.) merely appeals to the reader's intuitive sense of "what is good or bad, desirable or undesirable" (p. 399). To correct this deficiency, Buss offered an evolutionary approach to "identifying the presence of disorder":

> Once an evolved psychological mechanism has been described and its proper function identified, a clear criterion exists for determining dysfunction: *Dysfunction occurs when the mechanism is not performing as it was designed to perform in the contexts in which it was designed to function.* A dysfunction of evolved mechanisms would be indicated, for example, if one's blood failed to clot after one's skin was cut. (p. 399)

Whether Buss's solution successfully avoids an appeal to the intuitive sense of good and bad, the reader can decide. (The contribution of evolutionary science to the psychological understanding of the moral aspect of behavior is taken up in chapter IV.) But one suspects that Watson would have admired Buss's criterion, and even Leucippus and Democritus would have approved such a materially determined explanation of behavior.

Thus, from ancient times to modern times, the naturalistic position has favored scientific concerns, subpersonal knowledge, and the language of technical precision; it has preserved a fondness for the material and the methodological and it has tended to overlook, exclude, or physicalize the moral aspect of behavior or to reduce it to some social or biological mechanism.

Humanistic Position

In a marked departure from the naturalistic position, some authors have readily acknowledged that the personal dimensions of human behavior are indeed matters of psychological concern; they began systematically to study the processes of subjective experience.

The chief concern of the *humanistic position*—as the concept is used in this work—is the human being. The roots of the position can be traced to roughly the same era in which the naturalistic tradition formed in ancient Greece. A trend took shape among the *Sophists*, a group of Athenian academics, specialists in *rhetoric*, the effective use of language. The Sophists were interested less in physics and more in human nature, human experience, and the practical matters of how people ought to live. *Humanism* was the central Sophist idea, encapsulated in the famous dictum attributed to Protagoras: *Man is the measure of all things.* Humanism

admits of another Sophist innovation *relativism*, which holds that reality, truth, and morality, like culture are all matters of personal perception, interpretation, and preference (Leahey, 2004). Historian Will Durant (1939/1966) remarked on the effects of relativism on Hellenic society,

> Every clever youth could now feel himself fit to sit in judgment upon the moral code of his people, reject it if he could not understand and approve it, and then be free to rationalize his desires as the virtues of an emancipated soul. (p. 362)

According to Leahey (2004), Sophistic moral relativism "carried dangers for Greek democracy and for Western social and political thought down to the present" (p. 47). But its ideas have demonstrated resilience and are embodied in the *humanities,* which entertain and express the intangible qualities of personal experience—wholeness, uniqueness, meaning, purpose, passion, imagination, and so on—those experiences that defy purely naturalistic or rationalistic analysis but whose products have been a source of delight and pride through time.

For the religious populations of the West, humanism was a vehicle to reinforce and celebrate the dignity of human life; its expressions were an admired adornment of divine creation. For the secular humanist—the one of interest here—it was less about God, more about man and, sometimes, man-*as*-god. Stark (2003) pointed to the nostalgic character of Renaissance-era humanism, with its dream of a restoration of past poetic glories, real or imagined. Durant (1953) hinted at something more resembling adoration:

> The proper study of mankind was now to be man, in all the potential strength and beauty of his body, in all the joy and pain of his senses and feelings, in all the frail majesty of his reason; and in these as most abundantly and perfectly revealed in the literature and art of ancient Greece and Rome. This was humanism. (pp. 77-78)

In the so-called Enlightenment era, *faith* seems best to describe the character of the secular humanist. *Man as the measure of all things* spoke to an increasingly unrestrained, optimistic faith—in human nature, in human experience, and especially in the morally sovereign individual. Secular humanism raised individualism to an ideology, carrying the conviction that, as Richardson et al. (1999) wrote, "Human beings belong to themselves and not to their traditions" (p. 40). According to philosopher Alisdair MacIntyre (1981/1984), the idea of a new moral authority, one "neither theological nor legal nor aesthetic" (p. 39), emerged between the years 1630 and 1850 and became the project of the Enlightenment philosophers.

Humanistic expressions during this period ranged from a respectful admiration of the classical past to good-natured satires of current institutions and affairs; to sharper attacks marked by intellectual snobbery, skepticism, even obscenity; to the overt preaching of amoralism and violent hatred, especially for political and religious institutions. Durant (1953) wrote, "The humanists, by and large, acted as if Christianity were a myth comfortable to the needs of popular imagination and morality, but not to be taken seriously by emancipated minds" (p. 84). Historian Peter Gay (1966) wrote that the humanists viewed the religiosity of the great 17th-century thinkers—Pascal, Newton, Locke, and the rest—as "a regrettable lapse, proof of the weakness of man's intellect" (p. 320). Leahey (2004) noted this contrast: "British philosophers did not denounce religion" (p. 153), but the French *philosophes* viewed the veneration of religious tradition as stupidity and "developed a strong hatred of religion" (p. 154).

The American colonists knew humanism. The classics were taught at Harvard as early as 1636 and the colonies endured humanistic trends of skepticism and religious liberalization (Evans, 1984). One well-known deist declared, "I

believe in God and no more . . . . My own mind is my own church" (Paine, 1794/1995, p. 666). But America's humanism was tempered by the Judeo-Christian tradition and its sober view of human nature, and when the Founders finally moved to establish their *novus ordo seclorum*, they turned for ultimate moral authority not to the nature worship of ancient Greece, nor to any faith in man, but rather to "nature and nature's God" (Jefferson, 1776/1984). Historian Thomas Cahill (1998) concluded, "There is no way it could ever have been 'self-evident that all men are created equal' without the intervention of the Jews" (p. 249).

The naturalistic refusal to address what many psychologists saw as obvious reality goes a long way toward explaining the elevation of humanism to metatheory. After all, humanists were willing to go where naturalists would not: to the subject's experience, purpose, meaning, and values. Modern forms of humanism began to appear precisely when positivistic behaviorism achieved dominance as the platform of American psychology, in the 1950s. One initial form arose in a grand convergence of multidisciplinary developments that began during World War II (Gardner, 1985). Cognitive science was to be a revolution, Bruner (1990) related, "intended to bring 'mind' back into the human sciences after a long cold winter of objectivism" (p. 1).

> It was, we thought, an all-out effort to establish meaning as the central concept of psychology—not stimuli and responses, not overtly observable behavior, not biological drives and their transformation, but meaning. . . . Its aim was to discover and to describe formally the meanings that human beings created out of their encounters with the world. (p. 2)

As noted earlier, this mission was abruptly derailed by operationism—at least for the time being.

Meanwhile, in a parallel post-World War II development, another humanistic form was taking shape, largely influenced by Goldstein's (1934/1995)

conception of the human organism as having "only one drive, the drive of self-actualization" (p. 163). Reisman (1991) enlarged upon the popular vision:

> Goldstein saw self-actualization as essentially good and the environment as, to a large extent, limiting and frustrating. Thus, like Rousseau, Goldstein thought that the basic and worthwhile potentialities of people are distorted and thwarted by a world that is largely oppressive. (p. 194)

Some psychologists were disillusioned by the apparent failure of behaviorism to explain adequately or to address important realities of human experience. These humanistic psychologists explicitly rejected the behaviorist's emphasis on conditioning, conformity, and social control, but they found appealing the idea of a biologically based inclination toward self-actualization—the *human potential*—and they adopted Goldstein's assumption of natural purpose and his biological drive explanation for good conduct.

For example, Rogers (1942) introduced a highly successful method that called for a "non-directive" and "value-neutral" clinical attitude but subtly directed the client away from inner conflict and toward the concealed values of congruence, self-activation, and psychological independence (chap. V). Rogers's (1951) theory derogated conventional morality and exchanged traditional moral authority, values, and concerns for an inherent "organismic valuing process" (p. 522) by which the person senses, feels, and chooses his own values.

> He discovers that he does not need to *know* what are the correct values; through the data supplied by his own organism, he can experience what is satisfying and enhancing. He can put his confidence in a valuing *process*, rather than in some rigid, introjected *system* of values. (p. 523)

Rogers (1951) placed ultimate faith in a basic and inevitable human goodness, proclaiming, for example, "When there is no need to defend, there is no need to attack" (p. 521). This faith never faltered. Toward the end of his life, Rogers (1989b) reaffirmed his conviction:

> Though I am very well aware of the incredible amount of destructive, cruel, malevolent behavior in today's world . . . . I do not find that this evil is inherent in human nature. In a psychological climate which is nurturant of growth and choice, I have never known an individual to choose the cruel or destructive path. Choice always seems to be in the direction of greater socialization, improved relationships with others. So my experience leads me to believe that it is cultural influences which are the major factor in our evil behaviors. (pp. 237-238)

In a distinctly religious style, to counteract the valuelessness which he saw as the ultimate modern disease, Maslow (1964) offered a humanistic model in which he envisioned a neighborly conflation of metatheoretical positions.

> Some others, still a small proportion, are finding in newly available hints from psychology another possibility of a positive, naturalistic faith, a "common faith" as Erich Fromm called it, humanistic psychology as many others are now calling . . . this new kind of faith and this new psychology. (p. 39)

As with Rogers, Maslow's new faith was none too kind to people of conventional morality or God-centered religion: "The traditional value systems have all failed, at least for thoughtful people" (Maslow, 1971, p. 151). Unlike Rogers, Maslow openly referred to objective moral principles that were discoverable "by digging into the best people in depth" (as cited in Goble, 1970, p. 87).

A related humanistic form, *virtue ethics* is currently receiving attention in the psychological community (e.g., Fowers, 2005; Keyes & Haidt, 2003; Miller, R. B., 2001; Waterman, 1995). According to Lapsley (1996), a renewed interest in classical Greek philosophy and ethics began to take shape in the 1980s, when some psychologists wondered "how the issues of character and virtue might be reintroduced into moral psychology" (p. 213). Paul Woodruff (2001), a scholar and translator of classical philosophic works, described the logic and claim of virtue ethics.

> A virtue is a capacity, cultivated by experience and training, to have emotions that make you feel like doing good things . . . . it runs against the grain of modern ethics, which is mostly about doing what is right whether

> you feel like it or not. . . . Rules are hard to apply and hard to follow. Feelings, on the other hand, are easy to follow and hard to resist. That's why, from the standpoint of moral education, virtue is best. (p. 62)

Ease of use appears here to outweigh the value of personal effort; still, Woodruff conceded, "a complete ethical theory will talk about rules and rights and duties" (p. 63).

Of all the humanistic forms, virtue ethics seems to speak most directly to the moral aspect of behavior. Central to this form is the notion of *eudaimonism,* "in which the moral priority is assigned to the individual in terms of promoting self-realization" (Waterman, 1995, p. 255). Socrates and Aristotle considered *eudaimonia* (*flourishing* or *well-being*) to be an innate human potential, the purpose and supreme good of life (Leahey, 2004; MacIntyre, 1966/1998).

Fowers (2005) offered a modern psychological application of virtue ethics. The motivational heart of his system is a trust in the natural attractiveness of the good and in the power of the human inclination to goodness, presented again as distinct from *duty ethics.*

> Virtue ethics proposes that individuals act in the best ways when they are genuinely drawn to seek what is good. In contrast, there is a . . . strand of moral reasoning that views morality as a corrective for self-interested or wayward emotion and impulse . . . [wherein] moral behavior requires an act of will in accordance with universally applicable maxims that often run counter to our natural inclinations. (p. 70)

The duty ethics of Kant (1797/1996), Kohlberg (1981) and the Judeo-Christian tradition are rejected, as is the virtue of self-restraint.

> [They] see emotions as either inherently contrary to moral action or simply unreliable and changeable as motives for acting well . . . . [They] assume that this internal conflict is an inescapable feature of human existence. The assumption of unavoidable inner conflict implies a powerful constraint on how coherent and integrated one's life can be. Virtue ethics does not adopt this assumption. (p. 71)

Virtue ethics emphasizes the wholehearted engagement in "worthwhile pursuits," "the good life," "the best kind of life," "the highest and finest," "friendship, solidarity, justice, democracy, flourishing" (p. 216). The emphasis is on good lifestyle, not good and evil; notions of universal duty and an objective standard of right and wrong conduct are precluded.

There are clear parallels between Fowers's (2005) virtue ethics claims and those of the human potentialists, such as that "vicious individuals . . . are . . . misinformed . . . mistaken about what is good in life and how they should act" (p. 72) or that people can reach a level of character where self-restraint becomes obsolete and "there is no need to struggle or agonize" over moral questions (p. 73). It should also be noted how faithfully proponents of virtue ethics have preserved the views and values of ancient Greece. According to Leahey (2004), Socrates believed that "harmful acts are never chosen as such, but only when the actor is ignorant of their evil nature. . . . [And] knowledge of the good . . . was all that was needed to effect good behavior" (p. 50). Its positive features notwithstanding, Leahey recounted, Socratic ethics fell out of favor.

> Later Greek and Roman ethical philosophers, including Plato himself and the early Christians, found Socrates' intellectual solution [to the problem of moral conduct] implausible because, manifestly, some people enjoy wrongdoing, and even virtuous people sometimes knowingly do wrong. . . . Wrestling with the source of evil in human behavior became an important question for motivational psychology. (p. 50)

Virtue ethics, with its valuation of character and practical wisdom, injects a daily human concern—the internal need and inclination towards goodness—into the psychological dialogue. This humanistic form emphasizes that goodness can be internalized, cultivated, made to come easy, but it has little to say about the human inclination that is *not* for good, or whether evil, too, can come easy.

Finally, another humanistic form began to draw attention in the 1980s, a loose association of groups known generally as *postmodernists* or specifically as *constructivists*, *deconstructionists*, *reconstructionists*, *co-constructivists*, or *social constructionists*. Postmodernist doctrines have come to dominate much of American academia, especially departments of the humanities and social sciences, much to the puzzlement of some observers (Pinker, 1997).

Postmodernism has offered psychology a critique of *certainty* and of *empiricism.* It favors qualitative over quantitative research, interpretation over measurement, narrative over experiment, plausibility over causality, the relative over the absolute, and meanings over precise operations; it has emphasized social complexity and the contextual over isolated elements and the individual (Bruner, 1990; Cushman, 1990; Feyerabend, 1975/1993; Gergen, 1985, 1994b; Richardson et al., 1999). Such tastes predispose the postmodernist to challenge traditional values and morality *using the language of values and morality.* Cushman (1993), for instance, characterized psychotherapy as a political and moral enterprise concerned with "the definition of the good and the determination of what is proper or improper behavior" (p. 103).

The postmodern form of humanism appears to be a resumption of the meaning-making revolution that Bruner and his colleagues attempted in the 1950s. Perhaps the human potentialists of the 1960s rendered the intellectual-political winds more favorable to postmodernist assumptions. Or perhaps, insofar as its criteria appear to be exclusively subjective, this humanistic form is simply the flip side of what Toulmin and Leary (1985/1992) branded the "cult of empiricism." In any case, postmodernism has been characterized as the "fairness revolution" by religion historian Huston Smith (2001); it has carried at its core a deeply moral

social protest against a variety of conventions seen to promote inequities, and its sometimes-passionate protestors, "nurtured by the soil of discontent" (Gergen, 1985, p. 267), have expressed an almost evangelical sentiment reminiscent of Maslow. The chief interest is the individual's ability to create his own reality or "story" and to find, re-create, and redeem lost "commitments," traditions, and social values:

> The central point of my argument is that in a world surely lacking in community and tradition, the most effective healing response would be to address those absences through structural societal change by reshaping political relationships and cultural forms and reestablishing the importance of their transmission. (Cushman, 1990, p. 607)

Cushman surmised that, to be effective, "reshapers" and "healers" would call for the ability to perform a "profound critique of our field and our society," requiring an as-yet-unidentified, currently unavailable (presumably postmodernist) "training to attempt such a task" (p. 609). What shape this reshaping might take and how the new social relationships might be established or enforced were not specified.

For all its good intentions, postmodern rhetoric tends to raise eyebrows among those not sharing the position, perhaps startled by curious dogmatic pronouncements, such as Watzlawick's (1984) statement that "the environment as we perceive it is our invention" (p. 42). Is one to assume, then, that objectivity, truth, moral values, and reality are essentially human creations—imaginings, fictions, properly expressed in quotation marks, and wholly relativistic? Human nature, too, in the postmodern view, is something of a blank slate. Cushman (1990) spelled it out: "Humans do not have a basic, fundamental, pure human nature that is transhistorical and transcultural" (p. 601). Cushman drew instead the profile of a de-centered, socially constructed self, more or less a passive thing, manipulated, exploited, controlled, and spoken-through by impersonal, anonymous agentic

others, identified variously as *culture, society, the modern nation state, the power structure, the economy,* or simply *advertisers.* Upon reflection, the profile does appear to represent a sobering tally of the effects of 100 years of speaking about *behavior* versus *conduct.*

Unsurprisingly, some overtly political movements, typically of a Marxist bent, have found the postmodern view useful and have demonstrated a talent for establishing platforms within professional associations, drawing support from postmodern doctrines in order to advance some special cause or morality. The following value-laden assertions from the article *Deconstructing the Essential Father* (Silverstein & Auerbach, 1999) serve as an example:

1. Both the mother-child dyad and gender itself are socially constructed myths.

2. "Neither mothers nor fathers are essential to child development" (p. 397).

3. The traditional marriage is no better than "cohabiting unions" or "friending."

4. Marital childbearing has nothing to recommend it over nonmarital childbearing.

5. As for parental involvement, "it is economics, not marriage, that matters" (p. 402).

Throughout that article, traditional Western values, painstakingly developed over 3,500 years and widely held as fundamental to civilized society, are summarily dismissed as "popular culture," and those who hold such values are discounted as "neoconservative" and "reactionary." Perhaps most significant is that these assertions appeared not in some marginal, counterculture publication but in the lead research article of the single most widely distributed professional journal of the

largest psychological association worldwide. Nor does the article represent an isolated example in recent history. If these authors' assertions seem remarkable (or dangerous), it should be remembered that such assertions fit quite well with the assumptions of Protagoras and that first formal group of moral and cultural relativists, the Sophists.

Thus, from ancient to modern times, the humanistic position has been primarily attentive to human concerns—to subjective experience and feelings—and has addressed morality as the innately driven, personally preferred, and/or socially created expression of human beings.

Theistic Position

A small number of modern-day authors have *openly* emphasized human conduct measured against an objective standard of right and wrong, associated with a transcendent moral order and a caring God who demands moral behavior. They have conceived of human nature as owning both good and bad tendencies, and have described an ongoing inner struggle between those tendencies as being part of the natural and permanent human condition.

The chief concern of the *theistic position*—as the concept is used in this work—is God. The roots of the position predate the Greek atomists and Sophists by some 1,000 years and have been traced to the introduction of its central idea *ethical monotheism* as recorded in the Hebrew Bible. Psychoanalyst Mortimer Ostow (1959) commented,

> Morality is not an intrinsic element of religion . . . but . . . was introduced into Western religion by means of the spiritual monotheism of Biblical Judaism. . . . To incorporate moral behavior into religious observance was an act of genius which made religion an institution which not only relieved

> some of the psychic pain of daily life but also made it a powerful force for social order and cohesiveness. (pp. 1795-1796)

Stark (2003) added that moral order is contingent on "images of Gods as conscious, powerful, morally concerned beings [italics removed]" (p. 376), and not all religions endorse such images.

Embedded in ethical monotheism are the notions of *moral autonomy* and *moral obligation*, as relayed in Biblical stories of primeval man (Plaut, 1981): "The Lord God called out to the man and said to him, 'Where are you?'" (Genesis, 3:9), and, "The Lord said to Cain, 'Where is your brother Abel?'" (Gen. 4:9). The God of the Jews fixed the source of evildoing in human nature and the ongoing moral conflict in each human life. The five books of Moses are charged with moral matters, from the coarse to the sublime, and with God's expectations of man, summarized in the Ten Commandments and distilled in the injunction: "Do what is right and good in the sight of the Lord" (Leviticus, 6:18). In ethical monotheism, man is not the ultimate moral authority; his moral battle is with himself; he is responsible for his acts.

Because the theistic position is commonly instituted in religion and because religion is a human—hence corruptible—institution that purports to represent God's good, the theistic position has always carried a danger for society: wrongdoing in the name of God. Nevertheless, the image of a merciful God that demands moral behavior from each human being has proved to be resilient. Enshrined in Biblical religion and its ethical code, the theistic position was carried forward from a time when the Jews were the world's only monotheists to the advent of Christianity. Through Christian institutions, ethical monotheism provided the moral system that underpinned Western civilization and its science across Europe and, eventually, in America.

American psychological thought underwent a formative period from 1714 to 1890, but histories of psychology seldom address the premodern era (Evans, 1984; Fay, 1939). Koch (1985/1992a) explained, "An initial invidious distinction between the 'old psychology' . . . and the 'new' soon led to the virtual disappearance of the 'old' from the group memory . . . a virtual blackout of historical interests" (p. 935). Might the early American psychologist have a thing or two to tell his modern counterpart?

The majority of colonists who arrived in America in the 17th century were passionately religious Christians and remarkably open-minded learners. They had full faith in the power of their theistic explanatory scheme, even with respect to secular learning. On the other hand, they shared a deep mistrust of human nature, reinforced by their own political experience that *power corrupts* (Evans, 1984; Morgan, E. S., 1992, 2004; Stark, 2003). Therefore, along with their religious commitment they were firmly committed to a secular government and to morality enforced by a disarmed church and clergy. Wrote American historian Edmund S. Morgan (2004):

> In the early seventeenth century [the clergy] had exerted a powerful influence in New England, which has often been called a theocracy. But the existence of real theocracies in the Near East today should call our attention to the care that New England Puritans took not to create one. In the rest of America the absence of clerical powers may have been at first accidental; for the founders of New England it was a matter of fundamental principle. (p. 28)

The combination of a disarmed church and a vigorous faith among the populace had two important immediate effects: (a) It fostered religious pluralism with the creation of new denominations, and (b) it reinforced both the individual's desire for liberty and his sense of obligation.

Of course, the "New Learning" so enthusiastically received in the early 18th century must also have had a seductive effect on the open-minded, religious colonist, especially the young adult. Humanism challenged religious beliefs and practices, questioned moral values, and promised freedom from the restraints and obligations of God-based morality. Naturalism offered knowledge for its own sake rather than to proclaim God's handiwork. These skeptical influences strained the colonists' confidence in the power of faith to reconcile the new learning.

> Newton's and Locke's view of the lawful universe, originally viewed with favor by Calvinist leaders as evidence of the existence and work of God, led ultimately to the view that God does not intervene in the everyday affairs of men. (Evans, 1984, p. 30)

Meanwhile, confidence in the explanatory power of empirical science only increased. A disengagement of science from its theistic roots was unstoppable. According to Evans, it was troubling for some.

> All his life Johnson [president of King's College in 1754] had tried to balance religious conscience—whether Puritan or Anglican—against the influences of the New Learning that led so many educated Americans to deism and atheism. In the end, the strain was too much, and Johnson withdrew into the safety of the Old Testament in Hebrew. . . . (p. 27)

Others seem to have been better able to reconcile moral and scientific concerns in their lives. Consider the following four exemplars of premodern, theistic psychology:

1. Jonathan Edwards (1703-1758) has been called a genius, a skeptic, the father of American functionalist and cognitive-behaviorist psychology, and more influential than any psychologist before William James (Blight, 1984; Leahey, 2004). Impelled by his desire for spiritual understanding, Edwards developed theories of mind and cognitive reorganization remarkable for his time. During the first Great Awakening, according to Blight, Edwards set about documenting cases

of religious conversion experiences in order to identify the roles of affect, cognition, and moral behavior. He wanted to establish "a set of criteria for evaluating the validity of conversion experiences . . . [and] to demonstrate that valid, reliable, and *observable* signs of conversion are theoretically possible" (p. 81). His findings demonstrated instead the *limits* of empiricism and constituted a "refutation of the concept of certain, empirically verifiable knowledge" (p. 91).

2. Benjamin Rush (1745-1813) was a signatory of the Declaration of Independence and the first draft of the Constitution; he was America's first psychiatrist, a religious Christian, and "a stern moralist" (Menninger, 1973, p. 229). Rush admired Scottish rationalism and naturalism, which he found wholly compatible with his religious views. In a warm letter of counsel to his friend John Adams, Rush affirmed the objective grounds and necessity of morality. As to those "virtues which alone can make a people free, great, and happy" (p. 206), Rush wrote,

> You may lay the foundation of national happiness only in religion, not by leaving it doubtful whether morals can exist without it, but by asserting that without religion morals are the effects of causes as purely physical as pleasant breezes and fruitful seasons. (as cited in Schutz & Adair, 1966, p. 206)

3. Dorothea Dix (1802-1887) was neither psychologist nor psychiatrist, but her demonstration of the moral role in mental health was profound. Impressed by the *moral treatment* of the European asylum reform movement, Dix launched a one-woman campaign to humanize treatment of the mentally ill in American asylums. According to Thielman (1998), "American asylum superintendents of the early nineteenth century . . . often incorporated religious and spiritual elements into their treatment approach" (p. 14). But as Lightner (1999) pointed out, such treatment did not extend to the indigent insane, who were, as Dix wrote, "confined . . . in *cages, closets, cellars, stalls, pens! Chained, naked, beaten with rods, and*

lashed into obedience!" (p. 3). Dix appealed to the Christian sensibilities of lawmakers, as in this remark from an address to the Illinois legislature in 1847:

> But gentlemen, I do not come to move your *benevolent* feelings, so much as to present *just claims.* I do not ask of you the performance of *generous acts* from yourselves and constituents, but respectfully urge you to fulfill *absolute obligations:* the obligations of man, favored with competence and sound reason, to his fellow-man, rendered helpless and dependent through infirmities to which *all* are exposed, and from which none are too rich to be exempt, or too poor to escape. (p. 14)

Her mission was impelled by her theism—a Christian devotion and the belief that religion was, in her words, "the basis of every virtue, the source of every consolation" (p. 123).

4. James McCosh (1811-1894) represented the Presbyterian, Scottish moral philosophy that so heavily informed the American founding and that, by the 1820s, provided the pedagogic context for America's conception of psychology as a moralized discipline (Evans, 1984; Leahey, 2004). From the 18th century through most of the 19th century, Scottish "commonsense psychology was taught as a pillar of religion and Christian behavior" (Leahey, p. 322). Evans explained that McCosh, as president of Yale, promoted the free exchange of sound ideas—including Darwin's theory, which he found compatible with religion. McCosh called for a distinctly American psychology, one that "would bring together the methods of experimental research from Wundt's laboratory and the underlying concepts of mind-in-use from the Scottish philosophical traditions" (p. 56). It was a call for a morally balanced psychology. To the end of his life, despite ridicule from new psychologists such as G. Stanley Hall, McCosh (1889) persisted in defining psychology as "the science of the soul" (p. 1).

As it happened, psychology students returning to America from advanced training in German universities, having immersed themselves in methods of

experimentation and a theory of *mind-as-contents*, adopted the experimental method but rapidly reverted to the more American interest in socially useful (and moralized) *mind-in-use* (Evans, 1984). As Leahey (2004) noted, "American psychologists have retained to the present day the Scots' concern with mental activity and with making psychology serviceable to society and the individual" (p. 323).

The significance of the premodern era is in the fundamental role that the theistic explanatory scheme and its moral concern played in shaping the new psychology, largely by virtue of its willingness to coordinate new data with traditional wisdom. The first efforts in the search for balance between scientific and human concerns are to be found here, where for nearly 200 years naturalism and theism wrestled for the position that would define the purpose and significance of science—and of psychology—for generations of Americans. The famous educator and Yale president Mark Hopkins (1870) summarized the premodern balance in psychology just prior to the advent of psychotherapy:

> What man ought to do will depend on what he is, and the circumstances in which he is placed. Mental science, or psychology, will therefore, be conditional for moral science, which will make use of the first, and is the higher of the two. The province of psychology will then be to show what the faculties are; that of moral philosophy to show how they are to be used for the attainment of their end. (as cited in Evans, 1984, p. 43)

As for any "blackout" of premodern contribution to psychology, Fay's (1939) observation holds true:

> Our neglected "early American psychologists" will be found to be weak indeed in scientific psychology as now conceived, but strong in philosophical insight into some of the most real and important problems of an empirical science, both introspective and behavioristic, founded upon a penetrating analysis of its fundamental assumptions and its relations to the whole field of human experience and knowledge. (p. 169)

Mainstream psychology in 18th- and 19th-century America was theistic and moralized, concerned with *conduct,* moral mind-in-use. At the dawn of the 20th century the old, moralized, faculty psychology was about to be purged of moral matters as such and to submit to a new scientific method, to functionalism and laboratory experimentation, and to 100 years of demoralization or "moral neutrality." With the moral component removed, B. Schwartz (1986) noted that the educative interest shifted from teaching people "how they *should* live" to teaching "how they *do* live" (p. 17).

Hermann von Helmholtz (1877/1938) had warned against the tyranny of a materialistic metaphysics. In his detailed analysis of American psychology, Rychlak (1977) faulted a "functionalist metaphysics" (p. 167) for "arbitrarily negating proof for teleology [referring to purposeful human behavior]" (p. 177). Rychlak counted William James among the dissenters in this materialistic scheme. Indeed, when James (1890/1950) declared psychology a naturalistic science, it was not a statement of any faith in scientism. In his brief version of *Principles*, James (1892/1948) forcefully articulated his true metatheoretical position:

> Ethics makes a counterclaim; and the present writer, for one, has no hesitation in regarding her claim as the stronger, and in assuming that our wills are "free." For him, then, the deterministic assumption of psychology is merely provisional and methodological. . . . I only mention the conflict to show that all these special sciences, marked off for convenience from the remaining body of truth . . . must hold their assumptions and results subject to revision in the light of each others' needs. (p. 461)

Clearly, James found the naturalistic idea useful but he did not elevate it to meta-theory. In a letter to a friend regarding his upcoming Gifford Lectures on religious experience to be delivered in Edinburgh, James (1900) again disclosed his fundamental position:

> The problem I have set myself is . . . to defend . . . "experience" against "philosophy" as being the real backbone of the world's religious life . . . and to make the hearer or reader believe, what I myself invincibly do believe, that . . . the life of it [religion] as a whole is mankind's most important function. A task well-nigh impossible, I fear, and in which I shall fail; but to attempt it is *my* religious act. (p. 127)

James (1902/1994) recognized the moral implications of the religious stance: "The world interpreted religiously is not the materialistic world over again, with an altered expression . . . [but] *different conduct must be required"* [italics added] (p. 563).

His extraordinary capacity to work in both naturalistic and theistic spheres notwithstanding, James's foremost impact was the instant worldwide credibility that his *Principles* earned for the science of psychology. The price of that credibility was the demoralization of psychology, and payment was under way. Leahey (2004) recounts that, for years to come, the theistic position would be virtually silenced by successive waves of Freudian psychoanalysis, behavioral, sociological, and humanistic psychologies, and the seemingly wholesale abandonment of traditional moral values in academia and eventually in the popular culture (chap. 9).

It was O. H. Mowrer (1947/1950b) who effectively breached the silence with stirrings of premodern psychological thought. In works still largely unknown to today's psychologists, Mowrer began to question prevailing therapeutic dogma.

> In recent decades it has been unfashionable to speak up in support of discipline, responsibility, and duty. Self-expression, freedom, and personal liberty have been the popular rallying cries. Merely because we have discovered the unhealthy after-effects in the lives of some unfortunate individuals of stupid and brutish discipline, we have jumped to the conclusion that it is discipline as such which is to blame. On both theoretical and pragmatic grounds we now know that discipline, properly conceived, is not only necessary for the maintenance of group life but that it is also necessary for the normal development and adult happiness of the individual. (p. 469)

Mowrer (1947/1950c) cast Freudian anxiety theory in terms of moral conflict.

> Nothing could be truer in the light of my own clinical, as well as personal, experience than the proposition that psychotherapy must involve acceptance of the essential friendliness and helpfulness of anxiety, which under such management, will eventually again become ordinary guilt and moral fear, to which realistic readjustments and new learning can occur. (pp. 539-540)

Mowrer (1947/1950a) replaced Freud's notion of *biological frustration* with *moral frustration.*

> Most—perhaps all—neurotic human beings suffer, not because they are unduly inhibited as regards their biological drives, but because they have disavowed and repudiated their own moral strivings. Anxiety comes, not from repressed sexuality or pent-up hatred, but from a denial and defiance of the forces of conscience. (p. 568)

Mowrer (1957) identified the position that supported his observations.

> Ongoing researches and a re-examination of history point to the conclusion that religious precepts and practices, over the centuries, have grown up largely in response to man's unique psychological needs and that there are insights and prescriptions for action here which contemporary man may, with profit, reconsider. (p. 110)

Mowrer (1961) conceived of his approach as "actively religious but minimally theological. . . . It stresses the interpersonal dimension as more crucial for therapeutic movement than the man-God relationship" (p. 220).

> I . . . assume that there are *principles*—universal, consistent, knowable principles—in the domain of human personality and social process which transcend "persons," and that we can *know others* and *be ourselves*, in the ultimate sense, only in terms of these principles . . . [and] what *I* want . . . is a clearer knowledge of *principles*, which we can learn to obey and live abundantly or, if we choose, disobey and suffer the consequences. (pp. 182-183)

Mowrer was not one to mistake complexity for profundity. At a time when the mood in American academia increasingly favored modern, secularized models, Mowrer (1964) reclaimed sources of the old psychology for his hypothesis: "The personal condition we misleadingly call 'neurosis' is essentially what earlier

generations knew, more accurately, as a state of 'unredeemed sin' or 'hardness of heart'" (p. 750). Nor was his a claim to orthodoxy:

> Our present difficulties in the realm of morality do not, in my judgment, come from lack of complete agreement as to what is or what is not a "sin." It's rather that we don't really believe and enforce what we are presumably already agreed on, namely the importance of being honest, responsible, "square" with respect to the commitments we have already made. (p. 752)

Mowrer (1967) was surely thinking about a curriculum change when he published a collection of writings from popular sources, psychology, law, the clergy, and literature, all in support of addressing moral concerns in the field of mental health. He wrote, "There is no textbook which systematically presents the tenets of what may be called Integrity Therapy" (p. x).

It is a statement both of the times and of human nature that all of Mowrer's efforts in this area were abruptly relegated to the dust bin of psychological history. To this day, with rare exceptions (e.g., May, 1950), references to O. H. Mowrer are limited to his work in sensory physiology, learning, and behavior, such as his bell-and-pad method for the treatment of nocturnal enuresis. The message must have been clear to the young psychologist contemplating doing research on moral matters or advocating a moralized psychology on a theistic basis.

Expressions of a theistic position such as Mowrer's were atypical in 20th-century mainstream psychology. Another exception was Karl Menninger, who, in 1954, initiated training programs that integrated theologians, clergy, and psychiatry (Menninger Clinic, 2008). In a well-received popular publication Menninger (1973) suggested that psychology may be contributing to an erosion of morality in America with its ill-conceived populist tenets, such as, "There are no 'bad' children; only bad parents" (p. 44) and its theories that transform misdeeds and crimes into illnesses and evil into pathology. Menninger asked, "Is it not possible

that some . . . patients, deeply involved in self-destructive or socially destructive activities, are seeking help for minor symptoms which disguise major sins?" (p. 49). Menninger insisted that "mental hygiene is a reality, not a metaphor," and urged a culture-wide, personal "renunciation of apathy and a courageous facing of the responsibility for evil" (p. 189).

It is probable that a significant silent community has existed all along, within the general population of psychologists (e.g., Andrews, 1987; Bergin, 1991; Hoge, 1996; Leary, 1980; Shafranske, 1996b) and a movement toward greater overt interest in the relationship between theism and psychology has been gaining momentum since the latter half of the 20th century (e.g., Koenig, 1998; Pargament, 1997; Richards & Bergin, 1997/2005; Shafranske, 1996a).

Allen E. Bergin was perhaps the first modern-day advocate of the theistic position to win a hearing for moral values in mainstream psychology for the inclusion of the moral aspect of behavior. Like O. H. Mowrer, Bergin's (and his colleagues') efforts span decades; more than Mowrer, Bergin brings a wealth of empirical support for a morally balanced psychology. In "Psychotherapy and Religious Values" Bergin (1980b) pointed to the nontechnical values that underlie psychotherapeutic techniques, observing that they are clearly "a means for mediating the value influence intended by the therapist" (p. 97). Such moralistic clinical values are justified on medical, social, and humanistic grounds. Bergin attacked the deliberate *exclusion* of religion-based moral values—a taboo, he noted, that flies in the face of logic, reality, and practical sense. He contrasted clinical with theistic values and advocated *theistic realism* for the effective treatment of the estimated 30% to 90% of Americans whose values are religion based. Bergin assumed (as did Mowrer) discoverable, non-relativistic laws of

human behavior: "The axiom of theistic systems that human growth is regulated by moral principles comparable in exactness with physical laws" (p. 99).

Bergin (1985) identified the major metatheoretical positions in psychology from which the problem of morality has been addressed:

> Although there is a trend in western nations toward distinctly humanistic and naturalistic therapeutic philosophies consistent with the scientific secularism that dominates western education, a strong countertrend exists within more theistic and conservative communities. (p. 99)

Bergin discussed specific values shared by psychotherapists and believed to enhance mental health. As in prior works (1980a, 1980b, 1980c), he hammered the irrational argument that universals or absolutes require or cause narrow-minded authoritarianism. Bergin (1988) argued that the deliberate exclusion of spiritual perspectives results both in a failure "to provide a comprehensive account of human functioning" (p. 21) and in poor therapeutic outcomes. By contrast, "A spiritual perspective . . . anchors values in universal terms" (p. 25) to which a client is more likely to commit. Furthermore, "self-regulation can never be optimally successful unless a commitment is made to values" (p. 26). Bergin noted a consensus among psychologists that such universals reflect "values that seem to be derived in a general way from the Judeo-Christian roots of our culture" (p. 28). Citing D. T. Campbell, Bergin added, "The development and endurance of such traditions is not likely to have been accidental or irrelevant to the needs of human beings" (p. 30).

In his analysis of 10 years of empirical studies Bergin (1991) examined a "legitimate concern among clinicians that religiosity can be associated with a variety of mental disorders" (p. 399) but he found no correlation. However, Bergin, Payne, and Richards (1996) found that "intrinsic religiousness is positively related

to mental health" (p. 303) and that "biases and stereotypes against religiosity are giving way to empirical findings showing positive relationships between mental health markers and committed religiosity" (p. 297). Moreover, "recent literature amply supports the therapeutic potential of healthy spiritual commitments" (p. 304). These authors advocated "an explicit and nonrelativistic therapist stance about values, along with a tolerance for differences . . . instead of an implicit and relativistic therapist stance" (p. 300). Richards and Bergin (1997/2005) presented a model for a nonsectarian *theistic psychotherapy* in which they located the role of moral universals, responsibility, and values in the context of a spiritual psychology.

Finally, in an exploration of their own Mormon perspective, Barlow and Bergin (1998) reaffirmed the notion of morality anchored in religion, noting that the programs of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints (LDS) "are aimed at human development that aspires eventually to nothing less than becoming more Godlike inwardly and in conduct" (p. 233). Here is a living expression of the ancient Biblical tradition of *ethical monotheism*: "You shall be holy; for I, the Lord your God, am holy" (Leviticus, 19:2, New King James Version).

Thus, from ancient times to the present, the theistic position—specifically ethical monotheism—has featured the moral vision of a covenantal community under God and a human nature that entails an ongoing struggle between good and evil inclinations, between right and wrong. A tiny minority of psychologists openly holding this position have taken the moral aspect of behavior to be of fundamental concern with respect to psychological functioning.

Chapter Summary

Historically, psychologists have addressed matters properly belonging to the moral domain in the categories and terms of content, process, or theory. Likewise, they have viewed such matters from a naturalistic, humanistic, or theistic metatheoretical position. An author's metatheoretical position is particularly significant in that it reflects the author's assumptions about human nature and the world, about science and ways of knowing, and about the right and the good; it defines the terms, categories, and direction of the author's line of inquiry as well as how elements of the moral aspect are organized. Each of the positions has ancient origins, each treats the moral aspect in its own way, and all have been accorded more or less weight at different times in the ongoing search for balance between the scientific and moral concerns of psychology.

Mainstream American psychology was effectively demoralized in the 20th century; moral matters as such were no longer acceptable topics in psychology. Ideas of a morally balanced psychology received some hearing, due to the efforts of a few persistent voices, but morality remains marginalized, only dimly recognized as a component—much less a *pillar*—of mental health. Paradoxically, there has been a proliferation of psychological data related to morality. This growing collection of data has outstripped its own integration as well as its accommodation within psychology generally and has remained unfulfilled in terms of a comprehensive interpretation.

The focus now turns from the basic categories in which psychologists have viewed and handled moral matters to the basic nature of morality and its effects on the person.

Chapter III
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND, BASIC NATURE

This chapter continues and completes the literature review as it unfolds against the backdrop of the search for a balance of scientific and moral concerns. New categories are introduced but the emphasis shifts from basic categories to the basic nature of morality as defined in its second sense: as a unitary *presence*. The research question broadly is, *How have psychologists conceived the moral presence, and what effect does the moral presence have on the person?* In order to address the question, this chapter is organized around the third and fourth of the four key observations made in the course of the review. These regard two qualities of the moral aspect—*the enduring moral presence* and *the intrusive moral demand*—which, it is proposed, warrant the distinct moral category *conduct* in a science of human behavior. The chapter is designed to (a) introduce the *moral presence* and the problem of the moral ground; (b) introduce and sketch the development of the moral forms and traditions, including an American tradition; (c) examine how psychologists' solutions to the problem of the moral ground have revealed or concealed the moral presence; and (d) introduce *moral intrusion*, its nature, agents, and effects. A chapter summary and a restatement of the problem and purpose of the study are provided.

Third Observation: Enduring Moral Presence

Given the discussion thus far, this third key observation is inescapable: For 100 years—a modest but steady stream of advocates for a moralized psychology notwithstanding—the moral aspect of human behavior *as the personal encounter with the moral situation* has been the virtually unacknowledged elephantine presence in the living room of psychology. Despite the immersion of premodern American psychology in the moral tradition, despite the weighty role of morality in contemporary life, and despite a substantial and growing body of knowledge related to the moral aspect, the fact remains: The psychological community of 20th-century America has, for the most part, shunned the moral presence as defined in this work, as a topic for study. Rather, modern psychology has treated moral matters "scientifically" by reducing them to their components and determinate processes; or ideologically as taboo, by a silent marginalization or isolation; or dismissively as if they were a collection of behavioral artifacts or fashion trends or the exclusive business of religion, somehow irrelevant to a science of mind and behavior. Even where moral matters *have* been addressed directly, one or more of the three defining criteria of the moral presence—its agency, objectiveness, or gravity—have been effectively blocked from view. This situation continues to be the case today, with exceptions. Present-day introductory college textbooks reveal psychology's persistently thin and fragmented view of morality, a view typically limited to a brief recap of Kohlberg's stage theory of moral development (see appendix). A truly vital and whole image of the moral aspect of behavior in the mainstream curriculum is notable more in its absence than its presence. The discipline has successfully resisted decades of proddings by a handful of clinicians

and researchers. All told, psychology has yet to accommodate the moral aspect in a realistic way. All told, the elephant has not gone away.

Problem of the Moral Ground

The interest now is a fuller view of the enduring moral presence. The task is to find a reliable way by which the moral presence and its defining features and valid claims may be known. To this end, the research question can be more narrowly stated: *How have psychologists revealed or concealed the basic nature of morality?* Here, a blunt and crucial challenge invariably interrupts: *Whose morality?* This short question has the power to confuse thinking and end dialogue. It is the first question of any moral analysis—the question of authority: *On what grounds are moral claims made?* The authority or grounds on which morality rests constitutes the initial challenge to a fuller knowledge of the moral presence. A review of known solutions to this problem—the successes as well as the failures—will be instructive and occupies this third observation. It must begin in the back yard of history.

Early Pathways to Morality

The human concern with moral conduct—with good and bad behavior—is as old as human interaction. Some of the world's earliest written records (ca. 4000 to 2000 B.C.E.) prove a surprisingly articulate interest in moral concerns. According to Assyriologist Samuel Noah Kramer (1963), the Sumerians of the Near East "cherished goodness and truth, law and order, justice and freedom, righteousness and straightforwardness, mercy and compassion, and naturally abhorred their opposites, evil and falsehood" (p. 123). The Sumerians are also said

to have been an aggressive people—ambitious, competitive, and fond of power and prestige. Nor were these latter features frowned upon. Contradictory human inclinations and emotions were apparently familiar and unexceptional to the ancients.

Durant (1935/1963) pointed out that, in all archaic societies, certain behaviors were praised as virtuous, while others were condemned. Morals were universal in this sense, but a transgression in one group could well be a virtue in another: right and wrong were often a matter of local custom. Situation counted as well. Durant (1935/ 1963) wrote of the Hellenes (ca. 1200 B.C.E.), at a time when "no city is safe from sudden and unprovoked attack" (p. 49):

> Odysseus can hardly speak without lying, or act without treachery . . . . The other Achaeans . . . envy and admire him, and look up to him as a model character . . . . a hero in every respect. . . . Even the goddess Athena praises him for his lying, and counts this among the special charms for which she loves him. (p. 49)

And yet, Durant writes and quotes from Homer, "He is a gentle father, and in his own kingdom a just ruler, who 'wrought no wrong in deed or word to any man in the land'" (p. 49). Durant explained:

> The Achaean's standard of judgment is as different from ours as the virtues of war differ from those of peace . . . . Every weakling is fair play; the supreme virtue, in his view, is a brave and ruthless intelligence. Virtue is literally *virtus,* manliness . . . . A bad man is not one that drinks too much, lies, murders, and betrays; he is one that is cowardly, stupid, or weak. (p. 50)

Thus, the good, just, heroic Achaean was free to deceive, rob, rape, or brutally murder *strangers*, with impunity, shamelessly, at his pleasure—and did so. Slavery, infanticide, and filicide, too, were moral norms among the ancients (deMause, 1982; Meltzer, 1971/1993).

These are examples of a prototypal moral form, here termed *tribal morality*: various collections of moral concerns and practices rooted in the organismic urges to survive, to form groups, to protect *one's own*, and to defeat and dominate others. Tribal morality thus grounded was as likely to be ruthlessly aggressive as it was to be kind; its values—such as blood relations, might, and family honor or *face*—applied exclusively to the tribal group.

The pagan cult was the repository of ancient tribal morality. Its gods, deifications of nature's phenomena, were subject to many of the same natural forces, frailties, and capricious urges that befell humans—some were seen as good, others "planned evil and falsehood, violence and oppression—in short, all the immoral and unethical modes of human conduct" (Kramer, 1963, p. 125). The world was known through magical rites and myths. Ultimate moral authority was vested in the cult; orderly conduct was reinforced by threat of religious sanction. Such was the *primacy of the cult* that its authority was as undeniable as the fearsome reality against which it offered protection and psychological relief (Boardman, Griffin, & Murray, 1986; Durant 1935/1963; Kaufmann, 1956; Kramer, 1963). The cult *was* the moral presence.

From Sumer to Greece—birth-regions of Western civilization—human beings knew a mythical, magical, mysterious, and fatalistic moral presence, as shown in this Sumerian hymn.

> To comfort the orphan, to make disappear the widow,
> To set up a place of destruction for the mighty,
> To turn over the mighty to the weak . . . ,
> Nanshe searches the heart of the people. (Kramer, 1963, p. 125)

In time, especially in Greece, passive awe and superstition began to give way to the desire and effort to *comprehend* nature and to question its gods, including those of the moral realm.

> The chorus in Euripides' *Hippolytus* comments, when faced by the downfall of a most virtuous man: "To think of the gods' care for men is a great relief to me from pain. Deep within me I have hopes of understanding; but when I look around at what men do and how they fare I cannot understand." (Boardman et al., 1986, p. 272)

In a world that stumbled between brutality and tyranny on one hand and tenderness and civility on the other, at a time when human action was seen as subject to the fatalistic whims of the gods and when right and good were considered properties of tribe and cult, people still dreamed of justice, care, and meaning and yearned to understand the motives of men.

Two Prototypal Moral Traditions

Out of the primordial mix of tribal practices in Near Eastern and Greek societies arose two great moral traditions that would eventually propel and support Western civilization. It is unknown to what extent these societies influenced one another but, given the centuries of trade and war that engaged them, an exchange of ideas was likely. This much is known: Each of the two new moral traditions preserved a deep appreciation of moral gravity; each rejected the popular polytheistic cult and tribal morality of its surrounding world; each found a new authority for a *universal morality* to replace the tribal; each elevated in its way the moral responsibility of the individual person; and each developed its own distinctive way of viewing, grasping, relating to, and explaining the moral aspect of human behavior.

Hebraic Prototype

The advent of the Hebraic tradition marks the first full expression of the moral presence as it is understood in this work. According to Biblical scholar Yehezkel Kaufmann (1956), a small Near Eastern band of wandering shepherds or *Hebrews* migrated from Sumeria some 3,500 years ago and undertook a revolution in the way man, morality, and the divine were viewed. Many of the Hebrew stories (of creation, the flood, the dispersal of a once-unified language community, and others) and many of their moral rules (against murder, theft, lying, and the like) were not at all new. Rather, they were restatements of a millennia-old wisdom literature and a morality already ancient in the Near East. What distinguished the Hebrews was implicit in "the notion of a supreme omnipotent God, who performs wonders, who is good and abundant in mercy, and who revealed His word to man in prophetic visions" (p. 18). The knowledge of the one God grew among the Hebrews for some 250 years prior to the revelation at Mount Sinai; the worship of false gods—of nature, magic, or the powers of man—was forbidden. The revelation, said to have occurred in the 13th century B.C.E., marked the founding of the faith and nation of Israel; its message was without parallel in the pagan world.

> When the hidden God revealed Himself to Israel, by framing moral rules as expressions of His will He put their authority on a new basis. . . . This restatement lent new authority to morality, for now the moral imperative was absolute, supreme, everlasting, inasmuch as it was divine. (pp. 23-24)

Over time, from the notion of one predictable, caring God of all creation and one morality for all, the Israelite prophets derived the revolutionary "doctrine of the primacy of morality" (p. 61).

> Israelite religion raised morality to the level of an absolute religious value, because it regarded morality as essentially divine. Moral attributes are of the essence of God Himself; He who requires righteousness, justice, and com-

> passion of man is Himself righteous, just, and compassionate. The moral man thus shares, so to speak, in divinity. (p. 62)

This doctrine—*ethical monotheism,* as it has come to be known—initiated a profound revision of thought in two important ways. First, it began to erase long-standing group-specific values—of family, tribe, race—and to write in values of goodness having *equal and universal* application (Hertz, 1977).

> And if a stranger sojourn with thee in your land, ye shall not do him wrong. The stranger that sojourneth with you shall be unto you as the home-born among you, and thou shalt love him as thyself; for ye were strangers in the land of Egypt. (Leviticus 19:33-34)

Second, it effectively stripped nature, the paganistic cult, its deities and priests of any intrinsic, absolute moral authority, and it did the same for the Israelite's own "YHWH cult" (Kaufmann, 1956). The knowledge and doing of good and evil became the responsibility of the individual person from whom God demanded obedience—and more. God required *love,* and a turning or conversion of the heart, as well as action (Hertz, 1977).

> And thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy might. And these words, which I command thee this day, shall be upon thy heart; and thou shalt teach them diligently unto thy children, and shall talk of them when thou sittest in thy house, and when thou walkest by the way, and when thou liest down, and when thou risest up. (Deuteronomy 6:5-9)

Knowledge was to be predicated on this love. Nor was this to be a blind, submissive love: The very name *Yisra'el* suggests that man wrestles in his heart with God, a relationship drawn repeatedly in the Hebrew Bible (Prager & Telushkin, 1975/1981). In struggling with God, by presenting moral arguments and pleadings at critical moments, figures such as Abraham, Lot, Jacob, and Moses are seen to have influenced God. In all this, the sense of moral responsibility of the individual was enhanced. Over time, most of the paganistic religions of the world,

with their anthropomorphic and sometimes immoral gods *in* nature, would collapse upon the announcement of the one perfect God *above* nature.

> The heart of man was captivated by the message of the one supreme God, sovereign and unfettered by blind fate, a God whose sacred moral will governs all, and is the source of man's moral obligation. The spirit of man was elevated by the message of his moral freedom and the injunction, "So choose thou life!" (p. 91)

Historian Paul Johnson (1987) wrote, "There had always been a rationalizing element in Mosaic legalism and theology" (p. 100). To be sure, Judaism includes a meticulous, systematic study, deliberation, and expounding of Torah laws and morality. But, according to Rabbi Louis Jacobs (1960), the genius of the Judaic moral tradition is primarily expressed in its concrete application—the doing of God's commandments as an act of love—not in abstract thought: "It is no remote ideal but a real, vital force in the lives of Jews . . . . 'existential' rather than systematic" (pp. 7-8). Knowledge, reason, concepts, and systems, then, are subordinated to righteousness in conduct and the love of God. The element of *care*—of pathos and delight—is characteristic of this prototypic tradition and of the Judaic conception of the moral presence.

Greek Prototype

According to historian J. M. Roberts (1976/1993), in and around the 5th century B.C.E., in a period of successive wars, a small number of Greek artisans, artists, and thinkers representing an aristocratic class generated a stunning moment of civilization, known as *the Greek miracle*. Their creations set the standards for physical beauty for much of the world for over 2,000 years; but, Roberts claimed, "it is an achievement of the mind that constitutes their claim on our attention" (p. 152). Durant (1939/1966) wrote, "Here for the first time thought became secular,

and sought rational and consistent answers to the problems of the world and man" (p. 135). In making the distinction between nature and convention, the Greeks—presumably by the faculty of reason—had discovered both nature and philosophy; and in overturning the primeval tradition of ancestral authority, they found a more fundamental and universal authority in *natural right* (Strauss, 1953/1971).

It was a time of psychological, political, and moral reorganization. For millennia, tribalism had been the organizing principle for the inhabitants around the Aegean sea. The forces of geography and the human urge to associate—and to war—led to tribal alliances and the emergence between 700 and 500 B.C.E. of the *polis* or city-state, which took on a new sort of organizational form. Now the ancient desire to understand behavior and the dream of justice found a measure of fulfillment. Roberts (1976/1993) noted that among the effects of the new political culture was a new awareness "that political arrangements could be consciously chosen" (p. 157). Unprecedented numbers of Greeks were exposed to the new mindset as they cast about for a ground on which to establish a new moral and social order.

Leahey (2004) added a further point. Life in a democracy meant large assemblies of unrelated members engaged in processes of debate, mutual criticism, and problem solving. "The ancient Greek philosophers were the first thinkers to seek progress through criticism" (p. 40). Because "the critical attitude is fundamental to both philosophy and science," Leahey claimed, "founding a critical tradition of thought was the major achievement of the Greek inventors" (p. 41). The point is well supported. Early in the 6th century B.C.E. Thales had already established *empiricism* as a dispassionate method of critical inquiry and rational explanation of the natural world "not affected by the capricious whims of the gods"

(p. 41). A century later Parmenides placed *rationalism* at the center of the philosophic method as the ultimate mode of knowing, thereby establishing the *primacy of reason.*

Of course, there were sophists, skeptics, cynics, and others who favored less rational approaches but, in Durant's (1939/1966) words, "the dominant strain, characteristic of Greek thought, was the love and pursuit of reason" (p. 136). The primacy of reason had subversive effects on tribalism and the paganistic cult. The individual sense of sovereignty was enhanced. Political and logical relations challenged tribal blood relations. Events once explained by superstition and myth were now explained by observation and reason. The heroic passions, rejected as irrational and blind, were overshadowed by a cooler passion for beauty and the pure pleasure of a well-defined idea. The new heroic act was the pursuit of *knowledge* by empirical and especially by rational means. Under the primacy of reason, the cult and priest were relieved of their moral authority by philosophy and the philosopher.

Philosophy contained its own prototypic approach to the moral presence. For the first time, a status was articulated for morality in a predetermined "law of nature and of reason" (MacIntyre, 1966/1998, p. 106). Socrates viewed morality as inherent in human nature; Aristotle claimed man's moral inborn purpose was to "flourish" (Leahey, 2004). Plato sought in reason "a natural ethic that shall stir men's souls to righteousness without relying on heaven, purgatory, and hell" (Durant, 1935/1963, p. 517). These thinkers were so enamored of philosophy, so hopeful and confident in the faculty of reason, that they relentlessly advanced the belief that man does not knowingly do wrong and that goodness follows knowledge

naturally. In this Greek tradition of *moral philosophy* the moral presence was seen as part of a purposeful natural order.

Problem of the Moral Ground, Revisited

In tracing the distinction between tribal and universal forms of morality, two alternatives in that first question of moral discourse *Whose morality?* are exposed: In any moral situation, either right and wrong are exclusive properties under the *human* authority of a person or specific group; or they are universal principles under a larger authority, equally applicable to all persons and groups. In considering the distinctive Hebraic and Greek prototypes, two alternatives of that larger authority are revealed: the *theistic* and the *naturalistic*. The tribal cult member experienced the moral presence through myths, rites, and physical force; morality was identical with cultic practice. The moral philosopher experienced the moral presence through reason and the power of knowledge; morality was identical with natural law. The worshipper of the one good God experienced the moral presence through revelation and the power of love and faith; morality was an attribute of God. From Sumer to Greece, the ancient moral traditions were variations of the three prototypal forms and their human, natural, and supernatural grounds.

Three Variations

Having introduced these prototypal expressions of the moral presence, and before addressing modern American psychological solutions to the problem of the moral ground, a brief look at the vehicles by which the ancient moral presence has endured is in order.

Christian Tradition

Early Christians embraced the Greek philosophic tradition, which they applied in a *rational theology* for understanding God's will, word, and world. Clement of Alexandria (ca. 150-215) wrote:

> Do not think that we say that these things are only to be received by faith, but also that they are to be asserted by reason. For indeed it is not safe to commit these things to bare faith without reason, since assuredly truth cannot be without reason. (as cited in Stark, 2005, p. 7)

But Christianity did not adopt the *primacy* of reason. Although its theology diverged from its Judaic origins, it is clear that the Christian moral tradition preserved the essential features of the Hebraic prototype—ethical monotheism based on divine revelation, the primacy of morality, the Ten Commandments, and so on. One moral Christian emphasis of particular historical significance was modestly credited by MacIntyre (1966/1998, without credit to its Hebraic origin):

> Christianity . . . incarnates one moral ideal which is foreign to . . . other views, the ideal expressed by saying that somehow or other all men are equal in the sight of God. . . . This doctrine in secular form, as a demand for minimum equal rights for all men and hence for a minimum of freedom, is Christianity's chief seventeenth-century achievement. (p. 149)

The Christian understanding of God's word is told in a letter from political prisoner Richard Overton (1646) to England's House of Lords as "An arrow against all tyrants and tyranny":

> For by natural birth all men are equally and alike born to like propriety, liberty and freedom; and as we are delivered of God by the hand of nature into this world, every one with a natural, innate freedom and propriety . . . even so are we to live, everyone equally and alike to enjoy his birthright and privilege; even all whereof God by nature has made him free. (p. 1)

Christianity carried the Hebraic prototype, and its moral tradition defined the standards of conduct and provided the view, ground, and voice of the moral presence for Western civilization for over 2,000 years and to this day.

Secular Tradition

The 17th and 18th centuries saw a resurgence of the Greek moral prototype in Europe's secular humanism. As with Plato's search for a "natural ethic," the interest was to find a compelling moral authority and to establish a social order based not on God or some divinely ordained government but on reason and natural law. MacIntyre (1981/1984) argued that this "Enlightenment project of justifying morality" (p. 36) was quixotic and doomed to failure from the start, precisely because it subordinated morality to a newly conceived *individual*, independent of any pre-assigned status, role, end, or purpose, "sovereign in his moral authority" (p. 62). Political philosopher Leo Strauss (1953/1971) had drawn a similar conclusion in his analysis of John Locke's teaching:

> [It was] revolutionary not only with regard to the biblical tradition but with regard to the philosophic tradition as well. Through the shift of emphasis from natural duties or obligations to natural rights, the individual, the ego, had become the center and origin of the moral world, since man—as distinguished from man's end—had become the center or origin. (p. 248)

In their effort to catch a glimpse of the moral ground through the lens of reason, the "natural ethic" most frequently encountered by observers was *self-interest* in the form of variously nuanced footprints of the moral presence, variously situated in biological, social, political, and psychological settings. It was not an insignificant finding. Locke's doctrine of natural right, which revealed a universal, rational scaffold for right and wrong in nature, begins with the most basic of rights and the first article of private property: *the life of the self.* Locke's influence was profound; his political rationale underpins the Declaration of Independence and the U.S. Constitution (Strauss, 1953/1971).

The question as to whether a natural universal ground is possible without appeal to a divine order remains unsettled. Meanwhile, proponents of the secular

moral tradition—theists, deists, agnostics, atheists, humanists, and scientists among them—continue to find it a viable way of at least partly understanding morality. Their leanings range from skepticism to belief, from reason to revelation, and they continue to examine the human capacities to sense, to seek, to detect, to appreciate, to critique, and to reason about a lawful moral presence.

Tribal Paths

In this study the label *tribal* is applied to nonuniversal moral forms. It is the oldest of the prototypes, having emerged in the precivilizational world that it resembles in its savage, aggressive, territorial, authoritarian behavioral style, and its eagerness to let blood and to take life. *Modern* tribal moralities tend toward intolerance, racism, tyranny, belligerent nationalism; they authorize mass murder, ethnic cleansing, genocide, homicidal "martyrdom," the intentional sacrifice of the lives of children, the suppression of women by so-called honor killings and other murderous pleasures acted out by otherwise ordinary human beings (Browning, 1992; Goldhagen, 1996; Gross, 2001; Oliver & Steinberg, 2005; Shirer, 1960; Wright, 2006). Tribal moralities share a defining feature, which is that the leader or the group *is* the unquestioned moral authority ("Right is what *I* do"). Being honored as a conforming member and believer is primary; objective principles of truth, justice, decency, and the preciousness of every human life (the natural right) are subordinate to values such as saving face and to practices such as the purification of nonbelievers or nonmembers by threat or murder.

Many of the ancient, tribal moral forms are gone. Gibson's *Apocalypto* (2007) offers a visceral experience of a now-defunct tribal morality in pre-Columbian Central America. Some ancient forms have survived intact in relatively

benign regional pockets: Kazantzakis's (1946/1953) *Zorba the Greek* captured the primitive superstitions, heroic passions, cruelty, scorn of strangers, and the custom of honor killing in 20th-century Crete. Today, a virulent, aggressive form of tribal morality seeks normalization among Islamic populations and aims to dominate all nonbelieving populations (Naji, 2006; Wright, 2006). Murder is systematically normalized for sixth-grade children, as by this quote from a Syrian textbook: "The purification of Palestine of the Jews . . . is a Jihad in the Cause of God" (as cited in Manor, 2007, p. 52); children are urged to "martyrdom" as in the seventh-grade textbook *Our Beautiful Language* used by the Palestinian Authority:

> Hearing [weapon's] clash is pleasant to my ear
> And the flow of blood gladdens my soul
> And a body thrown upon the ground
> Skirmished over by the desert predators. (as cited in Manor, 2007, p. 21)

Indeed, tribal morality has a way of reappearing, even in societies dominated by apparently strong, longstanding universal moral traditions. It can corrupt the very strongholds of universal morality—religions—whether they be theistic religions, such as Christianity, or secular religions (ideologies), such as Marxism. Because they are human institutions, religions are vulnerable to human impulses and abuses, as when absolute moral authority is accorded to or usurped by some person or group. Examples include medieval Christian conversions by sword, witch hunts, and persecutions for heresy (Durant, 1950; Kamen, 1997; Stark, 2003); the mass savagery unleashed in France's revolution incited by the well-intended, if naive *philosophes* (Andress, 2005; Durant & Durant, 1967); and 20th-century Europe's descent to communism, Nazism, and fascism (Besançon, 2007; Courtois et al., 1999; Goldhagen, 1996; Gross, 2001; Voegelin, 1964/1999).

In the United States, contemporary examples of tribal morality include tribes of one or two, such as Oklahoma City bomber Timothy McVeigh, Columbine murderers Harris and Klebold, and many ordinary criminals; atypical cults, such as the "families" of Charles Manson, Jim Jones, and David Koresh; and tribal organizations, such as the *Cosa Nostra* ("our thing") and inner-city gangs (Emmons, 1986; Harris, 1999; Maruna, 2001; Michel & Herbeck, 2001; Samenow, 1984, 1998; Yochelson & Samenow, 1976). It appears that, at any given time or place, the dark expressions of tribal morality are, at best, in remission.

Problem of the Moral Ground, Revisited Again

The original tribal, Hebraic, and Greek prototypes have remained identifiable over the centuries from ancient times to the dawn of the modern era. Two developments in that period are noted here. First, an interplay among moral forms became increasingly evident, perhaps due to increased historical coverage. For instance, Strauss (1953/1971) showed how Judeo-Christian morality is compatible with, if not essential to, a natural law theory of morality and how tribal self-interest is fundamental to both forms. The above discussion of three variations shows that the *practices* of one moral form may join another form through adoption or infiltration. Such interplay distinguishes the dynamic and fluid nature of moral expression and understanding, with respect to the moral presence and moral authority.

A second noteworthy development was the advent of modern science. Morality had always been known through the cult, religion, or philosophy. Now, disciplines such as biology, evolutionary biology, neurobiology, sociobiology, sociology, and psychology were being developed, and their proponents were

inclined to apply their explanatory schemes to morality (e.g., Alexander, 1987; Gergen, 1994a; Kohlberg, 1981; Mayr, 1997; Schwartz, J. M., 2002; Wilson, E. O., 1975/2000; Wilson, J. Q., 1993). New technologies would become available by which morality could be better understood. Of the new scientific disciplines, however, one in particular has proven especially well adapted for understanding and explaining the moral presence.

American Tradition

At this point the notion of an American moral tradition within psychology is introduced. This is not to be mistaken for the "moral development" psychology prominent in recent decades. Rather, it is an amalgam of Hebraic, Greek, Christian, and secular-humanistic traditions, enhanced by science and viewed through the lens of psychology. The roots of this tradition have been traced to the theistic moral philosophy of the 1640s (Fay, 1939). The modern phase can be said to have begun at end of the 19th century, when psychology officially disengaged from its theistic metatheory in order to establish itself as a natural science. Christian theism had been the unquestioned moral authority. Disengagement raised again the problem of the moral ground, *and* it was offered as modern psychology's first "solution" to the problem. This was the start of a 100-year-long field study, testing ways in which the human agent might grasp the moral presence and address the question, *Whose morality?* scientifically, without appeal to the divine. Each test-solution generated data and elicited the critiques of fellow psychologists. The record of solutions, data, and critiques provides an insightful dialogue in American psychology's effort to strike a balance between scientific and moral concerns; and it conveys information, often indirectly, about the moral presence itself. The 20th-century

solutions are now briefly examined in two groups: the rational-empirical and the experiential.

Empirical and Rational Solutions

Modern American psychology's first "solution" to the problem of a scientific ground for morality was introduced largely through James's (1890/1950) adoption of the naturalistic scheme and his deliberate rejection of the long-dominant moral-theistic explanatory scheme. For decades to come, a quarantine of moral terms and topics would be nearly total, but this "balance" of scientific and moral concerns proved unsustainable. The moral presence again made itself known in the 20th century, in ways that could not be ignored, as the world began to awake to the atrocities of communism, Nazism, and fascism. Psychology began to tackle questions about moral behavior.

Lawrence Kohlberg (1981) led a passionate effort to reestablish a place for moral concerns in psychology and to ground them on a universal principle, which he found in natural law theory. Motivated by a desire to vanquish the moral relativism that he believed had crippled the response to Nazi evil, Kohlberg found his principle *justice* in the moral philosophy of ancient Greece.

> The human sense of justice is a universal natural emergent in life; it rests on "natural law" in the sense that it is not the arbitrary creation of culture and training. Just because it is "natural," human morality comes into painful and sharp contrast with society's law or society's justice. Just that contrast proves that it has its source in a larger cosmic "law." (p. 391)

Kohlberg (1981) saw his work as a "reassertion of the Socratic faith in the power of the rational good" (p. 29) and blamed "epistemological blinders" for the misconception of morality characteristic of psychology in the early half of the 20th century.

> Many of us feel that the study of cognition by American child psychology failed to progress for two generations because of an inadequate epistemology, sometimes called *logical positivism* or *behaviorism.* The critical defect of this epistemology for child psychology was that it did not allow the psychologist to think about cognitive processes as involving knowledge. The critical category of the stimulus-response (S-R) approach was "learning," not "knowing . . . ." The fact that the cognitive categories of the philosopher are central for understanding the behavior development of the child is so apparent, once pointed out, that one recognizes that it is only the peculiar epistemology of the positivistic behaviorist that could have obscured it. (pp. 101-102)

Building on Piaget's work, Kohlberg studied moral reasoning in children. He identified universal, cognitive-developmental stages and explored ways to stimulate moral stage development through *education for justice* (Lapsley, 1996; Lickona, 1976; Noam & Wolf, 1991).

Kohlberg successfully provided a hitherto demoralized psychology with an epistemology that recognized the significance of morality. His rational, operationally defined, psychometric model seemed to satisfy scientific concerns well enough. Kohlberg opened the door to moral studies and inspired an industry of research programs related to the theory, assessment, and analysis of the cognitive stages and functions of moral development. For decades the name *Kohlberg* defined the field of moral psychology (Lapsley, 1996; Rest, 1974).

However, it may be underappreciated just how narrowly Kohlberg (1981) operationalized morality. It all came down to "one form of moral thinking":

> In my view, the basic referent of the term moral is a type of *judgment* or a type of *decision-making process*, not a type of behavior, emotion, or social institution. . . . I make no direct claims about the ultimate aims of people, about the good life, or about other problems that a teleological theory must handle. These are problems beyond the scope of the sphere of morality or moral principles, which I define as principles of choice for resolving conflicts of obligation. (p. 169)

Consequently, Kohlberg's model was found wanting in a variety of ways by psychologists. In a broad review of studies related to personality and social

development Hoffman (1977) identified the *affective processes* as a neglected area in the new moral psychology.

> There are endless studies that theoretically could be done . . . but what is needed is a far more systematic study of the full gamut of human motives. . . . Perhaps it is time for the cognitive and affective parts of the person, long separated for purposes of analysis and research, to be put back together again. (p. 317)

Again, in an extensive review of studies examining the correlation between moral reasoning and action, Blasi (1980) examined the fundamental problem with Kohlberg's treatment of the moral presence. Wondering whether "avoidance rather than neglect or even deeper incompatibilities are operating here" (pp. 40-41), Blasi faulted Piaget's rationalistic influence for Kohlberg's tendency to study cognitive structures and

> processes as disengaged from their psychological context, *as if they were not parts of a more complex organism, the psychological subject, to which in some way they would be subordinated* [italics added]. . . . There is no reason why processes related to the self could not be integrated with the general principles of cognitive-developmental theory . . . but [this] requires a substantial shift in emphasis and a careful rethinking of concepts and relations. (p. 41)

To be fair, Kohlberg did recognize the role of affection in moral development and eventually gave a larger role to the affective processes in his theory (Schore, 1994); but the emphasis in the Kohlbergian school remained on moral reasoning, giving rise to continued objections, such as to the neglect of intuitive and social modes in moral decision making (Haidt, 2001). These critiques raise serious questions as to the practical value of Kohlbergian research and the extent to which it addresses real-world moral concerns and reveals or conceals the living moral presence.

In other critiques, L. J. Walker (1995) noted the persistence in research of a "restricted notion of morality" and an "impoverished description of the moral

agent" (p. 1), and Bandura (2001) joined the call for "a broad vision of human beings not a reductive fragmentary one" (p. 13). Help in this regard has come from a perhaps unexpected source. Biology, it seems, would be recognized in the wider vision of morality and the moral agent, albeit to the apparent dismay of some. Bandura (2001) commented on the growing concerns of "a progressive divestiture of different aspects of psychology to biology and subpersonal cognitive science" (p. 13). But this is not a new trend. Darwin (1871/1998), for example, claimed instinct's jurisdiction over the moral aspect of behavior; a century later, sociobiologist Edmund O. Wilson (1975/ 2000) echoed the claim, recommending further that the domains of philosophy and psychology at least temporarily divest themselves of ethics and that moral behavior be *biologicized.*

> Ethical philosophers intuit the deontological canons of morality by consulting the emotive centers of their own hypothalamic-limbic system. This is also true of the developmentalists, even when they are being their most severely objective. Only by interpreting the activity of the emotive centers as a biological adaptation can the meaning of the canons be deciphered. (p. 563)

Prologuing his study of primates and the origins of right and wrong, ethologist *cum* psychologist Franz de Waal (1996) took a perhaps less provocative stance. Enlisting the perspectives of philosophy, social science, *and* biology more fully to understand morality, he defended the biologist's interest:

> They would argue that there must *at some level* be continuity between the behavior of humans and that of other primates. No domain, not even our celebrated morality, can be excluded from this assumption [italics added]. (p. 1)

Biology's valid claims on the moral aspect are examined in detail in chapter IV.

In a hermeneutic analysis of the study of human conduct, Packer (1985) concluded that both the materially oriented empiricist and the logically oriented rationalist styles are *inherently detached* from purposeful, active, practical, and

personal involvement; hence, they tend to yield a distorted and inadequate image of human experience and of the moral presence. Richardson et al. (1999) similarly found that the "privileging of formal relations" led Kohlberg to conclude that "the highest level of morality is the ability to apply highly abstract, formal principles to concrete situations" (p. 176). Such thinking prompted social scientist James Q. Wilson (1993) to quip, "I . . . am a bit suspicious of any theory that says that the highest moral stage is one in which people talk like college professors" (p. 182). Finally, pitting existential *experience* against a detached *epistemology*, Vandenberg (1991) argued that epistemology may simply not be enough when applied to the moral aspect. Vandenberg reasoned that Piaget's "epistemic constructivism remains a dominant feature of much of the work in developmental psychology . . . [but] theories grounded in epistemology fail to consider fundamental existential concerns" (p. 1278), nor are these concerns "merely the product of people who have failed to reach formal operational thought; rather, they reflect the *felt limits* [italics added] of science and technology for answering questions about meaning, value, and being" (p. 1284).

The empiricist and rationalist solutions to the problem of a moral ground by which the moral presence seems always to elude full exposure have been critically labeled *methodolatry* (May, 1958), *nothing-butness* (Frankl, 1967), *ameaningful thinking* (Koch, 1999c), *balkanization* or *regressive fragmentation* (Bevan, 1995), *naïve empiricism* (Gendlin, 1997; Rychlak, 1977), and so on. Such labels suggest that there is sometimes an overreliance on abstractions and reductions, on a stubbornly objective mode of knowing, a tenacious attitude of the knowing organism, one that inclines the psychologist-researcher toward an ever-narrower, increasingly detached focus, a more limited purpose, and more easily achieved

results, which may seem to the researcher to reveal more, or to carry more explanatory power than, perhaps, they do. Meanwhile, fundamental elements of the moral presence—the person, the sense of agency, personal experience, the sense of gravity—are all at play just outside the light of investigation.

Experiential Solutions

Around the time Kohlberg was formulating his psychology of moral development, other psychologists were addressing the experiential aspect of human behavior. Skeptical of the objectivizing methods of behaviorism and rationalism, these psychologists set their discipline on a *phenomenological* footing, establishing *felt experience* as the favored mode of knowing, placing the person at the center of concern (Leahey, 2004, chap. 14). A human-potentials group set out systematically to describe the inherent orderliness of subjective experience (Rogers, 1959) and "to facilitate the client's awareness of—and trust in—his own actualizing processes" (Meador & Rogers, 1979, p. 181). An existentialist group addressed a widespread sense of loss of self and meaning (May, 1953), aiming "to put decision and will back in the center of psychology" (May, 1969, p. 202). Also, a postmodernist group stressed a skeptical approach to "dominant narratives"—rules, practices, moral conventions, inviting the "development of alternative criteria for evaluation of psychological inquiry" (Gergen, 1985, p. 266).

The prioritization of personal experience quite naturally, if unintentionally, propelled these groups of psychologists deeper into the business of morality. Their strategies successfully enlarged the field of moral psychology well beyond the dimensions defined by Kohlberg, and they afforded new opportunities to perceive and examine more of the moral presence. A rejection of amoral-behavioristic and

duty-oriented (deontic) rationalistic approaches to conduct, coupled with the dismissal of traditional theistic values, warranted the establishment of alternative explanatory and regulatory grounds for conduct. A brief examination of three such alternatives follows.

Human-Potentialists: Self as Moral Ground

As noted in chapter II, Rogers (1959) assumed an inherent "unifying organismic valuing process" (p. 227) that acts as a behavioral regulator and values any experience or behavior perceived by the organism as satisfying.

> The simplest example is the infant who at one moment values food, and when satiated, is disgusted with it; at one moment values stimulation, and soon after, values only rest; who finds satisfying that diet which in the long run most enhances his development. (p. 210)

Rogers concluded that only one's own valuations are genuine, therefore good. Any experience involving the introjection of *another's* values creates a "condition of worth," which causes perceptual distortion and sets in motion patterns that eventually account for problematic behavior and ultimately for evildoing. For Rogers, the consequence of not being true to oneself is "the basic estrangement in man" (p. 226). In a later conversation with theologian Paul Tillich, Rogers (1989a) proved steadfast:

> I've sort of dropped the notion of values in the conventional sense of there being certain values which you could list—but it does seem to me that the individual who is open to his experience is continually valuing each moment and valuing his behavior in each moment, as to whether it is related to his own self-fulfillment, his own actualization, and that it's that kind of valuing process that to me makes sense in the mature person. It also makes sense in a world where the whole situation is changing so rapidly that I feel that ordinary lists of values are probably not as appropriate or meaningful as they were in periods gone by. (p. 77)

May (1953), too, was convinced that people suffered from normative social pressures and *conformity* that result in the loss of sense of self. In what might be read as a 300-year progress report on the Enlightenment project and the search for a secular moral ground, May wrote,

> The upshot is that the values and goals which provided a unifying center for previous centuries in the modern period no longer are cogent. We have not yet found the new center which will enable us to choose our goals constructively, and thus to overcome the painful bewilderment and anxiety of not knowing which way to move. (p. 49)

The inherent (and presumably good) "self-process" of the individual became the ground for moral conduct; *growth* and the *actualization* of one's potentials became central values for society (Leahey, 2004). Surely, the shift from impersonal, method-centered behavioristic and psychoanalytic clinical styles to the engaged, person-centered style of the humanistic counselor was well received. But there was another attraction: The promise of a *virtuous* life—free of lists of rules, values, external duties, obligations, and restraints—must have had enormous appeal to young and old. It is not surprising that the humanistic orientation became a favorite in the clinical market place.

Some psychologists, uneasy with the moral implications of humanistic assumptions, questioned the adequacy of those assumptions as a ground for morality. Kohlberg (1981) was suspicious of a "psychology that conceives of the child as having a spontaneously growing mind" (p. 70) or that postulates "'basic human tendencies' . . . taken as good in themselves, rather than being subject to the scrutiny of moral philosophy" (p. 72). Koch (1969/1999e) charged,

> "Humanistic psychology" started as a revolt against ameaning—against the fifty-year constraint of an ontology-defiling epistemology. . . . In almost no time at all it achieved a conception of human nature so gross as to make behaviorism seem a form of Victorian sentimentality. (p. 143)

Koch (1973/1999b) found the value *transparency* in Rogers's "cracking masks" encounter-group technique to be an affront to human dignity and individuality, a frightening submission to groupthink and peer pressure, and an abdication of "the capacity for individual transcendence of the group [which] is perhaps the most value-charged gift of the human station" (p. 325). Waterman (1992) pointed out that Rogers's assumptions of the inevitability of goodness and the external source of bad behavior undercut the very agentic capacities that he otherwise endorsed.

In a popular book May (1953) elevated the search for self to a heroic moral enterprise: "Finding the center of strength within ourselves is in the long run the best contribution we can make to our fellow men" (p. 69). One wonders how readers in general, and psychologists in particular, might have squared this new value with the fact that more than 330,000 American fellows had so recently lost their lives in Europe and Korea, making their "best contribution" to the cause of liberty, including the liberty of strangers. Moral values imply value hierarchies and a top-most value; different hierarchies carry different real-world consequences.

Yalom (1980) suggested that the 1950s humanism of Rogers and Maslow was swallowed up by the 1960s counterculture and then degenerated into something of a carnival.

> The big tent of humanist psychology was, if nothing else, generous and soon included a bewildering number of schools barely able to converse with one another even in an existential Esperanto. Gestalt therapy, transpersonal therapy, encounter groups, holistic medicine, psychosynthesis, Sufi, and many, many others pranced into the arena. The new trends have value orientations that bear significant [moral] implications for psychotherapy. There is an emphasis on hedonism ("if it feels good, do it") . . . on individual fulfillment ("doing your own thing,"), and on self-actualization (a belief in human perfectibility). (pp. 19-20)

But Leahey (2004) charged that the humanistic movement was *co-active* in establishing a "cult of the self" (p. 490), a "new Hellenistic Age" (p. 499) at war

with the greater culture, wherein the notion of a transcendent moral order was abandoned and *what feels comfortable* was installed as the new grounds for moral decisions. Leahey saw duplicity in the movement's having posed as value-free science (he judged it neither value free nor scientific) and sharply questioned its professed opposition to the behaviorist ideas of social control and adaptation.

> In its cultivation of feeling and intuition, humanistic psychology harked back to the romantic rejection of the Scientific Revolution but was never honest enough to say so. . . . Humanistic psychologists, like the hippies, did not really question the value of adaptation and social control: they just wanted to change the standards to which people had to adapt. (pp. 502-503)

R. B. Miller (2004), too, remarked on Rogers's undeclared moral and political agenda for change, which leaned heavily "in the direction of greater unconditional positive regard and openness (moral values, surely)" (p. 94).

May (1969) began to express ambivalence about the new basis for valuation that was being adopted by the younger generation:

> They seek an honesty, openness, a genuineness of personal relationship; they are out to find a genuine feeling, a touch, a look in the eyes, a sharing of fantasy. The criterion becomes the *intrinsic meaning* and is to be judged by one's authenticity, doing one's own thing. (p. 306)

May noted that these values seemed to lack content, lastingness, and dependability; they were based on "whim and temporary emotion" (p. 306). May did not ignore or minimize the darker human potentials and actualizations. Years later, May (1982/ 1989) charged Rogers with promoting an unrealistic and destructive conception of evil: "The issue of evil—or rather, the issue of not confronting evil—has profound, and to my mind adverse, effects on humanistic psychology. I believe it is the most important error in the humanistic movement" (p. 249). May sharply criticized the humanistic movement, which he came to see as a haven for narcissists "so lost in self-love that they cannot see and relate to the reality outside themselves" (p. 249).

The human-potentialists had revealed and explored phenomena vital to a full perception of the moral presence, namely, personal experience and the innate moral sense, hitherto obscured by objectifying medical, behavioral, and cognitive-developmental theories. However, their assumptions about human nature and their reliance on self as a moral ground undercut critical features of the moral aspect: its gravity and agency.

Existentialists: Radical Choice as Moral Ground

No other area of psychology matches the existentialist's concern with man's naked encounter with freedom—the terror and thrill of the power of choice, the option of saying *yes* or *no*, of choosing good or bad, life or death, stand or run—to which every person must respond. The existential contribution to understanding the moral presence is its witness to the gravity of human agency.

Yalom (1980) tackled the problems of personal freedom and the search for self in the context of the choice of *meaning*. He argued that a sense of meaning is a universal human need; that "once a sense of meaning is developed, it gives birth to *values*" (p. 464); and that value hierarchies, generated from meaning schema, provide the person with a blueprint for conduct, telling him *why* and *how* to live. Yalom observed that, clinically, a lack or loss of meaning produces dysphoria and has a disorganizing effect on the person.

Ironically, the *meaninglessness* of life is a basic tenet of Yalom's existential position. Thus, Yalom (1980) asked, "How does a being who needs meaning find meaning in a universe that has no meaning?" (p. 423). For Yalom, the answer was, "wholehearted engagement in any of the infinite array of life's activities" (p. 482).

Engagement alleviates dysphoria and enriches one's life. The very activities believed to bring meaning and a value system to the person are to be freely selected by the person. To this end, Yalom offered a broad survey listing "secular activities that provide human beings with a sense of life purpose" (pp. 431-441). The whole question of the objectiveness of meaning is obviated by the presumed groundlessness of life; it is of little consequence *which* activities are selected as personally meaningful. Such a selection constitutes a radical choice, about which Yalom (in Yalom & May, 1995) asked—but did not answer—a critical question: "Is it possible that a self-created life meaning is sturdy enough to bear one's life?" (p. 276). For Frankl (1967) the answer was *No*.

> A person's will to meaning can only be elicited if meaning itself can be elucidated as something which is essentially more than his mere self-expression. This implies a certain degree of objectiveness, and without a minimum amount of objectiveness meaning would never be worth fulfilling. We do not just attach and attribute meanings to things, but rather find them; we do not invent them, we detect them. (p. 16)

Richardson et al. (1999) agreed with Frankl on this point.

> When values and projects are seen as things we choose solely in order to gain integration and maturity, and when it is assumed at the outset that no values are intrinsically better than others, then values appear as purely adventitious, mere means to ends, and presumably dispensable in favor of other means—perhaps unbridled aggression or some sort of pill—if those would do the job just as well. (p. 129)

Richardson et al. stressed that the notion of meaninglessness is inherently demoralizing: "Where all values are up for grabs . . . they lose the traits that made them values in the first place: their exigency and normative force" (p. 134).

The existential alternative partly corrects an inadequacy of the human potential movement by emphasizing the gravity of agency; however, an existentialism based on meaninglessness does not appear to support the objectiveness of the moral presence.

Postmodernists: Skepticism as Moral Ground

Gergen (1985), a godfather of American postmodernism in psychology, introduced social constructionism in the context of a historic struggle between the reliance on subjective versus objective knowledge: "The challenge (for many) has been to transcend the traditional subject-object dualism and all its attendant problems" (p. 270). To this end, Gergen advocated a sort of radical doubt by which "both the concepts of experience and sense data are placed in question" (p. 272):

> Constructionism asks one to suspend belief that commonly accepted categories or understandings receive their warrant through observation. Thus, it invites one to challenge the objective basis of conventional knowledge . . . [such as] the social construction of gender . . . *the seemingly incorrigible fact that there are two genders* [italics added]. . . . Possibilities are opened for alternative means of understanding gender differences or of abandoning such distinctions altogether. (p. 267)

Having arranged for this open-minded suspension of empirical, objective, and conventional understandings (moral values, surely), Gergen did not provide the exclusionary criteria necessary to confirm or deny "seemingly incorrigible" facts, much less to make grave moral decisions. Rather, he announced, "Constructionism offers no alternative truth criteria" (p. 272).

> The scientist's claims to privileged knowledge have served as mystifying devices within the society more generally. Constructionism offers no foundational rules of warrant and in this sense is relativistic. However, this does not mean that "anything goes." Because of the inherent dependency of knowledge systems on communities of shared intelligibility, scientific activity will always be governed in large measure by normative rules. However, constructionism does invite the practitioners to view these rules as historically and culturally situated—thus subject to critique and transformation. (p. 273)

Furthermore, since investigative studies may not lay claim to objective validity, "the success of such accounts depends on the analyst's capacity to invite, compel, stimulate, or delight the audience, and not on criteria of veracity" (p. 272).

> Virtually any methodology can be employed so long as it enables the analyst to develop a more compelling case . . . [and] like vivid photographs or startling vignettes drawn from daily life, when well wrought they may add vital power to the pen. (p. 273)

In this view, it appears, universal rules are traded in for local norms, publicly confirmable evidence is exchanged for publicly moving rhetoric, success criteria replace truth criteria, knowledge is reduced to *linguistic construction* achieved through *conventions of discourse*, and the concern with right and wrong is replaced by a concern with power. The open invitation to dispute any and all conventions of civilization is clear enough; the basis for selecting one convention over another is not. Postmodernism *aims* to alter fundamental societal agreements—moral agreements especially—and to justify these changes on good intentions or some unspecified values or assumptions the objectiveness of which is *a priori* denied.

Some psychologists have found postmodernist claims incredible. Koch (1985/ 1992c) quipped that postmodernists "like to perform 'deconstructions' on all positions in the history of thought other than their own" (p. 965). Pinker (1997) remarked on a postmodern "secular catechism," filled with "astonishing claims . . . uttered without concern for whether they are true" (p. 57). M. B. Smith (1994) found many of Gergen's propositions "fashionable" but "dizzy and disoriented" and dogmatic, inasmuch as they were presented as "intrinsically valid" (p. 408). Richardson et al. (1999) were likewise struck by "the absolute certainty with which postmodern or social constructionist thinkers deny the very possibility of absolutes or of any settled moral convictions" (p. 18).

> Postmodernists sometimes suggest that just denying all metaphysical and moral universals will free us from tendencies toward dogmatism and domination. But where in this brave new world would we find the conviction or dedication needed to keep from abandoning our society's ideals of freedom and universal respect in favor of shallow diversions or some comforting new tyranny? (p. 193)

Indeed, some have found a dark psychological message—an *old* message—at the core of this sort of doctrine. In the words of political philosopher Harry Jaffa (1984/2002),

> Nihilism begins in the denial of any ground for faith in the reality of sense perception. Nihilism declares that all we can do is to frame hypotheses about a world that is permanently hypothetical. And we can frame these hypotheses, not for the sake of knowledge—which is impossible—but for the sake of power . . . . Nihilism . . . sees moral prescriptions and commandments merely as manifestations of the will, a will that imposes or is imposed upon. (p. 265)

Professor Gergen (1994a) brushed aside charges of nihilism in his views. After his own moral vision, Gergen (1996) urged students toward "relational realities," a rediscovery of the romantic idea, a surrender to the power of the "relational sublime."

> When concert goers experience the power and ecstasy of their common immersion in rock and pop music, when city crowds gather to shout their welcome [to] their championship team, when the throngs gather on the Washington mall to chant their cause, and when gays join the annual parade in San Francisco, they know they are participating in an event . . . that eclipses the importance of any single participant. . . . If we succeed in losing the self, we may be prepared for a conjoint reality of far more promising potential. (p. 10)

It is incumbent here to recall the corrupting effect of thinking about people as pawns of matter, history, power and ecstasy, the great man, or anything else: The spilling of blood is always made a little easier.

> I became acquainted with the last stage of that corruption in my second concentration camp, Auschwitz. The gas chambers of Auschwitz were the ultimate consequence of the theory that man is nothing but the product of heredity and environment—or, as the Nazi liked to say, of "Blood and Soil." I am absolutely convinced that the gas chambers of Auschwitz, Treblinka, and Maidanek were ultimately prepared not in some Ministry or other in Berlin, but rather at the desks and in the lecture halls of nihilistic scientists and philosophers. (Frankl, 1955, p. xxi)

Two charges have been leveled against postmodernism here: It is deficient in reason and it harbors a deadly urge. Intellectual trends that "liberate" the person

from morality and the rules of reason seem always to have been popular and to have provided lucrative opportunities for their proponents. A predictable result of such trends, in philosopher Allen Bloom's (1983) words: "Students in the best universities do not believe in anything" (p. 29). Let the morally concerned psychologist inquire, What might people, especially young students, find attractive in a doctrine that is implicitly profoundly permissive on the one hand and contemptuously dismissive of established restraints and duties on the other? What if that doctrine is offered by a professoriate with its own tacit claim to "privileged knowledge"? What are the consequences of such a doctrine for a society?

The narrow concern here is the attempted promotion of skepticism as a moral ground. Postmodernism speaks eloquently to the inexactness and variation of experience and to the gap between experience and concept, but it is mute with respect to values and objective reality (Gendlin, 2003). Richardson et al. (1999) observed that the postmodern approach to values and meaningful choice has a paralyzing effect on the individual because it brings the person to "a wide-open cafeteria of options," and then "den[ies] that there are any good grounds for choosing one option over another" (p. 195). As a substitute for scientific method and knowledge, skepticism is uncompelling; promoted as a solution to the problem of the moral ground, it is troubling.

Present Status of the Problem of the Moral Ground

The search for balance between scientific and human concerns in the first 100 years of modern American psychology represents a mega-study of the problem of the moral ground, wherein the criterial features of the moral presence—agency, objectiveness, and gravity—have been observed, isolated, tested, and variously

considered. Theistic explanatory schemes having been set aside, the empirical, rational, and experiential approaches have shown what they can and cannot do with respect to revealing the moral presence and the problem of the moral ground. Rational and empirical solutions, while scientifically impressive and other-oriented, left the human experience behind. Experiential solutions, while eloquently human, were fixed in orbit around the self, in phases of self-seeking and self-ridding. In many cases gravity seemed to be compromised. It appears to be a rule that *the absence of even one of the three criterial features in the solution obscures and distorts the moral presence and its ground.* In this 100-year study, no new moral form or authority has emerged, but old ones have shown up, namely the tribal and naturalistic forms and their human and natural law authorities. Interplay among forms continued to be evident.

In a century of studies related to the moral presence, modern psychology appears implicitly to have delivered its insightful results. It now remains to consider one other feature of morality, also implicitly delivered. Perhaps inelegant and commonplace, this feature nevertheless seems to reveal more of the basic nature of morality and promises to further inform psychological inquiry.

Fourth Observation: Intrusion of the Moral

It is clear from even a cursory survey of the literature that morality is not a passive "presence" nor is it merely active. The apparent failure of American psychology to sustain a quarantine of moral matters or to explain them away or to disregard the moral presence, along with evidence provided often unwittingly by psychologists themselves, supports a further point, the fourth and final key observation made in the course of this literature review: *Morality is by nature*

profoundly and chronically intrusive, potentially entering every field of human activity, carrying to each person its special demand, to which demand each person's action is a reply, on which reply the intrusive demand is carried to others. This section considers the nature and agents of moral intrusion in terms of their effects, as described in the psychological and related literature, and it considers two powerful institutions of moral intrusion in America today. The guiding question is, *How and to what effect does the moral presence intrude upon the person?* Acknowledgement of moral intrusiveness adds to the warrant for *conduct* as a distinct category in a realistic science of psychology.

Nature of Moral Intrusion

Authors in the life sciences have suggested that nature provides the "building blocks" of morality (Flack & de Waal, 2000). They have examined certain animal behaviors said to prefigure what are *for humans* moral matters—loyalty, altruism, abortion, infanticide, shame, and so on (e.g., Darwin, 1871/1998; Edelman, 1992; Flack & de Waal; Hrdy, 1999; Lorenz, 1963; Parker, 1998; de Waal, 1996; Wilson, E. O., 1975/2000). A distinction is typically drawn between human morality and the apparently moral acts of social animals, and there appears to be general agreement as to the biological structures and functions that account for this distinction (see chapter IV). But even the most careful examination of structures and processes yields no image of the moral presence or its intrusive demand; a wider lens is required, such as that used by C. L. Morgan (1927/2007) or Mayr (1997) or here, in Polanyi (1958):

> The phylogenetic centres which formed our own primeval ancestry have now produced . . . a life of the mind which claims to be guided by universal

> standards. By this act a prime cause emergent in time has directed itself at aims that are timeless. (p. 405)

Religious and secular thinkers alike have long observed the natural lawfulness of morality and its intrusiveness (MacIntyre, 1966/1998; Strauss, 1953/1971). The prototypal theistic version of moral intrusion appears in Genesis (Plaut, 1981), when God calls Adam to account for himself and Cain to account for his brother: "Where are you?" (3:9); "Where is your brother Abel?" (4:9). Mythology scholar Joseph Campbell (1968) found a "call to adventure" (p. 49) to be universal in myths and stories; he commented on the spiritual and psychological meaning of the *rejection* of the intrusive moral call:

> [It] is essentially a refusal to give up what one takes to be one's own interest . . . . for, obviously, if one is oneself one's god, then God himself, the will of God, the power that would destroy one's egocentric system, becomes a monster. (p. 60)

Philosopher Eric Voegelin (1964/1999), in his analysis of Germany's Hitler era, examined what he considered to be a refusal to participate in the transcendent, a *dedivinization* that precedes dehumanization, and the grim meaning of this moral act of "radical stupidity" (p. 85). Polanyi's (1958) conception of *commitment* dovetails here.

> The act of commitment . . . saves personal knowledge from being merely subjective. Intellectual commitment is a responsible decision, in submission to the compelling claims of what in good conscience I conceive to be true. It is an act of hope, striving to fulfil an obligation . . . which therefore determines my calling. (p. 65)

Following Levinas, Vandenberg (1999) explained the existential nature of moral intrusion:

> Ethics does not simply arise from 'moral dilemmas' that force difficult decisions. Moral choices do not leap out of a flat epistemic landscape at moments of crisis. Rather, our daily in this moment journey is a moral one, every action a decision about how to comport ourselves in the face of ethical demands engendered by being with others. (p. 34)

In this study the term *intrusion* is selected to emphasize an uninvited, unexpected, often unwelcome pressure to act; it is the other-oriented, motivating aspect of the moral presence. The "special demand" of moral intrusion has been variously explained as a pressure on the person to declare, locate, and define himself with respect to the emergent moral, psychological, or spiritual world in which the demand is by nature established. The person's response to the moral demand implies and exposes a natural moral sense and the agentic nature of human being; it reveals one's commitment, primacy, governing interest, or, in Rychlak's (1977) style, *that for the sake of which one's actions will be determined.*

Only when the observer considers the moral nature of human reality—the psychological life of actual *people*, embodied moral agents actively engaged in situations—can the moral presence be viewed and its intrusive nature be meaningfully explained and appreciated for what it is: the awful, solitary, precious freedom of a person's decisive power; the reality of right and wrong, good and evil; and the grave potential within even the most ordinary act.

Experience of Moral Intrusion

Morality intrudes without prejudice on all members of the human family, who are the observers, experiencers, and agents of intrusion. Thus, as Hallie (1997) showed, intrusion has "much to do with perspectives, points of view."

> If you want to know whether cruelty is happening and just how painful it is, do not ask the torturer . . . . Victimizers can be blinded by simple insensitivity, by a great cause, by a great hatred, or by a hundred self-serving "reasons." Victims . . . are the best witnesses to their pain. They feel it in their flesh and in their deepest humiliations and horrors. And if you want to know about goodness, do not ask only the doers of good . . . . The points of view of victims and beneficiaries are vital to an understanding of evil and of good. (p. 71)

The response to moral intrusion makes for differences, as does its interpretation: Ellis (1960) and Freud (1933/1995) found it to be a source of pathology; Mowrer (1947/ 1950a, 1947/1950b, 1947/1950c) and Bergin (1980a) found a source of mental and spiritual health.

Normal Everyday Intrusions

Some psychologists have more or less openly acknowledged the intrusive role of the moral presence in everyday life, as it affects human relationships throughout the lifespan. Hadfield (1923/1964) associated it with a familiar disturbance seen in psychoanalysis: "When we go deeper and investigate the origin of the psychoneuroses, we often find that they are concerned with problems essentially moral" (p. 2). R. B. Miller (2004) found "overwhelming evidence that moral issues permeate clinical psychology" (p. 89). L. J. Walker (1995) pointed to a basic human "need to maintain the sense that we are good people" (p. 5). Vandenberg (1999) found evidence of morality at work in infant behavior. However, for the most part, psychologists have explained moral intrusion in terms of its biological, mental, behavioral, and social mechanisms or systems, such as neurological maturation and self-regulation in the mother-infant interaction (Schore, 1994); fixed stages of cognitive maturation and rational development (Kohlberg, 1984); the nature, acquisition, and function of conscience in relation to conduct (Aronfreed, 1968); the shared fantasies of parent and child (Chazan, 1995); justly balancing ledgers of fairness and merit in family ethics (Boszormenyi-Nagy, Grunebaum, & Ulrich, 1981/1991); respect and disrespect, intimacy, sexual problem-solving, and "normal marital sadism" (Schnarch, 1997); and so on.

Hurtful Intrusions

Psychologists have considered the human agent of moral intrusion—again not always in terms of morality per se. A significant segment of the psychological literature examines the behaviors and pathologies associated with harmful actions, their perpetrators, and their victims. Kitwood (1990) noted that "the greater part of psychotherapeutic work is concerned with the harm human beings have caused one another" (p. 5). Deliberate, serious acts that harm innocents (the chief characteristic of evildoing) has been examined by psychologists in terms of the social conditions thought to foster destructiveness (Fromm, 1973); of the sexual, physical, and emotional abuse of children—both by adults (deMause, 1982) and by siblings (Wiehe, 1991); of domestic violence—both the battered woman (Walker, L. E., 1979) and the batterer (Dutton, 1995); of psychoevolutionary understandings of homicide (Daly & Wilson, 1988) and rape (Thornhill & Palmer, 2000); of the cognitive-behavioral patterns of criminals (Yochelson & Samenow, 1976); of the bystander effect (Darley & Latané, 1968); and so on. Similarly, although less frequently, authors have examined another response to moral intrusion, one associated with human goodness in terms of the rescuing of potential victims (Oliner & Oliner, 1988), of the reformation by convicts or "making good" (Maruna, 2001), of helping others as a path to wellness (Piliavin, 2003), and of positive moral emotions such as "elevation . . . elicited by acts of virtue or moral beauty" (Haidt, 2003, p. 276).

Institutions as Agents of Moral Intrusion

When people organize around some activity or program, the organization or group becomes an institutional agent of moral intrusion. Religions, political

platforms, governments, militaries, professions, associations, schools, societies, and civilizations are examples. The person must square his or her actions with the moral values of the institutions with which he or she is associated. Kohlberg (1981) offered an ordinary instance:

> Although *moral education* has a forbidding sound to teachers, they constantly practice it. They tell children what to do, make evaluations of children's behavior, and direct children's relations in the classrooms. Sometimes teachers do these things without being aware that they are engaging in moral education, but the children are aware of it. For example, my second-grade son told me that he did not want to be one of the bad boys. Asked "Who were the bad boys?" he replied, "The ones who don't put their books back where they belong and get yelled at." His teacher would have been surprised to know that her concerns with classroom management defined for her children what she and her school thought were basic moral values or that she was engaged in value indoctrination. (p. 6)

Two institutional agents of moral intrusion in contemporary America—religion and psychology—are of particular interest to this study because they are viewed as and serve as sources of moral authority for individuals and for institutions.

Religion as Agent of Moral Intrusion

So much has been written in recent decades about the abuses and failures of religion that its beneficial influence may be forgotten. Throughout human history, religion has openly claimed authority in moral matters. Durant (1939/1966) credited religion with having "molded the moral life of Greece" (p. 202). *When it has not been abused*—and here the reference is specifically to ethical monotheism—religion has served to curb the destructive human inclinations and to foster the constructive. Therefore, the conduct of a population has been observed to correspond to the strength of its religion. Durant and Durant (1967) quoted de Toqueville: "The universal discredit into which all religious belief fell at the end of the 18th century exercised, without doubt, the greatest influence upon the whole

course of French Revolution" (p. 898). Durant and Durant explained: "[The *philosophes*] had not intended to produce violence, massacre, and the guillotine . . . . but they were responsible insofar as they had underestimated the influence of religion and tradition in restraining the animal instincts of men" (p. 899).

Religion impinges not only with restraints but with obligations. The Judeo-Christian tradition contains a unique bias toward the powerless, women, children, strangers, even slaves (Cahill, 1998). Indeed, the primeval act of human enslavement was universally practiced in ancient societies. The Hebrews were no exception. Yet a promise of the eventual demise of slavery is found in the Biblical and Talmudic injunctions of the Hebraic moral prototype: It was a capital crime for an Israelite to kill his slave or to steal another human being. Violence against one's slave was justification for the slave's release. One was forbidden to return a runaway slave but *required* to shelter him. The slave had to rest like the free man on the Sabbath. If a man offered himself for slavery due to poverty, one was permitted to *hire* him as a "sojourner." Every 50 years a national *jubilee* required that all slaves be released and restored to their families (Meltzer, 1993). Such a policy was unheard of in the ancient world and bespoke the preciousness of every human life, a central theme of Biblical morality.

The promise of slavery's demise was slowly and unevenly fulfilled in Europe as the Roman Catholic Church developed doctrines that condemned slavery as a sin (Stark, 2003). Following a 26-year campaign led by the Methodist William Wilberforce, the slave trade was finally criminalized worldwide by an act of British Parliament in 1807 (Metaxas, 2007). Although the American colonies were heavily invested in slave labor, the founding principles of the United States ensured an eventual reckoning as to the status of the slave population (West, 1997). Christians

had participated with the world in the terrible practice of slavery; Christians led the way to the abolition of slavery. Today, new forms of a global slave trade feed on millions of human lives, but Judeo-Christian governments comply with the U.S. Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 and the United Nations Trafficking in Persons protocol, and they are among the most aggressive in combating and prosecuting the immoral practice (U.S. Department of State, 2007).

Religion as an agent of moral intrusion also played a key role in America's Founding. According to Jaffa (1984/2002), "A morality supported by a non-sectarian natural theology (as in the Declaration of Independence), was an essential element of the Founding" (p. 53). The Founders were convinced of the importance of religion as a moral agent. In his 1796 *Farewell Address* President George Washington said,

> And let us with caution indulge the supposition, that morality can be maintained without religion. Whatever may be conceded to the influence of refined education on minds of peculiar structure, reason and experience both forbid us to expect that National morality can prevail in exclusion of religious principle. (Rhodehamel, 1997, p. 971)

Benjamin Franklin reasoned, "If men are so wicked as we now see them *with religion*, what would they be *if without it*?" (as cited in Brands, 2000, p. 658). Indeed, some of the Founders lived to see a wave of skepticism sweep the new nation, influenced by the ideas of Rousseau, Voltaire, and Thomas Paine. Atheism, profanity, rowdiness, gambling, and drunkenness spread, students became more radical and violent, and Bible burnings were reported (Evans, 1984).

> Civil unrest came to the colleges around the turn of the century, with riots and vandalism becoming commonplace on previously placid campuses. Religious affiliation was at the lowest ebb in the history of the nation. Irreligion became common on the postwar campus. . . . In 1802, Samuel Stanhope Smith watched Nassau Hall burn to the ground at Princeton . . . by "those irreligious and demoralizing principles which are tearing the banks of society asunder." (p. 35)

Religion, disarmed in America, had to compete for hearts and minds in the new free market of ideas; new denominations had to *convince* the population to faith and goodness. Evangelicalism rose in response to the agnostic trends in post-Revolutionary America. Missionaries, religious teachers, Bible societies, and moral reform groups went out across the states and territories, promoting temperance and opposing vices. In the process, women's authority in moral and social spheres was enhanced (Crawford, 2001).

By the end of the 20th century, Weaver (1998) reported, some 500,000 churches, temples, and mosques dotted the United States landscape, and about the same number of clergy. According to a Gallup poll (Gallup Organization, 2007), regular (weekly) church attendance has remained stable (about 40%) for several decades. Shafranske (1996a) argued that, historically, religion has played a key role in the lives of most Americans and continues to do so.

> The vast majority of individuals in western society are raised within some religious tradition, and indeed recent surveys have found that 93 percent of Americans identified with a religious group . . . and over 80 percent reported that religion is "fairly" or "very" important in their lives. . . . *Even for the unchurched or irreligious, the atheist or agnostic, the influence of religion cannot be dismissed* [italics added]. (p. 1)

The American Judeo-Christian tradition of *ethical monotheism* has been an institutional agent of moral intrusion with its vision of a struggle between good and evil; its social restraints against inborn destructive impulses; its institutional upholding and promotion of standards of conduct through precepts, customs, and community; and its cultivation of good character through virtues such as reverence, duty, and modesty—all anchored in the belief in a universal moral order and a God that cares how people behave (e.g., Bergin, 1980a; Campbell, D. T., 1975; Gartner, 1996; Mowrer, 1961; Richards & Bergin, 1997/2005). Indeed, the promulgation of

the Judeo-Christian moral heritage has been so successful that most people, in Cahill's (1998) words, "no longer give any thought to the origins of attitudes we have come to take as natural and self-evident" (p. 7). Cahill's comment may contain a warning, given the disturbing ease with which decency can be thrown off and how rapid is the descent to depravity (Andress, 2005; Durant & Durant, 1967; Evans, 1984; Gross, 2001; Voegelin, 1964/1999).

Psychology as Agent of Moral Intrusion

In contrast to religion, American psychology has been a reluctant or unmindful moral agent. Psychologists have long tried to maintain a disinterested posture with regard to morality presumably in order not to interfere with the individual's autonomy. But the search for balance between scientific and human concerns, as it is traced in this study, indicates that psychology is unavoidably bound up with moral matters. Even before the era of psychotherapy, at the dawn of the 20th century, Americans turned to the psychologist for answers that philosophy seemed unable to provide and religion alone could not provide.

> We live surrounded by an enormous body of persons who are most definitely interested in the control of states of mind, and incessantly craving for a sort of psychological science which will teach them how to act. What every educator, every jail-warden, every doctor, every clergyman, every asylum-superintendent, asks of psychology is practical rules. Such men . . . do care immensely about improving the ideas, dispositions, and conduct of the particular individuals in their charge. (James, 1892, p. 148)

Today, lawyers and courts rely on testimony from psychologists in administrative hearings, civil proceedings, and criminal trials (Melton, Petrila, Poythress, & Slobogin, 1997). Psychologists are invited to the White House by America's First Lady to provide advice on teaching values to children (Smith, D.,

2002). It is estimated that 57 million Americans, "about one in four adults . . . suffer from a diagnosable mental disorder in a given year" (National Institute of Mental Health, 2004) and are cared for by a mental health work force estimated in excess of 500,000 (Robiner, 2006). In the clinical arena, where psychologists directly engage the population regarding virtually every aspect of life, clients frequently present their problems to the clinician in moral terms.

> In the descriptive sections of presenting problems, life history, family background, and so on, one often saw terms such as *betrayal, cheating, lying, broken vows, abandonment,* and *abusiveness*, which conveyed not only emotional pain but also moral transgressions. (Miller, R. B., 2004, p. xii)

The client in psychotherapy may need help to recognize moral behaviors that can cause or contribute to symptoms, such as guilt, anxiety, boredom, and depression, and the therapist may need to distinguish between the client who *can't* change and the client who *won't* change (Andrews, 1987). Clients may need help to identify moral conflicts, make moral decisions and commitments, develop virtues, and deal with moral failures (Peteet, 2004). The client may need help to establish or reclaim a sense of moral autonomy or control over his or her own mental health (Glasser, 1998, 2003). Furthermore, it is widely accepted that psychologists bring their own moral values to their work, in addition to their professional ethics (e.g., Andrews; Bergin, 1985; Cushman, 1993; Doherty, 1995; Grant, 1985; Howard, 1985; Mowrer, 1980; Peteet; Strupp, 1974; Tjeltveit, 1986). To the degree that morality is associated with motivation and motivation with successful therapy outcomes, the ability of therapist and client to articulate moral values must be considered a therapeutic adjunct.

By an old agreement, much of psychology still adheres to an early 20th-century-style naturalistic method and the presumption of a value-free, fact-based

science. The original purpose of the agreement was the liberation of psychology from sectarian dogma and the often fruitless metaphysical speculation of moral philosophers. The aim was a scientific psychology, but the method and assumptions had unintended consequences.

Samenow (1998) criticized counterproductive treatments based on false premises that ignore human freedom and on the unsettling reality that "there are individuals who regularly choose evil over good" (p. 223). Kagan (1998) identified the wrong-headed idea of biological and early-experience determinism. Glasser (2003) argued against a growing overreliance on medications to solve problems more properly defined as matters of conduct. Rosemond (2005) objected to the "diseasing" of children's normal developmental stages and to a fashionable "postmodern psychological parenting" (p. 227) which, at best, prolongs toddlerhood. These authors argued that such ideas and practices may appear scientific, but they tend to weaken the individual's mature sense of autonomy; to reinforce hostility, a false sense of victimhood, and narcissism; and to add to a diffusion of moral responsibility.

From a broader perspective, psychology's blind eye toward moral agency created a troublesome vacuum of meaning, values, and moral authority. Its ineffectiveness in the face of moral matters fostered a growing popular perception that psychology is "method acting" in a parody of itself (Robinson, 1985/1992). An authoritarianism began to fill the moral vacuum and to threaten civil liberties (Szasz, 1965/1988). Recently, Cummings and O'Donohue (2005) criticized a psychological profession that bows to the intimidation and authoritarianism of political correctness and its "instant effortless claim to morality" (p. 21) and that

then jeopardizes clients' rights, such as the homosexual's right to reorientation therapy when requested.

The vacuum created by the old rule of value neutrality appears to have inadvertently aligned psychology with amoral policies and rendered it vulnerable to the infiltration of questionable political agendas and moralities. For example, the *Psychological Bulletin* published an article that presented pedophilia in a favorable light (Rind, Tromovitch, & Bauserman, 1998). This article won the American Psychological Association the distinction of being "the only professional society in the history of America to be [unanimously] censured by the Congress" (Cummings, 2005, p. xvii).

Redding (2001) called attention to psychology's discrimination against *conservative* sociopolitical views, noting that its own flagrant bias threatens psychology's credibility in the courts. Has psychology also been selectively value neutral? It may be inaccurate to say that psychology has marginalized morality, given that a certain *sort* of moral values—namely humanistic and postmodern values—has won widespread and largely uncritical acceptance: More accurately, *only universal moral forms have been marginalized.* The 100-year-old experiment with moral neutrality, along with academia's longstanding (and moralistic) hostility toward Christianity and traditional morality, may have proved a rule of moral intrusion: *A moral agent cannot "agree" to be free of the moral demand.* Even a "demoralized" psychology morally impacts its beneficiaries. With psychology, as with the individual, it is not a question of *whether* morality, but *whose* morality.

Whether acting individually or as a professional body; whether in the arena of theory, research, clinical practice, or elsewhere; whether they reveal it or not,

whether they are aware of it or not, whether they try or not, whether they like it or not—psychologists function as agents of moral intrusion.

As an institutional agent of moral intrusion, psychology either expands or shrinks the public awareness of the moral presence; it either helps or hurts the health, welfare, and decency of the society. Psychology has effectively rendered itself morally inarticulate. The psychologist-in-training may be struck by the fact that the training curriculum has brought him thoroughly unprepared to the moral reality that he encounters in the therapeutic session; or worse, he may not notice.

Chapter Summary

The continued lack of attention to morality in modern psychology has not diminished or eliminated a large, enduring moral presence. A discussion of the basic nature of morality gives rise to the problem of the moral ground, the basis or authority on which moral claims are made. Three prototypal moral forms, based on human, natural, and divine authority, have been central to human experience for thousands of years. An interplay of practices among forms is observed. With the advent of modern science an American moral psychology tradition began.

In what can be seen as a 100-year-long experiment in psychology to solve (or avert) the problem of the moral ground, empirical, rational, and experiential solutions have shown what they can and cannot do. Each solution partly reveals the moral presence but each compromises one or more of three key features of the moral presence and so partly distorts or obscures the presence. Critics have noted the demoralizing effects of such partial solutions: that they foster depersonalization, detachment, hedonism, narcissism, irrationality, paralysis, or dogmatism in the person; or that their values are impermanent, subjective,

uncompelling, or worse. Meanwhile, no new moral ground has been discovered; the prototypal moral forms and the three features of the moral presence appear stable. A modern American moral tradition utilizing a multimodal way of knowing, such as the *natural knowing* described in chapter I, may be the best instrument for grasping, viewing, and understanding the moral presence.

The moral presence is intrusive and carries a demand for every human being. Intrusiveness entails the perspectives of observers, experiencers, and agents; it may be normal or pathological. Religion—specifically ethical monotheism—has been the most powerful institutional agent of moral intrusion in Western civilization with its regulatory influence on conduct and its universal moral form. Psychology is unavoidably bound up in moral matters but it has been a reluctant or unmindful moral agent. By an old agreement of value neutrality, psychology has effectively rendered itself morally inarticulate. The training psychologist is unprepared for the moral realities of the therapeutic setting. Bias, dogma, authoritarianism, materialistic metaphysics, false assumptions, questionable policies and practices, and a diffusion of moral responsibility have filled the moral vacuum. A century of experience suggests that it is not realistic for psychology as an institutional moral agent to assume moral neutrality.

Restatement of the Problem

A substantial body of psychological knowledge pertaining to morality remains unfulfilled in terms of its organization and a comprehensive interpretation. The discipline of psychology remains unfulfilled in terms of achieving a balanced accommodation with respect to that body. Given the considerable and disorganized body of psychological literature related to the moral aspect of behavior, a

comprehensive, systematic and interpretive treatment of the moral aspect seems to be in order. Given the stable, ubiquitous, and meddlesome nature of the moral presence and the apparent failure of psychology effectively to quarantine moral from psychological matters, an integrative program for a morally balanced psychology seems likewise to be timely. A comprehensive organization of the moral aspect is needed to identify the form and content of a morally balanced psychology and to develop a sound curriculum for an integrated program.

Restatement of the Purpose of the Study

The purpose of this study is to identify systematically the range and nature of the moral aspect of behavior and to present a manageable, comprehensive, and interpretive scheme for the organization of its components; to suggest a curriculum for the education of psychologists and a guide for practitioners; and to articulate the rationale for a morally balanced psychology—one that conserves the wholeness and humanity of the person; retains the confirmatory processes of science; preserves the agency, objectiveness, and gravity of the moral; and is likely to promote mental health, happiness, and decency of conduct.

Having considered the historical background and how the American psychologist has viewed and handled the basic categories and nature of the moral aspect of behavior, the task now is to present a manageable, comprehensive, interpretive scheme that will facilitate the organization of the components of the moral aspect.

Chapter IV
DIMENSIONS OF THE MORAL ASPECT

It was claimed in the first chapter that much of the form and content of a morally balanced psychology is there to be unpacked in the psychological literature and that a comprehensive organization of the moral aspect will suggest the curriculum for such a psychology. Unpacked thus far are some of the historical context, basic categories, and conceptions of the nature of the moral aspect of behavior. The focus now turns to the presentation of a scheme for the organization of the components of the moral aspect as they are addressed in the literature and encountered in nature. This chapter first notes prior modern efforts to organize psychologically the moral aspect of behavior. Next, the rationale for the present organizational scheme is offered, followed by the plan itself, in five dimensions. Finally, in a special section, one of the five dimensions is presented in an expanded form to illustrate how each of the five dimensions might be laid out.

Efforts to Organize the Moral Aspect

The magnitude of the problem of organizing the moral aspect of human behavior, given its large constellation of variables, is appreciated when one begins to consider how it might be done or notices how others have tried—and how *few* those others are. A good organization of data begins with well-defined categories. Features of the moral aspect have been organized by psychologists on a variety of

scales, in all sorts of more or less helpful category combinations. But a comprehensive organization is another matter. Lickona's (1976) work is perhaps the most comprehensive treatment to date. His textbook on moral development and behavior offers a broad assortment of topics (moral values, motivations, human nature, good and evil, and so on) and a variety of perspectives (biological, psychological, social, cultural factors, and so on). Other authors have considered the theoretical foundations for an organizational scheme. For example, Dixon and Lerner (1984) identified five distinct metatheoretical models in developmental psychology—organismic, psychoanalytic, mechanistic, contextualistic, and dialectic—all based on Darwinian theory and each of which permits a relatively unique interpretation of data. Dixon and Lerner observed that all major contemporary theoretical systems "embrace a generalized historical or developmental approach to human phenomena" (p. 28) and emphasize environmental influence on the developing organism.

In a second textbook, Kurtines and Gewirtz (1995) borrowed Dixon and Lerner's five models to systematically arrange the field of moral development. Several contributors to that work offered smaller-scale schemes. For instance, in order to improve on a traditional three-category explanation of moral processes (cognitive, affective, behavioral), Narvaez and Rest (1995) proposed four categories: moral sensitivity, moral judgment, moral motivation, and implementation. Looking at ways to increase prosocial behavior, Eisenberg (1995) identified social, personality, emotional, and situational categories of development. Staub (1995) organized the roots of prosocial and antisocial behavior in categories such as personal characteristics, situational aspects, biological needs, social standards, other-oriented values, and personal goals and motives. Laupa and Turiel

(1995) presented a three-domain theory of development using categories of social convention, personal jurisdiction, and moral rights. Nisan (1995) offered a model of moral balance based on everyday observations, personal moral choice, and the calculation of a bottom-line personal identity.

In a separate study written from an education perspective, professor of Judaic studies David Blumenthal (1999) usefully organized six dimensions of phenomena said to facilitate good and evil behavior: human character; personal psychological history; socialization; authority and hierarchy; roles, norms, and rules; and praxis. In a third moral development textbook Lapsley (1996) offered categories of cognition, action, education, social rules and knowledge, and the moral self.

The textbooks by Lickona (1976), Kurtines and Gewirtz (1995), and Lapsley (1996) are all significant accounts, but their organizational capacity appears to have been constrained by the developmental perspective. To date there appears to be no organizational scheme for a comprehensive psychological account of the moral aspect of behavior. The body of data remains, as Wren (1991) observed, in "considerable disarray," largely because psychologists continue to study and to report on a wide range of variables that occur and operate at many levels of organization, not all of which fall within the historical-developmental model. Absent an adequate interpretive organizing scheme, valuable studies remain unconnected; data are on the increase but knowledge is less so. It may be useful at this time to approach the problem with a fresh organization, one not married to a single perspective.

Rationale for the Present Scheme

Realistic categories may be said to have *natural* value to the extent that they are, as Pinker (1997) described, "products of a complex mind designed to mesh with what is in nature" (p. 57). Useful categories should have *heuristic* value, as described by biologist Ernst Mayr (1997): "Every classification system has two major functions: to facilitate information retrieval and to serve as the basis of comparative research" (p. 125). Meaningful categories should also have a *hermeneutic* value, insofar as they are arranged in ways that are important to people: "We are always dealing with life situations that *matter* to us, and we reinterpret them, through dialogue with others and the past" (Richardson et al., 1999, p. 274). The organizational categories presented here aim to satisfy these natural, heuristic, and hermeneutic criteria.

The literature reviewed for this work was examined in part for the authors' uses of categories and for their implicit and explicit organizational schemes. It is clear, given the samples just presented, that there are all sorts of ways to carve up the moral aspect for study. However, a few recurrent categorical themes are strikingly stable. In virtually every work reviewed the author in some way referred to one or more of five categories of the moral aspect of behavior. It is here proposed that each of these five categories is necessary to a comprehensive psychological treatment of the moral aspect and that the five together can handily organize all of the content thereof. Although the categories appear repeatedly throughout the literature under a variety of labels, most authors utilize only one or two or three. The categories were not found in the five-part combination presented in this work: animal nature, human nature, personal nature, social nature, and the nature of conduct.

Of course, no category is absolutely definitive, and these five do not preclude other ways of carving up this phenomenon for study, nor do they preclude elaboration or subdivision. However, the categories correspond to familiar natural phenomena and are consistent with the following observation: A certain behavioral complexity (*the moral aspect*) is unique to the human being, who, having an animal body (*animal nature*) plus a reflective capacity not found among animals (*human nature*), experiences himself (*personal nature*) and relates with others (*social nature*) by behaving (*conduct*). Thus, the five categories "mesh" with the ordinary reality from which they derive their natural value. They are robust in their ability to capture, encompass, and systematically account for the immensely complex and subtle componential field of moral behavior and they permit useful distinctions to be made, important to the purpose of this work and for comparative research; hence, they satisfy the heuristic criterion. Equally important, these categories are flexible enough to contain the voices and images of the moral presence as a whole, as it is lived and experienced by actual people in the present world, and thereby support meaningful interpretations of the moral aspect of human behavior. It is proposed that the following scheme, at the very least, permits an organized presentation of the moral aspect for teaching purposes; better, it provides a means by which data can be assembled as an organized field of knowledge.

A Comprehensive Organizational Scheme in Five Dimensions

The moral aspect of behavior is most often conceived in the literature in terms of its components and their properties or of events and their processes or of

the relations of these. Less often, the moral aspect is conceived in terms of the problems that it presents for people in general or the psychologist in particular. The following categories may be viewed as five related, interactive arenas of an organized field where structures and events of the moral aspect meet and interact. Each of the five categories is intended to reflect a natural dimension of the moral aspect. Each dimension represents a level of organization of structures and events of the moral aspect. Together, the dimensions comprise a comprehensive organizational scheme for the moral aspect and meaningfully reveal the organization and relations of its parts and of the features of its full presence. It is a useful scheme by which a multitude of variables may be usefully displayed and considered (see Table 1).

Animal Nature

Reason and empirical evidence suggest that biology and animal nature may have something useful to say about the moral aspect of *human* behavior (e.g., Darwin 1871/1998; Edelman, 1992; Gould, 1982; Lorenz, 1963; Mayr, 1997; Midgley, 1978; Pert, 1997; Schwartz, J. M., 2002; Thornhill & Palmer, 2000; de Waal, 1996). Within this dimension are found those features that humans share with animals and that are related in some way to the moral aspect—from biological structures and physiological processes to animal behaviors that appear to be precursors, parallels, or clues to moral behavior. This dimension represents the biophysical context of morality; its contents are revealed in disciplines such as physiology, microbiology, genetics, neuroscience, endocrinology, evolutionary science, and ethology, and in biological, comparative, evolutionary, and developmental psychologies.

Table 1

The Five Dimensions of the Moral Aspect of Human Behavior

Dm	Nature	Description	Focus
AN	animal	The amoral, biological structures and processes of the MAB; animal features that correspond to the human moral agent; underlies all the dimensions; platform of the moral aspect	body
HN	psychological	Properties of AN plus self-awareness; mental processes of volitional agent; interplay between bodily urges and human agency; recognition of moral presence and its intrusive demand; dimension of moral agency	agency
PN	personal	Properties of HN plus the personal experience of a particular individual; specific beliefs, assumptions, feelings, cognitions; the actor, observer, experiencer of moral presence and demand; dimension of the moral agent	person
SN	social	Where two or more PNs converge; hierarchies and characteristic of groups and interpersonal behavior; relationship of person to group and group to group; dimension of society as moral agent	others
CN	conduct	Nature and type of action of a moral agent (PN) affecting another, alone or in group, in public or private, actively or passively; emphasis on effects of action; dimension of moral action	actions

Note. Dm = dimension, AN = animal nature, HN = human nature, PN = personal nature, SN = social nature, CN = conduct nature, MAB = moral aspect of behavior. A certain behavioral complexity (*the moral aspect*) is unique to the human being, who, having an animal body (*animal nature*) plus a reflective capacity not found among animals (*human nature*), experiences himself (*personal nature*) and relates with others (*social nature*) by behaving (*conduct*).

Numerous problems are encountered in studying animal nature, beginning with the problem of matter that is alive. Related problems are the

conceptualizations of instinct, voluntary movement, and motivation, which involve some description of the nature and organization of animal structures—orderliness, regulatory mechanisms, biological values (such as homeostatic *set-points*), and so forth. A methodological problem is that of balancing the demand for both precision and meaning when observed phenomena are hardly discrete.

Of special interest are the operations of biological regulatory values at molecular, molar, and organismic levels and how they translate into movement; the biological urges—such as to survival, reproduction, aggression, altruism, and bonding in social animals—and their implications for morality; and the emergent properties of some animals, such as primary consciousness, voluntary movement, and motivation, which appear to prefigure the moral aspect.

In what way, if at all, do the amoral values that govern biological systems, processes, and structures differ from those that govern human morality? Nature's orderliness, as evidenced in the regulatory systems, seen through the microscope and observed in the field, adds new *empirical* credence to the rationalist theory of natural law proposed by Socrates and Locke. Of the five dimensions, *animal nature* is probably the most ignored by psychologists, yet it is basic to all four others. This is the physical platform for the moral aspect of human behavior.

Human Nature

This category contains all of the biological features of animal nature plus one structure not found in animals, which directly bears upon the moral aspect: the expanded cortex. The human cortex is responsible for the emergent reflective capacity *self-awareness* and its associated properties, such as reflective thought, conceptualization, mental processes, volition, the awareness of the moral presence,

and the felt responsibility toward the moral demand (Edelman, 1992; Ferrari, M., & Sternberg, 1998; Kandel, 2000b). Alexander (1992) estimated that "self-awareness may be the biggest change in an environment of a living thing since life began" (p. 790). Kandel (2000b) named "biology's deepest riddle: the neural representation of consciousness and self-awareness" (p. 16). Self-awareness takes nature's biological orderliness to a whole new level of complexity: the level of *psychology*. Sources of data for this category include those of animal nature plus anthropology, cognitive and psychodynamic psychologies, history, philosophy, and religion.

Problems encountered in this dimension include the mind-body relationship; the problem of volition in the world of determinants; the problem of whether human nature is basically good, bad, neither, or both; the problem of understanding natural selection in light of human self-aware selection (and vice versa); and the fact that the human being is at once an animal and more than animal.

The central focus of this dimension is the interplay between the biophysical world and human agency. Data in this dimension are of biophysical, psychological, or moral types, such as the regulation of instinctive urges, the desire of the self-aware selector for certainty, or the expressions of the moral sense in belief systems. Of special interest are the invariants of human nature. Identifiable invariant biological values are known to account for the operation of body systems; are there also identifiable invariant psychological values and moral values? Because the human *response* to evildoing is so important, what if anything is there in human nature that interferes with or facilitates the response? Here is the dimension of moral agency.

Personal Nature

This category contains factors related to the special psychological processes and subjective experience of a live individual as they relate to the moral aspect of behavior. Here is found the person with a name, who selects and acts, and *all* players on the moral stage: lovers, fighters, perpetrators, bystanders, rescuers, victims, objectors, cheerleaders, heroes, and villains. In addition to the data sources for human nature, sources for this category include personality and experiential psychologies and clinical knowledge gained within the therapeutic setting or recorded in the case study or psychobiography.

The personal dimension is a product of human nature: "It is the potential for plasticity of the relatively stereotyped units of the nervous system that endows each of us with our individuality" (Kandel, 2000b, p. 34). This dimension contains data related to the person's subjective experience of the biological, psychological, and moral realities; his exclusive face, physique, and presence; his private mental habits, memories, emotions, and beliefs; his internalized codes, values, and concerns; and his moral successes and failures as revealed in relationships and character. In this dimension, the self-aware selector is seen to function morally in three capacities: as an observer, who sees and judges according to his commitment; as an experiencer, subject to the moral intrusions and demands of others; and as a moral agent, who, like the biblical Adam, answers or hides from the moral presence and its demand.

A central problem of this dimension is that of the moral engagement of the person. Does he acknowledge the moral presence or suppress it? Can he articulate his values or is he ignorant, avoidant, manipulative, blind, paralyzed, or confused with respect to right and wrong? Personal nature is where morality comes to life: in

the emotional and muscular effort, at the moment a chosen act becomes a matter of record and a story is written. The meaningful variable, the wild card, is personal nature. Whereas human nature describes the phenomena of agency, this is the dimension of the moral *agent.*

Social Nature

The dimension of social nature emerges when the personal natures of two or more moral agents coincide in some way. Mowrer (1964) wrote, "A social system is always a moral system" (p. 751); as such, the moral aspect assumes a larger presence. Sources of data for this dimension include those of social nature plus the interpersonal psychologies, such as object relations, transactional analysis, family systems, and social psychology; and other social sciences, such as economics, education, linguistics, political science, sociology, and history.

To this dimension belong data related to the hierarchy of social groups—dyads, families, clubs, communities, and so forth; the morally related characteristics of groups—roles, disciplinary styles, power hierarchies, governing rules, norms, and the like; and factors related to interpersonal relationships—group behavior, the processes and products of socialization, the transmission of knowledge regarding what is required, permitted, and proscribed. Social organizations function like persons, as self-aware selectors: they observe, experience, and act as moral agents.

A central problem of social nature is the goodness or decency of the group: What constitutes a decent society? How are social groups evaluated? What causes moral decline, and what will most likely promote a *more good society*, one whose members are more likely to do good? What role do social moral values play? What

are the effects on a society, say, when compassion is valued above justice or when racism or tolerance or health or happiness are valued above moral goodness? Another concern is the relationship between the self-interested or morally concerned person and the group, on the one hand, and that of the group and the larger social system on the other.

A prominent feature of this dimension is the interplay between social nature and human agency. Group influence on personal responsibility has been massively studied in psychology and is considered by many rightly or wrongly to be a determinant of conduct, such that a failure of the group or group leaders is effectively the cause of evil (e.g., Aronson, 2000; Darley & Latané, 1968; Staub, 1989; Zimbardo, 2007). In this study, social nature is the *arena* where most conduct occurs. This is the dimension of *society as moral agent.*

Nature of Conduct

This dimension describes the factors narrowly associated with the nature, forms, and effects of action taken by a moral agent and related to a standard of right and wrong. Moral action may be of a personal or group nature; it may be public or private, active or passive, total or incremental; and its effects may be small or great. In addition to those of social nature, the sources of data for this category include behavioral, abnormal, and positive psychologies and criminology.

Of particular interest are the effects or products of conduct on the actor, on immediate others, and on the society. Conduct has been viewed in both psychological and religious terms, as a path leading toward or away from mental health, prompting, for example, this from Mowrer (1960): "If it proves empirically true that certain forms of conduct characteristically lead human beings into

emotional instability, what better or firmer basis would one wish for labeling such conduct as destructive, self-defeating, evil, sinful?" (p 186). Holding a focus on the effects of conduct on others—an often neglected effort—is critical to understanding the moral aspect of human behavior (Hallie, 1997).

> Vague words like "sick" put murderous cruelty in the same sack with kleptomania and manic-depressive disorder. They turn our attention away from the fact that vicious people cause other human beings to be screaming, bleeding, pleading, writhing victims, and that there is something despicable about the torturers. (p. 97)

A central problem of this dimension is, of course, moral action—the doing of good and the doing of evil. Questions that arise are, Can one have good intentions and still do evil? Is the response to evil a requirement of good conduct? Is inaction in the face of evil, which permits evil to continue, itself an evil? Is good conduct a matter of conforming or obedience to rules and norms, or is it about the rejection of rules and norms? This dimension does *not* address the myriad influences on the person or the mental processes, feelings, or intentions of the person. This is the dimension of *moral action.*

Summary of Scheme

The moral aspect may be examined using any one of the five dimensions: animal nature, human nature, personal nature, social nature, and the nature of conduct. A comprehensive examination requires all five dimensions; none is disposable. Dimensions are distinct but not discrete. Each dimension has its own focus; all dimensions overlap, interact, inform, and moderate one another in seemingly infinite permutations. Next is presented an expanded view of the dimension *animal nature* to illustrate how the foregoing scheme may yield a comprehensive account of the moral aspect.

Special Section: Animal Nature as a Dimension of the Moral Aspect of Human Behavior

> *Understanding is relating*; it is fitting things into a context. Nothing can be understood on its own. Had we known no other animate life-form than our own, we should have been utterly mysterious to ourselves as a species. And that would have made it immensely harder for us to understand ourselves as individuals too. (Midgley, 1978, p. 18)

As a dimension of the moral aspect of human behavior, animal nature represents certain biological and behavioral features observed in animals and shared by the observer. The moral agent has a body. The living body *behaves*. As an organism—a subject in the animal kingdom—the embodied agent evidently has animal nature. People have always observed animals, perhaps out of a natural curiosity or the desire for knowledge that might increase their understanding of themselves. In another

common, if unscientific tendency, people have characterized—morally anthropomorphized—animals as wicked, altruistic, selfish, good natured, evil, devoted, treacherous, courageous, bloodthirsty, faithful, cruel, and so on (Midgley, 1978, 1984). But the bodies and behaviors of animals—especially of *mammalia*—have proved to be a generous *scientific* source of insight into aspects of *Homo sapiens* as well. The reader may recognize much in this section that applies to the moral aspect. Although animals are hardly the primary interest of most psychologists, animal nature warrants serious consideration in the curriculum of a morally balanced psychology, and it is a fitting point of departure for a comprehensive treatment of the moral aspect.

Assigning a meaningful set of categories for the biological and behavioral features of animal nature poses a multifold challenge. In the first place, categories can only be static idealizations, metaphors, or analogs of the unlabeled natural world. Then, in the natural world where structural wholes at one level of

organization are parts at another, where events are causes at one point in time and effects at another, and where a phenomenon may constitute both structure *and* event, things tend to gain or lose meaning depending on which level of analysis is applied to what level of organization at what point in a sequence. Indeed, meanings emerge or fall into disuse, much as objects appear or disappear beneath the withdrawing or advancing lens of a microscope. A case in point:

> Neurobiologists are now beginning to define the actual physiological states that correspond to the motivational states inferred by psychologists . . . . [and] the need for invoking these [inferred] states to explain behavior may ultimately disappear, to be replaced by more precise concepts derived from physiology and systems theory. (Kupfermann, 1991, p. 751)

While precision is one context for understanding, meaning is quite another. Moreover, the wonders and depths of nature at every level of its organization, from the molecular to the organismic, tend to induce in the observer a fascination with the power of a single level to explain all levels. The problem of categories for animal nature is further complicated by a multidisciplinary knowledge base—general, neural, and molecular biologies; genetics, physiology, and ethology; the biological, comparative, and developmental psychologies—and by arsenals of highly specialized terms and well-defended conceptual and professional turfs. Finally, and perhaps most perplexing of all, is the naked fact that the subject at hand is *matter that is alive,* which is to say an *event-structure* or *living being.*

Facing problems such as these, readers and writers will do well who remain alert to the limitations of categories; who carefully locate the contextual coordinates of topics at hand; who are able to suspend a disciplinary, conceptual, and methodological allegiance and habit; and who take the time to translate unnecessarily specialized terms into more commonly shared ones. This pragmatic attitude should better serve to approach the study of animal nature multifocally, to

view the animal organism both reductively and by whole systems, and to conceive of simultaneously interacting levels of organization—of molecules, limbs, and behavioral strategies, for instance—together, in an orderly way, in order to tackle the question at hand: *What is the biological basis for the moral aspect of human behavior, and what animal parallels, precursors, conditions, or clues afford a fitting context for its understanding?*

This special section solicits help from a few of psychology's neighboring disciplines in order to identify some of the biological and behavioral features of animals that provide a context for understanding the moral aspect and that properly belong in a curriculum such as is recommended in this work. Several themes of animal nature are introduced, followed by a sketch of relevant animal structures highlighting those recurrent themes at micro and macro levels. A note on the untidy concept of *motivation* is followed by a few concluding comments.

Nature of Animal Structures

In exploring animal nature, several related themes are encountered repeatedly throughout the literature and will be useful for understanding the moral aspect of human behavior: the principle *orderliness*; two pressures *conservation* and *generation*; three properties *organization*, *correspondence*, and *emergence*; and a pair of explanatory models, one based on *information* and one on *selection*.

Principle of Order

In general, *orderliness* refers to a nonrandom arrangement of separate elements, one that is lawful, regulated, rule- or value-governed. In the present context, *orderliness* refers to the hierarchical regularity of animal nature that proceeds from

the paramount governing biological values, typically expressed in the literature as *survival* and *reproduction*. Life is the given in biology, and it is the first biological imperative. Pinker (1997) "explained": "In the beginning was a replicator . . . [and] replicators are wont to multiply" (pp. 157-158). Thus, the chromosomal orderings of genes that govern structural development, regulate body functions, and account for morphological and behavioral traits—all represent nature's orderliness as an expression of the first biological imperative.

> The regulatory systems are found on all levels of the organism's functioning, right from the genome up to psychological behaviors; thus they appear to be among the most general characteristics of the organism. Self-regulations seem to constitute at the same time one of the most universal characteristics of life and the most general mechanism to be found in both organic and cognitive behaviors. (Inhelder, as cited in Schore, 1994, p. 499)

The general orderliness of nature makes certain cognitive processes possible, such as recognition, categorization, generalization, relation, and communication. These, too, are enlisted in the service of the highest priority. Virtually everything about the structures, processes, and behaviors of animals is a testimony to nature's orderliness and her first order.

Of course, animal nature is not stable and regular in the way that concepts or machines are. Mayr (1982) observed that most "entities in the physical sciences . . . have constant characteristics, [but] biological entities are characterized by their changeability" (p. 55). Organic structures are profusely diverse, adaptive, and commonly irregular. Consider the ubiquity of the uniqueness of the individual. The unevenness of nature gives the appearance of disorder; there *is* an element of randomness in nature. But much of nature's variation comes about in orderly ways, and only structures that are well adapted to the natural order will survive and

successfully reproduce. Thus, the orderliness of animal nature is characteristically variable, as suggested in the designation *event-structure* or *living being.*

Pressures

Animal life proceeds in an orderly marriage of two seemingly divergent biological pressures. *Conservation* acts as a sort of gravitational field within which the animal survives and quietly sustains its stable identity, cohesive genotype, internal equilibrium, morphological regularity, and postural balance. Throughout its lifetime the zebra remains a zebra, similar to its kind; the snail remains a snail, and their descendants may do so for millions of years. Explaining the ubiquity of stasis in nature has been a knotty problem for evolutionary biologists (Mayr, 1997); for Bateson (1979) it seems to have contained no special puzzle: "The developing embryo is, within itself, a context of selection favoring conservatism" (p. 175).

Against the pressure of conservation runs *generation*, a force that constitutes proof of life. During its lifespan, the organism and its tiniest components exhibit rather dramatic change progressions, including reproduction, such that additional or expanded properties arise. The pace of generation is continuous and variable, marked by periods of slow change (plateaus of normality) and accelerated change (growth spurts, punctuations). Animal generation proceeds in micromovements, by a variety of mechanisms typically observed along ontogenetic or phylogenetic timelines. Ontogenesis follows the relatively fixed stages and environment-sensitive growth periods of the individual, such as fertilization, gestation, maturation, homeostasis, and aging. Phylogenesis traces the historical development of divergent and variously complex species and the mechanisms of genetic evolution, such as random mutation, recombination, genetic

drift, the mixing or isolation of populations, and natural selection, or Mayr's (1997) preferred term, "nonrandom elimination" (p. 189). Any such development, of course, presumes a fundamental plasticity in the composition of the organism—that is, a capacity to grow, heal, strengthen, remodel, reorganize, or otherwise alter, expand upon, or acquire anew functions and forms. Every generative and plastic expression of animal structure is eventually met by some conservative pressure that limits that expression; every conservation is eventually destabilized by some generative perturbation.

Properties

Three properties of interest to this work are associated with the variable orderliness of animal nature: organization (or systematization), correspondence, and emergence. Because generative pressure works on what is already there, structural compounding, recombination, and complexity are routinely encountered in nature. The building and ordering of structures is everywhere observable: non-organic atoms combine to produce molecules and compounds; organic molecules combine to produce cells and organisms. McGuigan (1994) identified the biological combinatory orderings as *systems* or "material items . . . that interact with each other . . . through connections . . . called relations" (p. 4). Mayr (1997) referred to such combinations—be they molecules, cells, tissues, organs, organ systems, or whole animals—as *organizations* wherein the higher levels are said to "integrate" the lower levels. It will be shown that systematization or organization also applies to processes and behavior, such as the "genetic program" or "instinct system."

Correspondence was described by Pribram and Bradley (1998) as *transposable invariance.* Pribram and Bradley noted that "general systems theory is based on the finding that often collectives of different scales can be shown to operate according to the same . . . principles of organization" (p. 274); this finding permits "a translation of the concepts essential to understanding relations at one level of inquiry in order to articulate the meaning of concepts at an adjacent level" (p. 275). Such correspondence has been noted, for example, in the relationship between the organization of behavior of an individual organism and that of its social organization (Pribram & Bradley; Wilson, E. O., 1975/2000) and between the communication and control of animals and that of machines (Wiener, 1948/1957). Indeed, the property of correspondence has been applied to bridge subatomic systems and world political systems, along a path that integrates physical, chemical, biological, and social system levels; it has also been used to argue against an overly reductive approach in favor of a multilevel multidisciplinary one (Schore, 1994, chap. 36).

Emergence was described by Schroeder (2001): "Consistently . . . the information that emerges from a structure exceeds the information inherent in the components of that structure" (p. 178), and by Mayr (1997): "In a structured system, new properties emerge at higher levels of integration which could not have been predicted from a knowledge of the lower-level components" (p. 19). Indeed, surprising and orderly properties—C. L. Morgan (1927/2007) called them "resultants" and Schneirla (1949/ 1972b) called them "derivatives"—can emerge in biogenic and abiogenic systems alike. For instance, oxygen and hydrogen, both of which explode on contact with fire, can bond to produce molecules of water, a substance that extinguishes fire—new level of integration, surprising emergent

property. Likewise, non-organic elements, acting lawfully in a favorable atmosphere (and in the presence of water) can combine to produce organic molecules; life is an elaboration of that event—new level of integration, surprising emergent property (Mayr, 1997; Schroeder). Animals—those self-replicating, material structures that breathe, eat, heal, signal, and *go*—are the emergent outcome of an integration of organic molecules. The stable properties of animals are not apparent in their molecular components, nor are those properties predicted by their components, nor can they be meaningfully or fully explained solely in terms of—*or absent*—those components. Emergence spotlights the significance of whole phenomena and signals the need for fresh appraisals. It should be noted that what emerges is orderly, having its own regulatory value settings generally subordinate to the chief biological value, life.

Explanatory Models

Of the explanatory models of animal structures and their combinatory relations, two will be encountered repeatedly in the literature and can be usefully applied in this work. In one model the orderly relations that occur between the components of an animal body or between individuals are viewed as a sort of *articulation* and *responsivity*—cooperative conditions that suggest the transmission of *something*. The favored 20th-century metaphor for this something is *information,* famously defined by Bateson (1979) as "any difference that makes a difference" (p. 228). In this sense, the world may be conceived of as a world of differences, a variance pool. The transfer of information (*instruction*) entails a sender, a message from the pool, a receiver, and a shared medium, arranged such that the receiver, having "got" the message, is substantively altered, informed, or

moved. According to McGuigan (1994), "All bodily phenomena are influenced by messages that are transmitted within the numerous cybernetic circuits throughout the body" (p. 16). Message content is usually described in terms of *codes* (as in the genetic code) or *signals* (as in the regulatory feedback signals of homeostasis). The information model invites the observer to identify the communicative media and communicators, to break the biological code in order to eavesdrop on the transmission, or to identify regulatory threshold values—*these are biological values*, such as normal blood levels for various nutrients and hormones—in order to understand what drives, restrains, and directs behavior and to record and analyze the data, perhaps even to manipulate the process (Iversen, Iversen & Saper, 2000; Kalat, 2004; Kupfermann, Kandel, & Iversen, 2000; McGuigan).

Another model offers an evolutionary explanation in which the world is again viewed as a variance pool, but relations among and within animals are described in terms of *selection*—the nonrandom reduction of variants by competition, resulting in the survival or "reproductive success" of the "selected" variant. In this model survival and reproduction are implicitly the cardinal values (again, *biological* values) of a species. Gazzaniga (1992), perhaps in the spirit of competition, contended that "ever since Charles Darwin, the message from biology has been that selection is at work, not instruction" (p. 3), and "even though at the psychological level much of what happens . . . appears to be the result of instruction, at the molecular level we consistently see signs that *selection* is operating" (p. 5) on "what millions of years of evolution have already bestowed" (p. 7). The selection model owes much to recent work in molecular biology, particularly in the field of immunology, wherein somatic selection events have been likened to a science of recognition. Edelman (1992), a principal in that

research, has expanded the model, holding that animals have an evolved value system—again, biological values—that directs internal regulation and drives behavior in ways that maintain fitness through a precognitive recognition-selection process (chaps. 9, 11). The selection model invites the observer to trace the development of a species or trait, to ask what selective pressures may have produced it, to observe how its form and function have contributed to its survival and reproductive fitness, and to fashion explanations and applications based on sound biological realities (Edelman; Thornhill & Palmer, 2000).

The selection and information models appear to speak in Gestalt shifts, from different levels of analysis to different aspects of the event-structure *living being*. Whereas one model emphasizes what has been conserved in millions of years of biological bestowal, the other speaks to what is generated in current transactions. Where one is riveted on molecular interaction, the other addresses how meanings arise. The two models, then, are not mutually exclusive, nor are they opposed; nor does one contain or explain or refute the other. Rather, the two imply one another, insofar as, within a biological system, selection must work on information and information must be selected from a historical pool of signals. Both models entail related mechanisms of recognition and response; both share an inherent regulatory value system; both enrich the understanding of the orderly biological reality that, it will now be shown, forms the basis for the moral aspect of human behavior.

Structures of Animal Nature: Micro Scale

Which animal structures, shared by humans, are relevant to the moral aspect of human behavior? How do the principles, pressures, properties, and explanatory models all find expression in those structures? A brief sketch of some structures of

interest begins in the molecular neighborhood, where the modern microscope and related technologies have made possible a bird's eye view of an otherwise invisible animal nature at work.

Genes: Articulate Bases

Mayr (1997) described biological development as "an ordered sequence of gene expressions" (p. 167). Genes are linear arrangements of chemical bases located on the twisted and laddered strands of DNA, tightly packed within the chromosomes of every animal cell. The arrangement is often likened to a language or code: The bases represent the alphabet, genes the words, proteins the sentences, and the encryption "reads" in one direction (Mayr, 1997; Schroeder, 2001). The meaning of the genetic expression has been described in moral, almost religious tones: "The message is redundant, bespeaking care, conservatism; it conveys a sense that whatever it is saying must be preserved, treasured, passed intact to future generations" (Sagan & Druyan, 1992, pp. 76-77).

The genetic code serves both transmission and development functions for the organism. As *hereditary* units, genes conserve and transport the biochemical values for parental traits, which include the threshold values (or *set points*) for optimal body functioning and which are married in the offspring embryo and carried forward. Chief among the genetic values is, of course, *the fitness to survive and to reproduce*—in a word, *life*. The persistence of life alone, in all its varied species, testifies to the stability and regularity of the genetic program by which traits are conserved and faithfully transmitted through replication.

As *developmental* units, genes account for much of the perturbations and destabilizations associated with growth. Schroeder (2001) explained that genes

furnish both the general plan and specific values necessary for the production, protein by protein, of the entire adult animal body. The orderly unfolding of gene expressions does not stop at the completed adult; the body manufactures up to 2,000 proteins *per cell per second*, all to precise specifications over the lifetime of the organism. "The fabric from which we and all life are built is being continually rewoven at a most astoundingly rapid rate" (p. 189).

The relevance of genes to this work lies in the manner and extent to which they can be said to designate behavior, including moral behavior. It appears widely accepted among scientists that "genes that affect the body in any way also affect behavior" (Kalat, 2004, p. 14), and that activity-dependent development mediates implementation of the genetic design (Edelman, 1992; Gilliam, Kandel, & Jessell, 2000; Maturana & Varela, 1987; Schwartz, J. M., 2002). Thus, genes systematically and reciprocally determine by design a range of whole-animal behavior indirectly through the relations of biological order. Genes designate structures, structures designate capacities (the hand designates grasp), capacities tend toward activity (hand tends to grasp), and, as will be shown, activities influence further structural development, especially neural (grasping is perfected and becomes "second nature").

Peptides: Articulate Acids

Pert (1997) explained that, of the molecules that genes "code for" (specify), some regulate and coordinate activities at cell, organ, and system levels. *Receptors* are molecules of amino acids that "float" like lily pads on the fluid surface of cells, with "roots" that penetrate to the cell interior. They occur in high concentrations at information-intense "hot spots," such as the brain and locations where impulses

enter the nervous system through the senses. Millions of receptors may dot the surface of a single nerve cell, and the brain contains virtually all of the body's known receptor types. *Ligands* are tiny molecules produced and released at specific locations and transported throughout the body in various extracellular fluids. Some 95% of ligands are *peptides* (or *neuropeptides*), which include most of the hormones and some neurotransmitters. Peptides are tiny strings of amino acids, much smaller than receptors. From studies of mice, rats, and guinea pigs, it is known that, when peptides contact and bind with compatible receptors, a signal is passed to the cell interior, initiating biochemical chain reactions that can extend to distant body locations and affect bodily processes—including the animal's behavior—for extended periods of time (see chaps. 1, 3).

Iversen et al. (2000) described peptide-receptor binding as a "chemical coding of information transfer . . . although we are still only beginning to learn how to read the code" (p. 980). Pert (1997) argued that primitive peptides "were . . . being made inside cells long before there were dendrites, axons or even neurons" (p. 26) and that they have served a function, "crucial to the survival of the organism" (p. 86), as the locus or "biochemical substrate of emotion" (p. 179). Edelman (1992) similarly described a primitive limbic or hedonic system that regulates the body according to evolved, physiological value patterns (*homeostats*), causing the organism to select behaviors that satisfy those values and thereby enhance evolutionary fitness (chaps. 9, 11). The opiate receptors (discovered by Pert in 1972) provide an illustration. Opiate receptors occur in the brains of all vertebrates, invertebrates, even insects. From the brain, along with their ligand *endorphin* (endogenous morphine), they mediate pain relief throughout the body

(Pert, 1997). However, Amaral (2000) noted that laboratory-facilitated pleasure seeking in rats competes with and can override the supreme biological value, life.

> When electrodes were implanted into the animals' reward regions and the animals were allowed to press a lever to electrically stimulate their brains, the rats preferred self-stimulating their brains to obtaining food or water, engaging in sexual behavior, or any other naturally rewarding activity. (p. 334)

Pert (1997) voiced suspicion that the lion's share of exchange in the brain is conducted by this broad system of information molecules, that as little as 2% of neural activity actually occurs at the synapse, that the brain itself may be better understood as "a bag of hormones" (p. 139), and that traditional formulations of the neuroendocrine systems are inadequate because they neglect the peptides and focus almost exclusively on the neuronal control of emotional expressivity. In her view the moment-to-moment, bodywide bindings of innumerable neuropeptides and receptor molecules constitute a communication network whose "molecules of emotion" cross cellular barriers and initiate, integrate, and regulate activities in all body systems. The relevance of the peptides to this work is largely in their relationship to the emotions—including pleasure—and their impact on the brain and on conduct. Human emotion is, of course, central to moral care. Molecules of powerful emotions acting and reacting on behalf of an evolved hierarchy of biological values might reasonably be expected to impinge on the moral agent.

Neurons: Articulate Cells

Here, the eye in the microscope refocuses on the cellular neighborhood where *neurons* work in concert with the peptides. Neurons are specialized cells that function electrically and chemically to transmit signals throughout the innervated body. Compared to the slower transmission of peptides, the firing of neurons is

extremely rapid and renders the animal fit for predatory, protective, and other survival responses.

The content of neuronal signals is stereotyped throughout the nervous system and does not contain a code per se. Rather, the innumerable messages that pass through the brain are differentiated by the innumerable constellations of neural *pathways*, *networks*, or *maps* that "light up" with electrical impulses (Edelman, 1992; Kandel, 2000b). One crucial variable, then—one with broad implications for human behavior—lies in the formation and properties of the *neural connections* in the developing brain. Apparently, these connections are as much events as they are structures. According to J. M. Schwartz (2002), neural scientists have long held that the formation of neuronal connections in the animal brain "reflect the history of use of the motor system" (p. 165). Scientists have agreed that "as neuronal pathways are repeatedly engaged . . . those pathways become deeper, wider, stronger" (p. 163); "that the more a creature makes a movement, the larger the cortical area given over to that movement" (p. 166); and that experimentally "stimulating cortical cells to fire simultaneously strengthened their synaptic connections . . . . a key to the formation of enduring neuronal circuits . . . known by the maxim 'Cells that fire together, wire together'" (p. 107). Edelman explained the role of experience in these formations as they occur in goldfish and frogs:

> The principles governing these changes are epigenetic—meaning that key events occur only if certain previous events have taken place. An important consequence is that the connections among the cells are therefore not precisely prespecified in the genes of the animal. (p. 23)

Like other biologists, Edelman dismissed parsimonious explanations of neuronal activity. What distinguishes the brains of mammals (and humans) from computers or particles of matter is *evolutionary morphology,* which

> interacts at many levels, from atoms up to muscles. The intricacy and numerosity of brain connections are extraordinary. The maps that "speak" back and forth are massively parallel and have statistical as well as precise features . . . . The layers and the loops between them are the most intricate of any object we know, and they are dynamic; they continually change. . . . Indeed, the chemical and electrical dynamics of the brain resemble the sound and light patterns and the movement and growth patterns of a jungle. (p. 29)

Neurons have the property of *neuroplasticity,* by which they are said to rewire, remodel, or reorganize control of small groups or whole networks of cortical connections. This property is not limited to developing organisms. J. M. Schwartz (2002) chronicled the discovery of neuroplasticity in the fully developed adult brain. Recent experiments on adult monkeys with deafferented limbs demonstrated a surprising degree of neuroplasticity in the weakening and strengthening of synaptic connections through activity-dependent processes (Edelman, 1992); other experiments have indicated plasticity in the nervous system of the snail *Aplysia* (Kandel, 2000a). Kandel (2000b) affirmed, "There is now considerable evidence for plasticity at chemical synapses" (p. 34).

A related property of neurons is seen in the so-called *mirror neurons,* recently discovered in the premotor area of the monkey brain. "Like others, these neurons discharge when the monkey performs a specific grasping movement, but they also discharge when the monkey observes the same movement being made by another monkey or even by the experimenter" (Krakauer & Ghez, 2000, p. 778).

The relevance of the neural architecture for this work is that it facilitates two-way communication of biological values between molecular and

musculoskeletal levels of organization. The neural architecture enables the organized expression of genetic and peptide-receptor transmissions to the whole body and thereby to the outside world via animal movement. Component neurons constitute a highly flexible medium for sensory input, brain activities, and the delivery system that jolts muscle tissue and generates skeletal movement. The neural architecture also responds at molecular and cellular levels to that movement. The moral aspect of human behavior—every act of good or evil—will in some way be anticipated, processed, deliberated, and physically executed in conjunction with this same responsive nervous system.

Summary of Microstructure

Animal nature is soundlessly expressed in the dark, on winding threads of genetic orders, in gradual molecular tides, and in the electrified veins of neural firings. Microstructures and their micro motions perform a biological ballet arranged in a lifetime of unseen transactions and unspoken conversations, expressions of orderliness, and variation within and between biological systems, all rendered more comprehensible and more astonishing thanks to present-day technology. Evolved threshold values—set points, or homeostats—govern the structural formation and the procession of movements of microstructures in the animal organism. Deviations from genetically preset value settings trigger restorative activities at all levels of the organism; failure to do so can result in pathology or death (Iversen et al., 2000; Kalat, 2004; Kupfermann et al., 2000; McGuigan, 1994). The biological settings that bring order to organisms and help to optimize healthy life are nature's default values. These amoral values establish the animal body as an integrated, self-replicating conduction medium, messaging

system, and choreographed program. The program is *living being,* the supreme governing value is *life,* the biological imperative is *Live on!*

Now, setting aside the microscope, the focus returns to the more familiar neighborhoods of the visible world, as the expressions of animal nature are passed along from molecules and cells to the larger structures of animal anatomy—organs, muscles, limbs—where this nature participates in the still larger acts and conversations of the living being and where the animal precursors of the moral aspect are observed.

Structure of Animal Nature: Macro Scale

Generally speaking, the defining feature of animals is that they are *animate*, capable of motility and locomotion; they do not just sway with the breeze, they move about and *do* things. In this respect, they are the embodiment of movement. Since movement is a basic component of behavior—and since behavior is the medium for human conduct—it may be to their disadvantage that, as Kalat (2004) observed, "most psychologists pay little attention to movement" (p. 228). Psychologists thus neglect perhaps the most intriguing question about moving structures: *What moves what?*

Animals possess apparatus (fins, paws, wings, legs, hands, hooves) by which they travel (dart, crawl, fly, swim, wiggle, waddle, knuckle walk, hop) in their adapted environment (water, air, sand, soil, vegetation, swamp, snow), and they have instruments (beaks, jaws, fangs, talons, horns, stingers, proboscises, voices) by which they assert themselves (chase, ensnare, grasp, gore, sting, nibble, tear, suck, swallow up, burrow, fell trees, weave, build, play, sing, roar, hiss, coo)

wherever they go. Travel and assertion are achieved through the animal's motor mechanisms.

The motor mechanism of greatest interest to this work is in the mammal, in the coordinated, unidirectional contractions of striated muscles acting on the skeleton. Bones and their joints translate such one-way contractions into a whole range of motions—flexion, extension, abduction, rotation, elevation—according to the physical design of each species (Hole, 1992). Muscle contractions thus constitute both skeletal *movement* and motor *behavior*. Behavior emerges in a context of movement, and it speaks to the *meaning* of that movement. However, regardless of the complexity of a movement or its meaning, the *mechanism* of skeletal movement in the mammal is reducible to the one-way contractions of skeletal muscle—the very same musculoskeletal mechanism by which *Homo sapiens* moves about and commits acts of goodness and evil, right and wrong.

The mammal's body will lie nearly motionless in a heap without the delivery of an electrical impulse to excite skeletal muscle to contract. Electrical impulses are projected along motor neurons from the central nervous system, which in mammals includes the spinal cord, the brainstem, and the brain (*along with its hormones*), arranged in a hierarchy of control. The central nervous system receives a continuous flow of sensory signals from the body's organs and limbs, reflecting gross and subtle changes in environmental conditions, body state, and body position, from the slightest bending of a single hair to full-scale locomotion. Sensory impulses are prioritized and coordinated in different regions of the central nervous system for motor output, which output varies in quality according to the level of the nervous system at which the movement is ordered (Kalat, 2004; Kandel, Schwartz, & Jessell, 2000; Pert, 1997).

Fixedness of Movement and Behavior

Animal movement has been traditionally, if imprecisely, typed with reference to its biological *fixedness*, or degree of automaticity, a quality that goes to the question *What moves what?* Biologists generally hold that every creature is born with an evolved genetic program of movement common to its species. Such programs have been loosely termed *instincts*, referring to a behavioral process that "causes animals to respond adaptively to situations important to their survival" (Gould, 1982, pp. 13-14). Spalding (1873/1982) marveled at the seamless continuity between organism and environment reflected in the instincts; he observed that creatures "behave as if they already possessed an acquaintance with the established order of nature" (p. A4).

> When, as by a miracle, the lovely butterfly bursts form the chrysalis full-winged and perfect, and flutters off a thing of soft and gorgeous beauty, it but wakes to a higher life, to a new mode of existence, in which, strange though it may sound, it has, for the most part, nothing to learn, *because* its little life flows from its organization like melody from a music box. (p. A9)

The explanation of *living being* has been an ongoing challenge and a source of insight. James (1890/1950) viewed instincts as "the functional correlatives of structure" (p. 383); Lorenz (1963) similarly concluded that "every one of these behavior patterns is the function of a corresponding special physical organization . . . of a structure evolved in the organism by selection pressure" (p. 218). More recently, Edelman (1992) named the governing authority for the orderliness of animal behavior:

> The driving forces of animal behavior are . . . evolutionarily selected value patterns that help the brain and the body maintain the conditions necessary to continue life. . . [and] without prior value, somatic selection systems will not converge into definite behaviors. (p. 94)

The same governing value—*life*, or survival and reproduction—is implicit in Lorenz's (1963) "big four" instinct systems: "feeding, reproduction, flight, and aggression" (p. 89), to which Eibl-Eibesfeldt (1971) added care of the young.

Types of instinctive movements and behaviors vary widely among animals, and most are performed in a seemingly robotic manner. For instance, the "honey dance" is an example of a *closed instinct* (Midgley, 1978), wherein a honey bee signals to other hive members the precise distance and direction of a particular pollen source (Gould, 1982); similarly, the so-called *blind instinct* (Spalding, 1873/1982) entails complicated and precisely duplicated behaviors:

> Perhaps the most widely known instance of this class of instincts is the provision of the solitary wasp for the worm that will issue from her egg after her own death. She brings grubs—food that as a wasp she never tasted—and deposits them over the egg, ready for the larva she will never see. (p. A8)

In mammals, too, the most fixed or "involuntary" types of skeletal movements are largely stereotyped responses to specific sensory input, generated and regulated from the brain stem or below, and adequately explained by the endogenous or exogenous cues or material antecedents that determine the animal's behavior. Such movements do not improve with experience or respond to reinforcement. Examples include *reflexes,* such as the sucking, startle, or choke reflex; *rhythmic patterns,* such as "the wet dog shake" or the cat's scratch-reflex rate of 3-4 strokes per second; some *autonomic responses,* as when the cat hisses and arches its back; and *motor programs* or sequences which, once initiated, are fixed from start to finish, such as yawning, swallowing, self-grooming routines, and the stepping patterns of locomotion (Kalat, 2004; Krakauer & Ghez, 2000; Pearson & Gordon, 2000).

Other instincts, operating at a behavioral level, appear to shape, rather than to fix, behavior. *Open instincts* are "programs with a gap . . . left to be filled in by

experience" (Midgley, 1978, p. 53). Examples of these include the strong generalized tendency to come home seen in certain insects, birds, and mammals, where navigating a changing environment and negotiating obstacles are partly worked out experientially by the individual; and birdsong, bonding, and hunting maneuvers, which may entail a combination of fixed *and* learned behaviors (Lorenz, 1963; Tinbergen, 1951). *Predispositions* incline (or disincline) the animal in some behavioral direction. For instance, Kalat (2004) noted that animals have "evolved mechanisms that cause them to enjoy and therefore to perform . . . [apparently pleasurable] acts" (p. 338). (The molecular basis for an evolved pleasure mechanism is noted in the above section on peptides.) The *presence* of open instincts and predispositions is fixed but the specific motor *output* may involve learning; it is less stereotyped, a natural combination of automaticity, probability, and variety. Open programs tend to function with regularity under normal circumstances but may deviate when environmental conditions are extra-ordinary.

> Every livestock breeder knows what apparently slight disturbances can cause the failure of an inhibition . . . . I know of a case where an airplane, flying low over a silver-fox farm, caused all the mother vixens to eat their young. (Lorenz, 1963, p. 119)

Aggression

Lorenz (1963) referred to relational groupings and combinations of instincts as "the great parliament of instincts" and its "instinct systems" (p. 85). One such system is *aggression.* Tobach and Schneirla (1968/1972) defined animal aggression as "forms of intense, persistent approach behavior" (p. 525), involving "adaptive perceptual placement of blows by a fighting organism" (p. 526); Eibl-Eibesfeldt

(1971) described it as "innate and therefore species-typical motor patterns for fighting" (p. 68). In a more general sense, aggression is the primary animal expression for obtaining or controlling resources and conditions that matter to the organism, such as space, food, mates, social position, and social order. In the broadest sense, to live is perhaps the first aggressive act, the fundamental force of biology.

Aggression is of particular interest to this study for two reasons. First, of course, is its association with violence and evildoing. In his natural history *On Aggression*, originally published as *Das Sogenannte Bose* ("So-called Evil"), Lorenz (1963) described types of aggression that span the range of fixedness, in modes extending from hot and furious to cold and calculated: the violent *defensive* reflex of an animal in pain; the *offensive* mobbing of predators by prey, or the killing of a stranger ant that wanders into the territory of another group, or the efforts to destroy or drive away competitors; and the *predatory* actions of mammals, described as "in no way angry" (p. 25), such as ordinary carnivorous attacks or the cat that toys with a mouse until the helpless rodent dies of its injuries. Here is the deadly and destructive face of aggression.

However, to emphasize a second and perhaps more subtle role for aggression, Lorenz (1963) focused on *intraspecific* types of fighting behavior. He elaborated a relational theory wherein aggression plays a pivotal role in the security, order, and social organization of species and in the formation of *anonymous* bonds by which individuals are differentiated as either hostile strangers to be attacked or members to be trusted. The ritualization of intraspecific aggression—mating competitions, harmless fights, threatening, redirected or displaced anger, submissive greeting routines—establishes the familiar "pecking

order," which serves to promote cooperation, prevent serious harm, and protect weaker group members, the elderly, and the young.

Furthermore, Lorenz (1963) found that aggression plays a key role in the establishment and maintenance of *emotional* bonds. Unlike the anonymous or impersonal relations between members of colonies, flocks, or herds, the individuals of some social animals are known to form emotional attachments with companions: They look after one another and maintain regular contact; they express apparent grief over the loss of a companion and elation at reunion. Anonymous and emotional bonds reveal the constructive and nurturant face of aggression. Lorenz argued that affectionate bonds are exclusively features of animals who exhibit a pattern of "highly developed intra-specific aggression" (p. 47-48). By his own premise, "a corresponding special physical organization" (p. 218) is implied by the behavioral pattern. The likely organization is to be found in the neural architecture, specifically in the *cerebral cortex*, the last macrostructure to be discussed in tracing the animal precursors to the moral aspect.

Cortical Expansion and Its Effects

The most powerful region of neural motor control in animals is to be found in the mammal, in the layer of cerebral cortex, which blankets the heavy folds of the forebrain, that rather bulky outgrowth atop the brainstem. The motor region of the cortex projects impulses downward, along a corticospinal tract, in order to elicit skeletal muscle contractions via the same local mechanism used by the brainstem and spinal cord (Amaral, 2000). The more complex structure and mechanism are thus piggybacked on the more primitive.

According to LeDoux (1996), "All vertebrates have areas of cortex that correspond with what is called the neocortex in mammals" (p. 123), but mammalian *cortical expansion* far exceeds that of all other animals, and its significance can hardly be overstated. The expanded cortical structure, along with its substructures, give rise to an emergent property in the mammal best described as *psychological.* This psychological property entails capacities, such as for perception, categorization, memory, and responsivity; for corresponding regulatory and operational functions; and for an expanded range of response behaviors, such as the ability to plan and execute routine motor activities and to calculate and anticipate the outcomes of special-case strategies—all to a degree of complexity unseen in other animals (Amaral, 2000; Kalat, 2004; Krakauer & Ghez, 2000). Edelman (1992) described the expanded cortex:

> The cerebral cortex is a structure adapted to receive a dense and rapid series of signals from the world through many sensory modalities simultaneously—sight, touch, taste, smell, hearing, joint sense . . . . It evolved later than the limbic-brain stem system to permit increasingly sophisticated motor behavior and the categorization of world events. To handle time as well as space, the cortical appendages—the cerebellum, basal ganglia, and hippocampus . . . evolved along with the cortex to deal with succession both in actual motion and in memory. (pp. 117-118)

Three notable features of the combinatory structure *cerebral cortex* illustrate how natural combinations in structures, processes, and movements correspond in the mammal.

1. *Primary consciousness* was represented by Edelman (1992) to be "the state of being mentally aware of things in the world—of having mental images in the present . . . . [but] not accompanied by any sense of a person with a past and future" (p. 112). As for which creatures are likely to have primary consciousness, he concluded, "We can be fairly sure that animals without a cortex or its equivalent

lack it" (p. 123). Recalling how mental activity is tied to emotion-packing peptides, it seems reasonable to conclude that mental images would heighten an animal's emotional sensitivity to its surroundings and to other animals, permitting more intensified relationships, such as are seen in emotional bonds (Lorenz, 1963), and the so-called "incipient" moral behaviors described by Darwin (1871/1998), Parker (1998), de Waal (1996), and elsewhere. Moreover, the mental images of things, past events, and sequential motion add a psychological layer to the biological mechanism of movement—cognitive processes, such as prioritization, decision, and coordination—that participates in the control of movement. A sort of light is cast on animal sensory experience. The sensing animal is now also an *imagining* animal.

2. An *agentic role* emerges with the expanded cerebral cortex. The combined capacities for the categorization, evaluation, computation, selection, and remembering of significant data from massive sensory inputs appear to place a requirement on the animal mentally to organize and prioritize more of its own responsive movements, to plan and strategize toward a goal, and to anticipate the outcome of its plan. In combination with the images of primary consciousness, an operational and supervisory agency is established by which the animal can and must evaluate, decide, and otherwise participate in activities that in simpler creatures occur automatically. For instance, in getting food, the honeybee rather blindly follows narrowly specified routines, whereas the wolf must coordinate mental images with the fluid conditions of the world in order to calculate an approach to its prey. The automated animal is now also a *planning* animal.

3. Cortically processed *voluntary movements* look just like subcortical movements: They both utilize the same basic motor system and they can

collaborate in terms of control. What distinguishes the voluntary movement is that it entails psychological processes, such as a "decision to initiate" action (Kelly & Dodd, 1991, p. 279). Ghez and Krakauer (2000) described some of the psychophysical features of voluntary movement: "Motor processing *begins* with an internal representation . . . [of] the desired result of movement" (p. 658), response time depends on how much information must be processed, and "there is a trade-off between the speed of a movement and its accuracy" (p. 659). Mental imaging and planning thus render voluntary movement less automatic, less stereotyped, and less determined than involuntary movement. Involuntary movement does not require constant sensory feedback; it improves with experience and is responsive to operant conditioning and, because voluntary movement is assisted by psychological processes, it is not fully explained by material antecedents alone (Ghez & Krakauer; Schwartz, J. M., 2002). Ultimately, the cortically expanded animal must judge and select the best response to a given situation from a host of instinct-stimulating cues and a range of response options for which, according to J. M. Schwartz (2002), biology supplies the needed constraints. The determined animal is now also a *selecting* animal.

Summary of Macrostructure

The sometimes noisy and visible action of large-scale movements produced by muscle, bone, nerve, and brain, in species-typical patterns from the automatic to the planned, are all subject to the same conservative and generative pressures and share the same biological value priorities that govern structures and events at the micro level. But the emergent effects of cortical expansion on movement are curious. The same stuff (genes, peptides, cells) of the precortical creature can now

see (imagine, plan, select) through a partly conscious eye and act as a partly free body. It is as if a light is turned on and an operator is in, yet the output is the same—by all appearances. The emergent property in voluntary movement is not observed where muscle contractions occur, but the conception of the animal as embodiment of movement has a new dimension. The question *What moves what?* is subtly but dramatically enlarged. Now, a given movement can either be made to occur or not occur, and that movement can be directed by the animal with varying force, for various lengths of time, taking a number of different paths, enlisting and coordinating multiple body systems to a variety of possible plans and goals with regard to one or another urge or desire. A new distinction has emerged, a property relevant to the moral aspect of human behavior: the purposefulness of animal movement, which is to say, *motivation.*

Animal Motivation: Being of a Mind

> There is nothing anthropomorphic in speaking of the motivation of animals. . . . These are not . . . hypothetical inner states, but . . . major patterns . . . the signs of which are regular and visible. . . . We respond to the feelings and intentions we read in an action, not only to the action itself. (Midgley, 1978, p. 106)

In the absence of cortical expansion, a given animal movement may be fully explained in terms of rule-governed orderliness, such as in the physiological reaction to the perturbation of a homeostatic set-point value or in the automatic response to an environmental threat. In the presence of cortical expansion, where imagining, planning, and selecting are co-controllers, one thinks additionally about purpose. Thus, one encounters in the literature explanations of animal movement in terms of *motivation* or some substitute, such as *instinct, desire, reason, cause, intention, arousal, emotion, drive state, initiative,* or *program.* The sense of such

terms is rarely clear. Is the reference to a general *process* by which an organism behaves, or to some animating *principle* that drives behavior, or to the *intention* of a subject, or to the specific bodily *mechanisms* or genetic *instructions* of a behavior sequence? The first problem of motivation is its definition.

Ethologists have been generally hospitable to a concept of motivation within ontogenetic, social, and phylogenetic contexts (Gould, 1982; Lorenz, 1963; Tinbergen, 1951). Among the more reductive disciplines the concept has been controversial and interest has been unsteady. Some authors avoid it altogether (e. g., Kalat, 2004); others approach it narrowly in terms of causal mechanisms (e.g., Kandel et al., 2000; McGuigan, 1994). Kupfermann et al. (2000) noted a renewed scientific interest in a reductive version of motivation as "neuronal and physiological factors that initiate, sustain, and direct behavior" (p. 998). Psychologists have had difficulty in distinguishing between causal mechanism and motivation due to a rather narrow conceptualization of the latter, as in Tolman's operational definition of *purpose* as "a certain *persistence until* character" (as cited in Kimble, 1985/1992, p. 296). However, recent laboratory research on macaque monkeys suggests a basis for distinguishing motivation from causal mechanism. A growing body of neurological evidence points to an instinctive capacity in these monkeys to recognize or "read" patterns in the goal-directed behavior of like others—which is to say, the intention of the actor as it relates to the meaning of his behavior—in a word, motivation. This sort of reading or imaginative ability would have obvious selection advantages for predatory, defensive, and communicative responses. The capacity is said to derive from *mirror neurons*, a subset of multimodal neurons in the premotor cortex of some mammals (Ferrari, P. F., et al., 2003).

Two Senses of Motivation

The foregoing suggests two definitional senses of motivation. The *causal-mechanism definition of motivation* describes the activation and course of a behavior: the initiation, organization, modulation, direction, and completion of an observed activity (Bindra, 1985/1992; Corsini, 1999; Kupfermann et al., 2000). This tidy definition may apply equally well to the movement of an individual ant, jellyfish, chimpanzee, or robot. The *psychological definition of motivation* describes a conception of the presumed purpose of an actor in light of some context. Just as behavior speaks to the meaning of movements, motivation speaks to the meaning of behavior—to the intent or emotion that may be "read" in the behavior and body language of animals with a capacity for consciousness and voluntary movement.

Each definitional sense of *motivation* reflects a different analytic posture, each speaks to a different level of organization, and each relies on a different kind of knowing, but neither definition can be ignored if a full understanding of the phenomenon of interest is to be achieved. The neat, observable facts and the less tidy, felt meanings are both engaged in *motivation*.

From Causation to Motivation

Automatic movement is governed by biological values. Motivation raises the question of the governing value. Schneirla's (1949/1972b) answer was that mammalian behavior is "motivated by the organic processes of the individual" (p. 223), initially following tissue needs, then following security motives (dominance, social approval), then sex or hedonic interests. In the young mammal, motivation develops variously in ways "steadily more indirect and devious" (p.

223), each individual developing its own "ontogeny of motivational patterns" (Schneirla, 1956/ 1972a, p. 175). The individual obeys its biological governors but modifies them to its own unique experience. Motivation is a useful concept for talking about this modification of purpose in the movement of any animal that can *anticipate* an outcome and that can plan and select its moves, even if only to a limited degree. Schneirla (1949/1972b) advised that purpose, in the "scientifically acceptable sense of acting persistently and appropriately with reference to anticipated results . . . is a capacity not to be taken lightly" (p. 211).

Comments on Animal Nature

This brief and focused account reveals a relationship between animal nature and the moral aspect of human behavior but it does not support the notion that the moral aspect can be understood solely in biological terms. Rather, animal nature constitutes a biological context or platform for the moral aspect. The orderliness observed in animal structures and movements at both micro and macro levels is defined and governed by evolved, amoral, biological value settings that appear to serve the principal value *life,* an inexplicable given. Psychological processes emerge with cortical expansion and engage endocrine and neural structures and processes, such as for image manipulation, prioritizing and planning, motion calculations, and the like. Thus, in the cortically expanded organism, functions and movements are biologically *and* psychologically regulated. In addition, endocrine processes are seen to match the complexity of neural structures. As a result, emotional bonds, "social senses" (reciprocity, fairness, altruism, cooperation, help), and motivation are observed. These are often described in terms of moral behavior. One is inclined to ask, *By what logic does the animal act thus?* By all scientific

accounts, the cause and meaning of movement in the animal organism—be it lobster or ape—is finally the same: *survive and reproduce*. There is, however, an appreciable difference between the behavior of ape and lobster that ought not to be taken lightly.

Understanding the cortically expanded animal requires a suitable methodology. It may be *accurate* to say that "the major consequence of the elaborate information processing that takes place in the brain is the contraction of skeletal muscles" (Loeb & Ghez, 2000, p. 674)—but is it *enough*? A precision criterion alone can unduly restrict the appreciation of relations between and within highly relevant emergent properties. A well-fitted methodology must be able to tolerate some ambiguity, such as that implied in the designation *event-structure*; it must also allow for unique events, such as purposeful movement. Drawing distinctions between such phenomena as causation and motivation, between involuntary and voluntary movement, between movement and behavior, between conscious and unconscious animals, is rather like locating the precise moment at which night becomes day. A good start, then, is when one knows day and night when one sees it, knows that the rest is either dusk or dawn, and knows which comes next. Precision is a partner, not a guarantor of understanding; good categories require only an appreciable difference to be useful. In this regard, Darwin's gift is appreciated. As Mayr (1997) suggested, "If we enlarge the methodology of science to include historical narratives, we can often explain unique events rather satisfactorily, and sometimes even make testable predictions" (p. 65). To this end, R. B. Miller (2004) has called for a revival of the case study in psychology and Schultz (2005) for the inclusion of psychobiography.

According to the present organizational scheme, a comprehensive account of the moral aspect would now turn to *Homo sapiens*, whose cortical expansion far exceeds that of any animal, whose movements are governed not only by biological and psychological settings and experience, but by a relationship to decency or malice as well; who struggles with his own animal nature, deliberates, and decides on action, as did Louisa, on page 1 of this study, who, *against all biological values*, risked her life and her progeny in order to protect innocent strangers from murderous men.

Chapter V
DISCUSSION

The growth, size, and state of the database of modern American psychology suggest that what is needed now is not more data but more in the way of an integrative interpretation. The words of professor Jaffa (1984/2002) may apply here:

> What we need to be reminded of now, in this modern civilization of ours, is not to be told over and over again how complex it is. We know that. We need to be reminded about the simple elements out of which this complexity arose. We need to be reminded of what we are according to nature, to see what guidelines we can find amidst the enormously wider range of choices available to us. (p. 61)

Something lacking in the field of psychology today is a disciplinary recognition of the moral reality of human life, an appreciation of the orderliness of that reality, and a reconsideration of some old wisdom in light of new scientific facts.

Major Findings

The initial review of the relevant literature prompted the four key observations around which this study was organized. The observations, presented in the historical context of an ongoing search for balance between human and scientific concerns, were: (a) the mass of data in disarray and a field in disorder, (b) the divergent approaches and positions to moral matters, (c) the enduring moral presence, and (d) the intrusiveness of the moral. A careful consideration of the observations individually and together gave rise to the following three cumulative

findings: (a) There is a moral reality, (b) there is a natural orderliness to the moral aspect of behavior, and (c) there is an evolving moral tradition in American psychology.

Moral Reality

This study found that psychologists and their predecessors have variously viewed *Homo sapiens* as surviving and thriving on physical, psychological, and moral levels. History proves a consistent human awareness of a moral reality. From primitive to modern times, human beings have recognized and understood the moral reality through religion, philosophy, and eventually, in part, science. They have discovered and invented moral codes. They have tried to fathom and to control their own moral behaviors and those of others.

The ancient Greeks, among others, considered ethical values and moral conduct to be foundational for the mental well-being of the person and society, and the notion of the autonomy of the moral agent has been a central concern in Western civilization. With the rise of modern science, mental health came to be seen as a function of physiological and psychological processes. The differentiation of mind and body gave rise to separate lines of diagnostic criteria, etiological theories, and treatments for mental health problems. The moral reality was subsumed into this dualistic view.

In recent decades another view has begun to coalesce. For instance, it has been claimed that moral problems can mimic psychopathology (e.g., Bergin, 1991; Hadfield, 1964; Mowrer, 1953). Bergin wrote, "Treatment approaches may be enhanced by discerning the real values issues that may underlie disorders but that appear to be simply psychopathological matters" (p. 399). Elsewhere, moral

problems have been said to accompany psychological disturbances (e.g., Andrews, 1987; Miller, R. B., 2004; Peteet, 2004). In the new tripartite view, moral reality is not subsumed under medical or psychological realities, but *Homo sapiens* is seen to survive and thrive on physical, psychological, and moral levels simultaneously; decisions related to mental health depend on diagnostic criteria, etiologies, and treatments along physical, psychological, and moral lines. In this view, the patient whose clinician dismisses any of the three human realities is at a distinct disadvantage, at risk for misdiagnosis, perhaps months or years of ineffective treatment, or worse.

The record of human history and the realities of daily human conduct around the world—the more severe acts of cannibalism, enslavement, murder, rape, torture, mutilation, genocide, infanticide, repression of women, racism, child abuse, and the like, and less severe acts of deception, betrayal, abusiveness, infidelity, and the like—and the magnitude of suffering that flows from that conduct all testify that the principal problem of human interaction is now, as it has always been, a moral problem. The principal moral problem is wrongdoing and the response to it. In biological terms, it is the emergent product of evolved behavioral patterns and cortical structures in the service of an organism and its first order, to *live.* In psychological terms, it is the problem of the self-aware selector in a world of determinants. In moral terms, it is the personal struggle between one's inclinations for good and for bad, a problem fundamental to human nature.

Nor is there any evidence that human nature is about to change. The two faces in the archetypal murder narrative of Cain and Abel, for instance, are immediately familiar to modern man as the faces of malice and of innocence. To assume that malicious behavior is a product of physical or mental disorder may be

facile and deadly; to assume that it is not the business of psychology is equally naive and dangerous. It seems no longer scientific or wise for psychology—the science of behavior and mental processes, the science that addresses the problems of mental health—to dismiss the moral reality that is the moral aspect of human behavior.

Natural Orderliness of the Moral

Human beings have historically sought to explain and apply morality mainly through religion, philosophy, and—more recently—psychology. Earlier in this work it was noted that traditional, religion-based morality, Socratic and Aristotelian ethics, and the Enlightenment's secular morality project were all, for different reasons, declared failures. Has psychology fared any better?

Prior to the 20th century, American psychological thought was intimately bound up with moral philosophy and religious attitudes (Evans, 1984; Fay, 1939). In an extraordinary turn-of-the-century effort to establish a naturalistic, more scientifically balanced psychology, the discipline was systematically demoralized. Since then, naturalistic psychologists have been disinclined to address conduct as it had been understood for thousands of years—*as a moral matter*. Instead, in what amounts to a century-long experiment, these psychologists studied human behavior with their backs to the moral presence. They abstracted behavior from its moral context, reduced it to micro-mechanisms and molecular units, and ran meticulous analyses of the components and processes of human action. They relabeled and redefined all things moral and reassigned them to biological, behavioral, cognitive, and other categories, or to disciplines happy to subsume the moral domain one fragment at a time. In the hands of humanistic psychologists, morality has been

relativized, deconstructed, lost in macro-processes, dissolved in evolutionary contexts, and otherwise rendered arbitrary. Its foundation has been dislodged and its authority usurped by the flattering overvaluation of a feeling self and by proponents of a romantic, despairing, or cynical self. The very approaches intended to humanize the psychological subject and to dignify the human agent seem instead to have undermined him and rendered the essential features of moral reality *less* recognizable—an almost whimsical, weightless, purposeless appendix of the human psyche. All in all, in its explanation and application of morality, it may be said that psychology, too, has failed.

Were these efforts of religion, philosophy, and psychology really all failures? This work has noted that religion successfully applied to the formation of Western civilization its notions of moral primacy, restraint, and duty, all engraved in stone. Greek philosophers also succeeded in establishing a lasting rational basis for morality as part of a natural, cosmic order. The Enlightenment's John Locke so successfully applied the natural law model to government that his vision is enshrined in America's founding documents. Psychology, too, has had its successes. Naturalistic and behavioristic psychologists invited input from evolutionary, neurological, and medical disciplines, successfully revealing orderliness in the natural roots, biological processes, and behavioral mechanisms and controls of moral conduct. Rationalistic and structuralistic psychologists pulled back certain "blinders" of naturalism, showed the stage development of moral reasoning in children, and successfully re-opened a moral dialogue within psychology. Humanistic psychologists successfully lifted the rationalist's blinders and revealed an orderliness to the psychological phenomena of personal experience, emotion, freedom, the realms of meaning—all central elements of the moral

aspect. From the viewpoint of a morally balanced psychology—one that integrates perspectives of religion, philosophy, psychology, biology, and more—all these "failures" are transformed into partial successes.

It is true that no 20th-century psychology produced a comprehensive model of the moral aspect of behavior, and no psychology has as yet found a satisfactory, nontheistic solution to the problem of the moral ground. The succession of apparent shortfalls in the 100-year psychology experiment suggests a fundamental error in the *conception* of the moral aspect. In order to study and speak about the moral aspect, it is of course necessary to abstract, reduce, and analyze contents and processes; likewise, it is necessary to view them reconstituted within their temporal, spatial, linguistic, social, experiential, and behavioral contexts. But if an overreliance on observable phenomena tends to yield lawfully mechanistic but morally sterile results, and an overreliance on felt experience tends to yield results that are recognizably human but morally uncompelling, then a task is defined: to develop a more realistic conception of the moral aspect and more realistic ways of studying it, that better reveal, rather than conceal, its criterial features and its fundamental meaning. Again, from the standpoint of a morally balanced psychology, each of the methods, measures, modes of knowing, and metatheoretical positions, while insufficient alone, may yet prove indispensable to the larger project.

Two lessons are here taken from the 100-year experiment. The first lesson is that the moral aspect of behavior is to be conceived as participating in nature's orderliness, as the emergent properties and capacities of biological structural combinations. To assist in the conception, a scheme for the componential organization of the moral aspect was presented in chapter IV, and a number of

relational sets—concepts and conditions relevant to the moral aspect—were presented throughout the study (see Table 2). The second lesson is this: Matter that is alive, mobile, and human places certain epistemic and technical demands on the observer. These demands share a theme of *balance*, as in "the search for balance" and "morally balanced psychology," which refer to a balance of modes of knowing. In order to fully grasp the moral aspect of behavior, the observer must attend to and move between biophysical, psychological, and moral realities in a self-balancing *psychology in motion*, in accordance with the apparent natural order of things. A method for grasping the moral aspect (natural knowing) was outlined in chapter I; the study itself was intended to model the necessary balance of perspectives and modes.

Evolving Tradition in American Psychology

No other discipline has revealed as much of the moral aspect of behavior as psychology. The moral tradition in American psychology is as old as the psychology itself, some 360 years (Fay, 1939). The modern phase of the tradition began in a curious way at the dawn of the 20th century, when moral concerns were effectively silenced. As this study has shown, however, silent concern is not the same as no concern. Despite 100 years of marginalization, an awareness of the moral presence in psychology seems to have grown. Today, American psychology appears poised for the first real cooperation of moral and scientific concerns: the emergence of a morally balanced psychology.

Table 2

Orderliness Suggested in Six Concepts Related to the Moral Aspect of Behavior

Concepts	Physical condition	Human condition	Emergent/source
Three realities of the knowing organism	Physical	Psychological	Moral
Three modes of knowing	Objective	Personal	Fundamental
Three positions (metatheoretical)	Naturalistic	Humanistic	Theistic
Three criteria of the moral presence	Objectiveness	Agency	Gravity
Three authorities of morality	Natural	Human	Divine
Three pillars of mental health treatment	Medicine	Psychotherapy	Moral care

Note. The six tripartite concepts (realities, modes of knowing, metatheories, moral presence, moral authority, and pillars of treatment) are introduced in chapters I-III. Each concept is associated with three conditions (physical, human, emergent/ source). Condition sets appear to be related across concepts. Relations among concepts are also suggested. For example, it appears that the three pillars of mental health treatment correspond to three human realities, three features of the moral presence correspond to three modes of knowing, three metatheoretical positions correspond to three moral authorities, and so on. It is important to note that efforts to understand and explain the moral aspect of behavior based on monistic or dualistic concepts or conditions all appear to have failed or, rather, to have only partly succeeded.

The Morally Balanced Psychology

The general features of a morally balanced psychology can be gathered from the literature as discussed in this work, and some conclusions can be drawn. A morally balanced psychology recognizes the centrality of moral concerns in the lives of human beings. It is interested in the scientific investigation of all the properties and problems of the moral reality. It views moral care as foundational for mental health. A morally balanced psychology relies on the latest empirical science and technologies, but not exclusively. It also respects the time-tested moral traditions that human beings have practiced for millennia. It does not require religious affiliation nor does it discourage religious belief. It asserts that morality is not exclusively a religious matter and it affirms a basis in nature for a nonarbitrary moral reality and for universal or fundamental moral values, absent which not only decency but mental health itself may be unsustainable. As to the ultimate origins of the nonarbitrary reality and universal values, they remain in the domain of speculation and belief, along with all ultimate origins.

Psychology's professional ethics expressly aim to protect individual autonomy (APA, 2002). A morally balanced psychology views and engages the intact adult as a *responsible*, autonomous moral agent. The individual's right to make unhealthy, stupid, and immoral choices (with a few well-defined exceptions) is assumed. There may be a growing awareness within psychology that its 20th-century attitude toward moral responsibility, including the avoidance or denial, in some quarters, of objective moral right and wrong, amounts to a violation of autonomy. A morally balanced psychology recognizes that "freedom" from moral values and restraints actually *undermines* human agency and breeds pathology. It recognizes that, regardless of how it is achieved, any weakening of the agent's

sense of moral autonomy *or* responsibility amounts to a swindle. A morally balanced psychology recognizes that only a universal, nonarbitrary moral authority (e.g., natural law or theism), one that is beyond the lawful reach of human interlopers, can underwrite individual autonomy and justify the rights of every human being.

A morally balanced psychology recognizes that autonomy operates within the contexts of moral demand and personal response. The intrusive moral demand is nature's restraint on autonomy; it usually comes through other persons and represents a natural obligation from which no person is free, except in the response. The moral agent may select—or not select—that for which his behavior will be determined; this would appear to mean also that by which his moral judgments will be made. His selection, *because* it is selected, is a *moral* response or *commitment*. A moral commitment fills the moral vacuum. It supersedes biopsychological default values. The moral commitment establishes one's autonomous powers and resources. In the absence of a commitment, nature fills the vacuum and behavior is governed by the default values of the biopsychological organism.

A morally balanced psychology would likely view the refusal or abdication of moral commitment as a commonplace moral failure. One might suppose that the person who regularly avoids moral commitment would not have ready access to the moral resources available to the participating autonomous agent. For instance, he might find it difficult honestly to comment on the moral right and wrong of any action. How would such a person *as a parent* convincingly teach an adolescent child about making moral decisions? Indeed, such a person would hardly recognize (much less respond to) wrongdoing and would be more likely to dismiss or squelch

the moral commitments of others. Hence, the common *moral* platitude, "But surely it's always wrong to make moral judgments" (Midgley, 1991, p. 1).

A morally balanced psychology recognizes that the moral situation goes to the heart of being human. In the moment of the moral intrusion, when circumstances demand a moral response, a certain sense of gravity can arise in the moral agent. The existential stakes are high: One's freedom, isolation, and mortality are tapping at the window of awareness. The spiritual stakes are high: One intuits that a direction is to be taken that will ultimately lead toward the good or not. The personal stakes are high: Each intrusion is a reminder that one's character and name are somehow being called to account yet again. There is the sense of something of consequence, something not to be violated, but to be honored in the commitment. Each decision and response marks a potential moment of character growth, increased deliberative skill, and emotional strengthening. Moral gravity—or *care*—holds the person on the ground of the moral reality.

Third Pillar of Mental Health

A morally balanced psychology recognizes its own unavoidable role of moral agency, and includes moral care in its treatment armamentarium along with psychotherapy and psychopharmacology. In the therapeutic setting, the moral engagement, skills, and strength of the clinician take on obvious significance. The engaged therapist relies on his own moral character, experience, and commitments. To the extent that he is knowledgeable in the moral aspect of behavior and at home with his moral values, he can assist others in the clarification of their personal moral realities.

The clinician in a morally balanced psychology would probably not routinely speak of his client's behavior in deterministic or amoral terms. He would probably not make statements such as, "What matters most is that your choice is genuinely yours." He would probably not concede to his client by silence, "to each his own." In a morally balanced psychology the clinician does not seek to avoid morality or to pose as disinterested or "neutral" regarding moral matters. He will ask himself, *What is the moral view I am promoting? Am I laying down a strategy for mental health or a plan for a moral vacuum?*

The clinician in a morally balanced psychology will want to help his clients learn to access their own moral resources. He will neither preach nor proselytize to a client; his behavior will reflect a different attitude: *Neither of us is a moral authority, but both of us are moral agents. Each of us is the sole author of his moral decisions, and those decisions have an impact on our mental health. Part of our work here is to try to clarify the moral, as well as the clinical, implications of past and present actions and experiences, and to evaluate decisioning habits and review all of this in the context of moral commitments.* Initially, the clinician will help the client learn to identify moral situations as such. He will then apply moral dialogue on the same basis that he applies psychotherapy or recommends medicinal therapy: on his best scientific understanding of the principles of mental health.

The apparent evolution taking place within psychology is largely driven by events in the clinical arena. It is increasingly difficult to justify ignorance of the moral reality. Like it or not, every mental health worker is a moralist, engaged in a moral exchange with his client. Presumably, psychotherapists have been engaged in moral care all along, at some level, to some degree (Bergin, 1985), some perhaps not in a systematic or even knowledgeable way, some perhaps without the benefit

of theoretical basis, and some perhaps indirectly or even unaware. This raises a problem for the clinician. Whereas the client in therapy has the right to make uninformed, unhealthy, immoral, and even stupid decisions, the clinician does not have that right. In a morally balanced psychology, an articulate knowledge of the moral aspect of behavior is both a distinct advantage and an ethical obligation.

Final Hurdle

It is possible that the greatest hindrance to the emergence of a morally balanced psychology is no longer a scientific concern, as it was in 1890, but an unhelpful bias that lingers among the educated elite. A vocal element within American academia has had a long history of hostility toward notions of traditional morality, moral judgments, objective right and wrong, and universal values; it has had a corresponding affinity toward imported European ideas sometimes characterized as philosophies of despair and alienation (Bloom, 1983; Evans, 1984). In many respects, this element in academia has become America's secular church, having its own catechism, doctrines, traditions, and values. As a non-theistic religion, secularism has quickly proved itself capable of dogma, authoritarianism, conformism, narrow mindedness, blind certitude, fanaticism, coercive moral attitudes ("political correctness")—precisely those flaws for which its advocates (sometimes fairly) attack theistic religion. A morally balanced psychology suggests that these problems are rooted neither in theistic religion nor in non-theistic secularism, but are serious psychological and moral problems rooted in human nature. A morally balanced psychology has a unique capacity to shed new and useful light on these and other otherwise hidden problems of the moral reality.

Limitations and Innovations of the Study

The broad theme of this work has demanded a sacrifice of detail in virtually every area discussed. In this respect the work is incomplete and represents only a rough outline of potential elaborations. Although this study points to the necessity, possibility, and utility of a comprehensive account of the moral aspect of behavior, it has not produced such an account. What this work has attempted is to bring a full account closer to a reality by showing a way in which the moral aspect may be comprehensively viewed, a way in which its components may be categorized, and how some of its concepts are systematically related. This study has relied primarily but not exclusively on psychological literature. Free use was made of outside sources, after Mayr (1997): "Feedback from outside one's narrow domain [is] decisive for conceptual advance" (p. xviii). In the course of presenting the basic categories and nature of the moral aspect, this work has defined a curriculum for the training of mental health professionals. In all of this, the study may furnish a fresh look at the moral aspect of human behavior. Indeed, the very notion of a comprehensive account of the moral aspect has been almost unthinkable, and for good reason: Psychology appears to have had no position from which a comprehensive look might be taken and no scheme by which to organize such an account—nor has any other discipline.

At the same time, there is nothing by way of data that is really new here. The scheme proposed for the comprehensive organization of the moral aspect of human behavior was fashioned from well-worn categories grounded in natural phenomena; it is compatible with millennia-old human traditions and follows well-traveled rational lines; and it is, as much as possible, presented in conventional language. The dynamic mode of *natural knowing* proposed for viewing the moral

aspect has long been recognized in its objective, fundamental, and personal components and in its ancient constituent metatheoretical positions.

Future Study and Applications

From the perspective of advancing a morally balanced psychology, a first order of business is the completion of a comprehensive account, a textbook for the moral aspect of behavior. One such project is currently under way (Ford, 2008). The advancement of an American moral psychology tradition and the goal of bringing moral articulacy to mental health professionals represents an invitation to a grand project that will likely engage generations of mental health professionals. Virtually every chapter, section, and subsection in this study represents a fertile area of research in a remoralized psychology. Whereas many areas of psychology have been extensively and intensely studied, this field is wide open.

It would be unwise ever to forget reasons for the development of a morality-free psychology—endless metaphysical speculation, sectarian dogma, undue interference with a patient's autonomy, such as by misuse of guilt and shame. On the other hand, it should be clear by now that a demoralized psychology has its own downside: endless physical data collection and complication, secular dogma, the undermining of patient's moral responsibility. The moral vacuum created by "value neutrality" is a standing invitation to mischief. Furthermore, a morally blind psychology, or one that poses as "morally neutral," appears shallow and unwise to a majority population that identifies with traditional religious moral values. A full and unbiased comparative examination of the potential benefits and hazards for mental health of both a moralized and demoralized psychology would be useful now.

A remoralized psychology neither requires nor implies the abandonment of existing projects, orientations, or schools of thought. Rather, it *expands* all fields by one dimension, calling forth new measures, methods, and understandings. The moral aspect of behavior offers a unifying framework by which existing fields can be reevaluated in terms that include moral conduct. A morally balanced psychology may have a surprising contribution to make as a remedy for some of the unconnectedness and disarray that some authors have observed in psychology in general.

Authors have noted the failure of psychology programs to prepare future psychologists for dealing with matters of moral and religious values and the potential unfortunate effects of that failing on psychology's beneficiaries (Bergin, 1985; Bishop, 1992; Finkelman & Kessel, 1999; Miller, R. B., 2004). Similarly, members of the clergy often feel inadequately trained in distinguishing between moral and psychological problems (Weaver, 1998). A remoralized psychology would underwrite a program of training for all mental health professionals in this most meaningful of human concerns. It would serve as an indispensable guide for the psychology clinician, who has legitimate concerns as to the handling of moral matters in therapy, beginning with differentiating organic, psychological, and moral roles in mental health problems at individual, marital, and family levels. Psychologists, physicians, pastoral counselors, social workers, and others would benefit from research in such differential diagnostics.

A remoralized psychology will find useful and much needed application in the workplace and in public schools concerned with violence prevention and disciplinary problems. For example, in 1999, following the Columbine high school murders, the Federal Bureau of Investigation released a risk analysis report on

school shootings. Almost all of the contributors were experts in the field of mental health. The psychologists did precisely what they were trained to do. The report is stunning in its ignorance of the moral reality. Moralized psychological assessments would consider the dynamics of all involved moral agents. Such assessments might reveal crucial violence prevention information undetected by morally neutral assessments.

Moralized psychological assessments might also assist the court systems often seen to be captives of a therapeutic ethos, the "victimization defense strategy," and the "abuse excuse" (Nolan & Westervelt, 2000). Elsewhere, a morally balanced psychology might speak meaningfully to fearful, angry, guilt-ridden parents struggling to raise decent children (Gurion, 1999; Samenow, 1998). On a wider scale, a remoralized psychology might address ways of raising the moral awareness of the general public in a culture seen as increasingly demoralized (Himmelfarb, 1995, 1999; Smith, H., 2001). It would invite studies that address the moral climate and the moral environment.

In the clinical setting, further research and case studies that illuminate the impact of the psychologist as moral agent would be helpful. Perhaps more intriguing: Is it possible that there is something useful to be learned about the role of morality, say, in the individual's descent to madness? Would a psychotherapist want to know whether a suicidal, depressed, or addicted patient has access to powerful moral resources that could assist in the ascent to mental health? These areas of psychology remain largely unexplored.

Conclusory Remarks

The course of the American moral psychology tradition has thus far flowed from a pre-Jamesian immersion in religious morality, to a period virtually devoid of moral matters, to a measured postwar investigation of certain structures and processes associated with morality, to the latest trend: a growing recognition and appreciation of the need for some sort of interface between psychology and the moral. These broad, alternating trends represent transgenerational efforts to satisfy the concerns of science and the concerns of morality. The latest trend coincides strikingly with a national crisis in moral values. Moreover, the trend occurs at a time when America and the West face an external threat in what promises to be a protracted defensive war against an aggressive enemy whose global ambitions and theocratic ideology are wholly incompatible with liberty, democracy, and the values enshrined in the Bill of Rights. As a demoralized Europe appears to be losing this war, Americans may well wonder what, if any, keys to modern human problems psychology holds. By what psychological means does *Homo sapiens* maintain his decency, preserve his moral values, and find the heart to face and to oppose evildoing? The public welfare being a stated interest of psychology, to what misdirected purpose does psychology evade the moral aspect?

The American moral psychology tradition today affords a view of the moral aspect never before available in human history, courtesy of empirical science, modern technology, a 21st-century view of history, and a prudent pragmatism. Neuroscience and ethology show that the mechanisms of morality are embedded at all levels of biological nature. History shows that human beings have been concerned with the moral aspect since time began. But morality can be abused. Moral authoritarianism—whether of religious advocates or secular academicians—

stifles critical thinking and seduces moral agents with the false peace of conformity. A century of "value-free" psychological experiments shows, among other things, that the disavowal of moral agency is perilous; moral neutrality encourages self-interest and lacks the strength of conviction even to recognize, much less oppose, evildoing.

A new American moral psychology has a working relationship with religion and philosophy; it neither requires nor discourages religious affiliation, nor does it suggest or require faith in materialism or relativism or human beings, nor are denominational or secular dogmas held as tenets in this science. In a remoralized psychology, revelation and tradition have a place alongside reason and empiricism in natural knowing. The happy result of reasoning is, after all, discovery or revelation, and it is revelation that brings the person to some new place of reasoning. For these reasons and more, a robust treatment of the moral aspect of behavior belongs in the core curriculum of the psychology education program.

A remoralization of mainstream psychology—the proposed interface between psychology and the moral—may be emerging; but for many professionals, a reluctance to become involved with moral matters persists, and those who *are* willing to consider a morally balanced psychology are beset with questions and doubts as to *how* to proceed. It is the point where any moral struggle begins. Psychologists can engage the knowable moral reality in a meaningful way, just as they have in, say, cognitive-behavioral and pharmacological fields. The responsible psychologist, knowing that every intervention entails risk, would never undertake behavioral modification or prescribe medication without first understanding the principles of conditioning or the details of drug interactions. The same is true for the responsible, morally engaged psychologist. It is a premise of this work that the

first step for the psychologist in a morally balanced psychology is to become knowledgeable and articulate in the moral aspect of behavior.

It now remains to be seen whether the growing interest in moral matters, noted in the first key observation, will stimulate a balancing of assumptive positions within psychology, whether psychologists can think about how to engage the moral concerns of Americans, whether a psychology that openly engages the moral presence is a plausible and worthy pursuit, or whether a psychology that does *not* engage can long retain its status as an independent, relevant discipline.

To the silent psychologist for whom traditional universal moral values have meaning but who has conformed to what Leary (1980) called the "norm of silence about personal values" (p. 302) or who awaits an invitation to speak: Goodness is no well-intentioned bystander. A good outcome is not inevitable, and depravity is never far away. As a friend of well-being, goodness calls for opposition to wrongdoing and is enhanced in that response. It is the public regard for decency and the public opposition to wrong that pre-empts the arrival of the repressive regime in all its forms, external and internal, large and small. It is a cooperative effort. If one must, like Louisa at the opening of this study, hide the moral good beneath the sweater of a child, then someone has waited too long.

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APPENDIX

MORALITY AS A TOPIC IN INTRODUCTORY PSYCHOLOGY TEXTBOOKS

The following introductory psychology textbooks were examined for their treatment of the moral aspect of behavior:

1. *Psychology* (Ciccarelli & Meyer, 2006)
2. *Psychology: A Modular Approach to Mind and Behavior* (Coon, 2006)
3. *Psychology* (Hockenbury & Hockenbury, 2006)
4. *Introduction to psychology* (Kalat, 2005)
5. *Psychology* (Lefton & Brannon, 2006)
6. *Psychology* (Myers, 2007)
7. *Psychology: Concepts and applications* (Nevid, 2007)
8. *What is psychology?* (Pastorino & Doyle-Portillo, 2006)
9. *Invitation to Psychology* (Wade & Tavris, 2005)
10. *Mastering the World of Psychology* (Wood, Wood, & Boyd, 2006)
11. *Psychology: Core concepts* (Zimbardo, Johnson, & Weber, 2006)
12. *Psychology.* (Gleitman, Reisberg, & Gross, 2007)

Indexes were checked for the following terms and derivatives: *agency*, *character*, *conduct*, *duty*, *ethics*, *evil*, *free will*, *good*, *moral*, *responsibility*, *values*, and *virtue*. The in-text references were examined to determine each term's usage within some moral context, with the following results:

1. The terms *agency*, *conduct*, *duty, good*, and *virtue* were found in no index.
2. *Character* appeared in 2 indexes, definition only.
3. *Ethics* appeared in every text, but only in the context of *professional* ethics.
4. *Evil* was referenced in 2 texts:
    a) A provocative statement was offered, without discussion: "The compelling case for the banality of evil is, perhaps, the hardest lesson in psychology" (#9, p. 346).
    b) The notion of evildoing was briefly discussed at the end of one text, with a reference to the "evil of inaction" (#11, p. 579).
5. *Free will* occurred in 5 indexes, not in a context of morality per se.
6. *Moral* appeared in all 12 textbooks, invariably with reference to Kohlberg's theory of moral development, typically followed by Gilligan's critique. The following *other* references appeared in 4 textbooks:
    a) A psychoanalytic perspective was mentioned (#1).
    b) Haidt's *social intuitionist* theory was briefly described (# 6).
    c) The notion of a cortical "morality circuit" was mentioned (#7, p. 75).

d) The work of Narvaez was mentioned (#10).
e) Conscience was briefly discussed; Narvaez, Hoffman, Haidt, and Eisenberg were mentioned (#12).

7. *Responsibility* was discussed in 4 texts, in reference to the phenomenon of *diffusion of responsibility.*
8. *Values* was referenced in 3 indexes:
   a) In 2 cases, the context was not moral per se.
   b) A third textbook insisted that "psychology is definitely not value-free" (#6, p. 48) and made reference to "personal values" and "religious values," which were assumed to mean *moral* values.

The perfunctory attention to the moral aspect of human behavior evidenced in the above results appears to be inconsistent with some of the statements found in those textbooks:

1. "Psychology is definitely not value-free" (#6, p 48).
2. Regarding Kohlberg's theory, "at best only a modest relationship exists between moral reasoning and moral behavior" (#7, p. 387).
3. "The compelling case for the banality of evil is, perhaps, the hardest lesson in psychology" (#9, p. 346).
4. "Moral standards make moral societies" (#10, p. 245).

All of the textbooks agree on the definition of psychology as *the scientific study of behavior and mental processes.* On average, 0.6% of textbook space is devoted to the moral aspect of human behavior. The student of introductory psychology will draw his or her initial conclusions as to the relevance of the moral aspect of behavior based on the attention that it is given in the textbook.